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In recent work, various scholars have challenged retributive justice theorists to pay
more attention to the subjective experience of punishment, specifically how punishment
affects the experiences and well-being of offenders. The claim developed by these
“subjectivists” is that because people’s experiences with pain and suffering differ, both
diachronically and inter-subjectively, their punishments will have to be tailored to
individual circumstances as well.
Our response is that this set of claims, once scrutinized, is either true, but of limited
significance, or nontrivial, but unsound. We don’t doubt the possibility that different
people will react differently to the same infliction of punishment. It seems foolish to
deny that they will (although such claims can be exaggerated). What we deny, in the
main, is that this variance in the experience of punishment is critically relevant to the
shape and justification of legal institutions meting out retributive punishment within a
liberal democracy.
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BENTHAM ON STILTS: THE BARE RELEVANCE OF SUBJECTIVITY TO
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

DAN MARKEL ∗ AND CHAD FLANDERS †

INTRODUCTION
Despite a genealogy extending back centuries, scholarship on the
relationship between law and “happiness” seems all the rage today among legal
academics. 1 Not content to simply encroach upon the domain of tort law, 2
Copyright © 2010 Dan Markel and Chad Flanders. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is
a California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
∗ D’Alemberte Professor, Florida State University College of Law; A.B., Harvard
University; M.Phil., University of Cambridge; J.D., Harvard Law School.
† Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D.
(Philosophy), University of Chicago. We are grateful to the following people for comments and
conversations on this project: Wendi Adelson, Bill Araiza, David Ball, Shawn Bayern, Mitch
Berman, Stephanos Bibas, Don Braman, Curtis Bridgeman, John Bronsteen, Chris Buccafusco,
Beth Burch, Michael Cahill, Jack Chin, Dave Fagundes, Brian Galle, Adam Gershowitz, David
Gray, Alon Harel, Andy Hessick, Carissa Hessick, Paul Horwitz, Doug Husak, Dan Kahan, Rob
Kar, Adam Kolber, Erik Knutsen, Zak Kramer, Wayne Logan, Jonathan Masur, Marcia
McCormick, Harry Moren, Melissa Murray, Michael O’Hear, Mark Seidenfeld, Ken Simons,
Mark Strasser, Manuel Utset, Rob Vischer, Howard Wasserman, Melanie Wilson, and Lesley
Wexler; and the faculty participants at workshops at Law and Society (2009); Florida State;
McGeorge; Michigan State; and UNC-Chapel Hill. We also wish to thank Tiffany Roddenberry
and Will Ourand for excellent editorial and research assistance. Comments may be sent to:
markel@post.harvard.edu.
1. E.g., Symposium, Legal Implications of the New Research on Happiness, 37 J. Legal
Stud. 1 (2008) (including contributions from, among others, Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, Matthew
Adler, and Martha Nussbaum). Some scholars have registered their concerns with the claims made
by those who endorse extending the findings of the psychological literature to the design of legal
policies and institutions. E.g., Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New
Science of Happiness, 85 Ind. L.J. 553, 570–71 (2010) (questioning the strength of adaptation to
injury and return to well-being); Martha C. Nussbaum, Who Is the Happy Warrior? Philosophy
Poses Questions to Psychology, 37 J. Legal Stud. 581 (2008) (defending an objective conception
of happiness and criticizing subjective, psychological accounts). But other scholars advance a
subjective stance towards happiness—that is, it is a psychological state of (very roughly speaking)
“pleasure.” The subjectivists we review in this article largely do so as well. This is in fact a
controversial understanding of happiness, to which Nussbaum offers a valuable and bracing
corrective. Nonetheless, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, as well as
Adam Kolber—our targets in much of this Article—have recently come out with more sweeping
defenses of the importance of subjective well-being in the law. See John Bronsteen, Christopher
Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 Geo. L.J. 1583 (2010); Adam Kolber,
The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 Emory L.J. (forthcoming 2011) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1488444.
2. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, 1519 (2008); Samuel
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which has traditionally selected remedies designed to make someone injured
“whole” again, some scholars recently have begun charting the implications of
these “happiness” studies for the criminal justice system—in particular for
punishment theory. 3
Indeed, in the last two years, a number of legal academics have challenged
retributive justice theorists to pay more attention to what they call “the
subjective experience” of punishment: how punishment affects the particular
experiences and well-being of offenders. Some of these scholars argue that an
important aspect of this experiential approach also requires a close look at the
offenders’ baseline conditions (that is, their well-being prior to punishment)
and their psychological capacities for adaptation. 4 Their work seems to
emphasize that because punishment either is or frequently involves suffering of
some sort, we must pay attention to the different experiences people will have
with suffering.
Thus, the general claim made by these scholars, whom we call
“subjectivists,” is that retributive accounts of punishment must pay greater heed
to variation in the subjective individual experience of punishment. 5 Their
specific and stronger claim (made either explicitly or implicitly in their work) is
that institutions of criminal justice ought to calibrate punishments to the ex post
idiosyncratic tastes, capacities, and experiences of offenders. A failure to do so,
the subjectivists argue, is at odds with retributive ideals because a key aspect of
retributive theory emphasizes proportionality and this variance in the
experience of suffering challenges the administration of proportionality in
sentencing. 6
This focus on subjective experience in punishment has old and indeed
venerable roots in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, a debt which some of the
subjectivists openly acknowledge. 7 By saying that they are giving us “Bentham

R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60
Vand. L. Rev. 745 (2007).
3.
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur [hereinafter BBM],
Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1037 (2009). Related to the relationship between
happiness and punishment is the overall significance of changes in the hedonic levels of offenders
relative to their baselines, experiences, and preferences. These issues are similarly taken up in
recent scholarship. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 Colum. L.
Rev. 182 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Subjective Experience]; Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative
Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1565 (2009) [hereinafter Kolber, Comparative Nature];
Shawn J. Bayern, The Significance of Private Burdens and Lost Benefits for a Fair-play Analysis
of Punishment, 12 New Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2009).
4. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 3.
5. In this respect, we are not engaged in a different dispute in criminal law theory
concerning the objective or subjective prerequisites for criminal liability: whether wrongfulness is
judged by what the facts are (objective) or what the defendant believes them to be (subjective).
6. See infra note 29 and accompanying text in Part I.
7. See, e.g., BBM, supra note 1, at 1590 (explaining that the account of “well-being as
moment-by-moment affect evokes the account of welfare contained within the utilitarian theories
of Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer”); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3 at 184 & n.1;
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on stilts,” we aim in part to highlight this debt; whether they are merely
propping up flawed Benthamite arguments in the name of retributivism or
making them stronger is left for the reader to decide. Indeed, several of the
subjectivists have suggested their arguments are relevant to rethinking standard
utilitarian approaches to punishment, an updating that would no doubt win
Bentham’s approval. 8 But for purposes of exploiting our comparative
advantages, we focus our discussion on their challenges to retributivist
accounts of punishment. 9
Our response to that subjectivist challenge can be stated succinctly:
“subjectivity”—with its apparent concomitant requirement of ex post,
individualized, and dynamic tailoring of punishment to offenders—does matter
to some extent to retributivism, but much less so than the subjectivists claim it
should. It would be foolish to deny that persons experience punishment
differently. However, what we deny, in the main, is that this variance in the
experience of punishment is critically relevant to the shape and justification of
retributive punishment within a liberal democracy. Consequently, we argue that
these claims are, from a policy perspective, either true but of minor significance
(since most retributivists will agree with them), or else nontrivial but unsound.
A lot depends, of course, on how one defines and clarifies the meanings of
“subjectivity.”

see also infra n.42; Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, supra note 1, (manuscript at 5)
(citing Bentham on the importance of subjective experience while noting that Bentham “may have
oversimplified our experiential palate”).
8. Utilitarians conventionally view punishment as a necessary evil only to be applied if it
will serve to advance (or maximize) social welfare going forward. The primary concern of
utilitarians as applied to punishment is reducing future crime through penal responses that yield
deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Cases and Materials on
Criminal Law 34–38 (5th ed. 2009) (describing utilitarian justifications for punishment). Recently,
however, some utilitarians have focused on crime reduction through building compliance
predicated on legitimacy-enhancing strategies that focus on gaining trust and support from the
community, which often involves consistency with lay intuitions of moral desert. See, e.g., Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997). By contrast,
what makes an approach to punishment distinctively retributivist in orientation (at least in the
legal realm) is its commitment to the view that punishment for legal wrongdoing is “internally
intelligible” or intrinsically good and does not rely on the achievement of external benefits in
crime reduction in order to justify pursuit of that intrinsic good. Some might prefer thinking of the
pursuit of retributive justice as demanded by obligations to pursue the “right” rather than the
warrant to pursue the “intrinsically good.” We think there are problems with such a view but we
will leave them unarticulated since, for our purposes, they are outside the scope of this paper. See
infra note 19 & Part II. We will use the terms retributivist, retributive justice, and retributive as
roughly interchangeable. But see Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85
Wash. U. L. Rev. 815, 820 (2007) (offering distinctions between “retributive” theory and
“retributivist” theory that are unnecessary for our purposes here).
9. Those interested in a critique of Professor Kolber’s arguments primarily on deterrence
grounds should look at Miriam H. Baer, Response, Evaluating the Consequences of Calibrated
Sentencing: A Response to Professor Kolber, 109 Colum L. Rev. Sidebar 11, 19–20 (2009), which
contends that uncalibrated sentencing does not clearly fail to achieve the goal of deterrence.
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By our lights, we can locate a few “islands of agreement” between us and
the subjectivists regarding the significance of individualized experience. 10 First,
retributivists should care about the individual offender’s mental competence
throughout the life cycle of a crime, from commission through punishment. In
this respect, a person selected for punishment must be a fit interlocutor for the
communicative message of retributive punishment, a point that the U.S.
Supreme Court emphasized recently. 11 Accordingly, it is critical for state
officials to have a good grasp of the offender’s competence during his
punishment. After all, an offender who cannot appreciate ex post the retributive
deprivations of, say, liberty or property is likely not a good candidate for
punishment; instead, he probably requires treatment. We might even say this
competence criterion is the most basic form of subjectivity relevant for punishment. To be punished, the offender must be an autonomous agent (a
“subject”)—that is, at least capable of rationally understanding the message
directed at him via punishment. But with respect to offenders above that threshold of competence, retributivists should reasonably be relatively indifferent to
the idiosyncratic ex post preferences and varying experiences of offenders.
Second, we agree that retributivist policymakers should be sensitive to
knowledge of human psychology and social norms when crafting laws and
setting sentencing policy so that coercive actions or deprivations designed to
communicate condemnation do not flout the social expectations of what
reasonably counts as appropriate punishment, either as a floor or as a ceiling for
that offense. For example, it would be a mistake for retributive institutions to
throw ticker-tape parades to communicate condemnation to the offender or
express condemnation to the public. 12 A retributive response must be
convincingly viewable as a coercive condemnatory action by the polity and its
citizens under prevailing social norms; a ticker-tape parade does not qualify as
such a condemnatory action. A punishment also cannot be excessive or cruel;
this would flout moral expectations in the other direction. 13 Nor, relatedly, can
individuals (including both citizens and officials) take it upon themselves to
impose in the name of punishment hardships beyond what the polity has
authorized.
But these observations are largely unobjectionable, if not quite banal,
within the realm of retributive justice theories. Consequently, our

10. We owe the “islands of agreement” metaphor to Gabriella Blum. Gabriella Blum,
Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries (2007).
11. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958–59 (2007); Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eight Amendment, 103 Nw. L. Rev. 1163 (2009)
[hereinafter Markel, Executing Retributivism].
12. See Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in Retributivism and Its
Critics 1, 15 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992).
13. A concern for cruelty would also, under our configuration, encompass a concern for the
objective medical condition of the offender such that the state could not exhibit indifference to
serious medical needs of offenders.
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“concessions” to the importance of subjectivity are minor and provide little
basis for debate. Indeed, neither concession requires much tailoring of punishment to the particular experiences and capacities of each offender. We merely
point out that for each offense there will be floors (punishment that is too tame
to convey condemnation) and ceilings (punishment that is too harsh or excessive, including any punishment for the mentally incompetent), and that there
must be some mechanism to ensure that the floors and ceilings do not crumble.
Beyond this, we find little to agree with in the work of the subjectivists,
conceptually interesting though it may be (especially to the heirs of Bentham).
A key point of our disagreement is the common and, for the most part,
apparently unreflective conflation of punishment with suffering. 14 Punishment
involves the causing of (physical) pain or suffering, say the subjectivists, and
because individuals’ emotional reactive sensibilities differ, so too should
society’s punishments. This assumption that retributivism involves exchanging
or matching pain for pain—that is, the pain the offenders caused (or threatened)
by their criminal actions should be balanced by the pain they will experience
via punishment—may be true of some, mostly antiquarian versions of
retributivism, but not of the best versions, and not, as we will explain, of ours. 15
If retributive punishment is not about matching pain for pain but rather serves
as an attempt to communicate to the offender society’s condemnation by means
of a deprivation of an objective good such as liberty, then the idiosyncratic
experience of the offender will hardly matter—if at all. To be sure, some
retributivists (or their critics) may have also equated punishment with
suffering. 16 But we view this equation as mistaken in the sense that attempts to
justify punishment to cause suffering cannot work as persuasive justifications
for state punishment.
Moreover, we think the claims of subjectivists vis-à-vis sentencing
particularism misrepresent the animating and distinctive values of retributive

14. In a related and powerful paper, Professor David Gray drills down on this equivocation
between punishment and suffering, and notes, among other things, how prominent retributivists
have long rejected the suggestion that experiential results from punishment are material to the
justification and amount of punishment inflicted. See David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 64
Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1573600.
15. Indeed, Kolber might be willing to concede this, though it seems to us at some cost.
Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 203 (noting that objective theories of retribution,
even if they are able to discount subjective experience, would be “unattractive” for other reasons).
16. The equation of punishment with suffering can perhaps be better understood as the
attempt to justify punishment as a means to cause offenders to suffer. For some sophisticated
discussion of this point, see Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in Philosophical
Foundations of Criminal Law (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds.) (forthcoming 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1592546. For what it's worth, we do not mean
to say that those persons who identify as retributivists and who equate punishment with suffering
are not really retributivists, and that they are somehow prohibited from using the concept. But we
do believe that their conception of retributivism is an inferior one, for the reasons we go on to
explore in this Article.
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justice, particularly its commitments to equality and, relatedly, proportionality.
As we will show, the focus of the subjectivists’ critiques is off-target. It is not
retributive (or utilitarian) justifications for punishment institutions that are the
object of the subjectivist ire. Rather, their focus hinges on the difficulties of
implementing the principle of proportionality in sentencing. That is worth
noting because proportionality is a principle that is not only contested but also
largely “expressively overdetermined;” 17 that is, proportionality is a guidepost
to action that people from a wide number of viewpoints or dispositions have
come to agree upon despite disagreements over why that principle is or should
be operative. 18
Thus, while the subjectivists might have something interesting or important to say about sentencing and proportionality, it is less clear that their
message is relevant to the core claim that many if not all contemporary
retributivists defend: institutions of criminal justice have a prima facie
justification because of the internal intelligibility of retributive punishment for
offenses defined and enforced by the legal order of a liberal democracy. 19 As
17. The term “expressive overdetermination” was first used, so far as we know, by Dan
Kahan. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 Tex. L. Rev.
2075, 2085 (2006) (“A law or policy can be said to be expressively overdetermined when it bears
meanings sufficiently rich in nature and large in number to enable diverse cultural groups to find
simultaneously affirmation of their values within it.”). The idea is similar to an incompletely
theorized agreement in that it is thought of as a strategy to facilitate harmony among plural
worldviews but it is different in that the latter tries to avoid “going deep” or appealing to thick
cultural values. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L.
Rev. 1733 (1995).
18. Compare, for example, the various discussions of proportionality appearing in the
following articles: Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the
Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 571, 588–98 (2005)
(explaining how proportionality of government action can be understood in reference to fault,
costs and benefits, and available alternative measures); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as
Principle of Limited Government, 55 Duke L.J. 263, 314–30 (2005) (defending proportionality as
a consideration of “limited government”); Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia:
Philosophy, Proportionality and the Eighth Amendment, 55 Vill. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010)
(claiming that proportionality is not intrinsic to any one theory of punishment); see also Hugo
Adam Bedau, An Abolitionist’s Survey of the Death Penalty in America Today, in Debating the
Death Penalty 15, 34 (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004) (discussing the principle of
Minimum Invasion, which states that “[s]ociet[ies] ought to abolish any lawful practice that
imposes more violation of individual liberty, privacy, or autonomy [than necessary] . . . when it is
known that a less invasive practice is available and is sufficient” to satisfy the objective).
19. By “internal intelligibility,” in this context, we mean simply that the intrinsic goods of
retribution are independent from the goods of crime reduction or civil peace. The idea is that such
goods can be realized through punishment and understood as reasons for action even if they are
not “all things considered” reasons for action. See also Mitchell Berman, Punishment and
Justification, 118 Ethics 258, 278–84 (2008) (explaining how retributive justifications for
punishment can be understood as “tailored” to respond to particular doubts about the practice of
punishment as opposed to “all-things-considered” justifications of punishment). Specifically, the
nature of the reason for action in the retribution context is that punishing offenders for their
offenses makes sense as a way to communicate and express our fidelity to the ideals elaborated in
Part II, where we discuss equal liberty under law, moral accountability, and democratic selfdefense. For further discussion of the internal intelligibility of punishment, see infra Part II.B.2.
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we put it later, retributivism is a theory primarily about the justification of
punishment, and as such, will have little of substantive interest or precision to
say directly about questions of proportionality in sentencing. 20
If it is true that retributivism’s force can be appreciated in largely nonsubjectivist terms, then the allegation that retributivists ignore or overlook the
subjective side of punishment is of comparatively little significance. In other
words, retributivists need not lose sleep over the apparent problem that penal
institutions do not calibrate punishment to the idiosyncratic tastes and
experiences of offenders.
Furthermore, although it is relatively easy to explain why retributivists
need not take subjectivism too seriously, we try to answer the slightly harder
question of why retributivists must reject subjectivism (and sentencing
particularism). 21 Consequently, the Article defends the claim that retributivists,
enmeshed in and endorsing a liberal democratic culture committed to rule-oflaw values, should not embrace a radically individualized sentencing structure.
Indeed, thoroughgoing subjectivism would support results contrary to the
values undergirding not only the institutions of retributive justice, but also the
institutions of distributive justice.
In sum, to the extent that the subjectivist critique reaches beyond the
islands of agreement mentioned above, we think the specific claim regarding
narrow tailoring of punishment for offenders warrants even more skepticism.
Accordingly, one might fruitfully consider this Article as both a brief against
the subjectivists based on our own understanding of retribution, and at the same
time an effort to clarify what the best institutional theory of retributive justice
should look like. If the result of the subjectivist challenge is to increase clarity
about retributivism’s best aims, then perhaps it will have been a salutary
corrective. But it is, at most, only this. We believe that the better understanding
of retributive justice rightly discounts the significance of subjective
experience. 22
The Article unfolds in four parts. We begin in Part I by describing the
recent subjectivist critique. While many scholars have argued that legal
institutions should adjust the level of punishment based on various features of
subjective experiences, 23 we have chosen to examine three recent and
20. We don’t focus our effort here on spelling out the right relationship between retributive
justice and proportionality, but we elaborate our views on this issue in Parts II and IV.
21. We are not alone in these views. Professor Simons has written a short and sharp
response to Kolber. Kenneth W. Simons, Response, Retributivists Need Not and Should Not
Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 1 (2009). While we
share some of Professor Simons’ views, we add our own independent and elaborated arguments
here. See also Gray, supra note 14.
22. Notwithstanding our disagreements on other matters, we do share Professors Kolber
and Simons’ concerns that sentencing calibration based on subjective experience might be
occurring in an opaque manner and without sufficient democratic deliberation about the practice.
23. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn L. Rev. 1421, 1428 n.22 (2004)
(identifying other scholars, like Kathleen Dean Moore, who argue for special treatment based on
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distinctive iterations of this theme by Professors Adam Kolber, Shawn Bayern,
and John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur (“BBM”). 24
In Part II, we furnish an overview of our favored conception of retributive
justice, the Confrontational Conception of Retribution (“CCR”). 25 Once we
have this institutional and communicative conception of retributive justice in
mind, we emphasize how this conception of retributive justice can be usefully
distinguished from revenge or what we call “comprehensive” conceptions of
retribution that focus on the individual’s character and “global” moral desert.
In Part III, we draw upon that confrontational conception of retributive
justice in order to elaborate upon our agreements with the subjectivists:
ensuring that offenders are competent and that condemnatory measures are both
adequate (as a floor) and neither cruel nor excessive (as a ceiling).
Notwithstanding these islands of agreement, it is important to explain that these
areas of agreement are somewhat (though not entirely) predictable. In this
respect, the subjectivists are not really saying more than what many
contemporary retributivists have already said time and again. 26
The subjectivist arguments, however, do have some innovative appeal.
The problem is that the novel aspects of the arguments are unsound and deeply
troubling. Part IV lays out these disagreements and concerns, and culminates in
our set of arguments explaining the incompatibility of retributive justice,
properly understood, with sentencing calibrated to one’s hedonic
idiosyncracies. We begin by describing and responding to Kolber’s, Bayern’s,
and BBM’s attempts to anticipate criticism of their approaches. We argue that,
while the thoroughgoing subjectivist approach might be of interest to some
moral philosophers or laypersons thinking about their non-legal obligations, the
subjectivist critique loses its significance and attractiveness once the focus

the subjective experiences of offenders) [hereinafter Markel, Against Mercy].
24. See sources cited supra note 3.
25. In Part II, we draw on, amplify, and revise aspects of Markel’s earlier elaborations of
this account and its significance for other criminal justice and related issues. See, e.g., Dan
Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407 (2005) [hereinafter Markel, State,
Be Not Proud]; Markel, Executing Retributivism, supra note 11; Markel, Against Mercy, supra
note 23; Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2157 (2001) [hereinafter
Markel, Shaming Punishments]; Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 239 (2009) [hereinafter Markel,
Retributive Damages]; Dan Markel, The Justice of Amnesty? Towards a Theory of Retributivism
in Recovering States, 49 U. Toronto L.J. 389 (1999).
26. See, e.g., Markel, Executing Retributivism, supra note 11 (emphasizing significance of
competence of offender as predicate for retributive punishment); see also Pamela A. Wilkins,
Competency for Execution: The Implications of a Communicative Model of Retribution, 76 Tenn.
L. Rev. 713 (2009) (same); Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 372 (1981) (same).
To clarify, we do not mean to deny that there is much that is novel and nontrivial in the
subjectivists. Our point is that what is novel and nontrivial in what they say is, in our opinion,
false or unpersuasive.
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moves from personal or theological ethics to the design of legal institutions for
liberal democracies.
Second, as intimated above, we think the subjectivist critique has much
less to do with retributivism than with the challenges of remaining faithful to
proportionality in sentencing. This does not mean that retributivists can simply
slough off the challenge, but it does suggest that the challenge is different—
broader in the number of people it affects, narrower in its focus—than currently
conceived.
Furthermore, we explain the dangers that thoroughgoing subjectivism
poses to core retributivist commitments respecting autonomy, equality, and
dignity. We argue that focusing on subjective experiences wrongly fixates on
people’s status as feeling beings, rather than as choosing or autonomous agents.
Moreover, by emphasizing the different ways we may experience the same
event, the subjectivists downplay the palpable equality that our society values
and provides: the equality in the free choice made by criminals who commit the
same crimes, and the equality in the shared punishment (and condemnation)
that they ought to face. 27 In examining the equality issue carefully, we note the
similarities these subjectivist critiques have with earlier debates regarding the
relevance of subjective tastes and preferences to theories of distributive justice.
Insofar as those subjective welfarist accounts proved embarrassing in
distributive justice discussions, they are even more so in the context of criminal
justice, and will likely only exacerbate existing racial and economic disparities
in the criminal justice system. We then point out that by situating punishment
as a matter of subjective experience, subjectivism risks denying offenders’
dignity by emphasizing, to a potentially dangerous extent, how much and how
precisely each offender should suffer, thus implicating the state in an enterprise
dangerously approaching sadism. We close by responding to one final
challenge that may be launched particularly at communicative accounts of
punishment, like the CCR. Our conclusion briefly draws some lessons from this
inquiry for the practical reform of our institutions of punishment.
I
THE SUBJECTIVIST CHALLENGE: AN OVERVIEW
In this Part, we detail the character of the recent subjectivist critiques of
retributive theories of punishment. As noted in the Introduction, various
scholars have recently challenged retributive justice theorists to pay more
attention to the subjective experience of punishment, specifically how

27. In this regard we note the pickle the subjectivists are in: they have little principled
reason to forbear from adopting an idiosyncratic suffering approach when deciding what conduct
triggers criminal liability altogether. It would seem that citizens who have an easier time with
compliance to the law would presumably be given less leeway and harsher punishment than those
who suffer more by virtue of their compliance. See also infra note 240.
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punishment affects the ex post experiences and well-being of offenders. 28 The
claim developed by these subjectivists is that retributive theorists desire to
impose physical or psychological harm or suffering on offenders, and because
offenders’ experiences with pain differ, both intertemporally and
intersubjectively, 29 their punishments should accordingly differ as well in order
to achieve a proportionate amount of pain and suffering. The most elaborate
discussion of this view appears in two recent articles by Professor Adam
Kolber, but other scholars have also committed themselves to these views with
varying degrees and styles of emphasis. We first describe the views of
Professor Kolber, then of Professor Bayern, and finally of Professors
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur.
A. Kolber: The Inter-Subjective and Diachronic Critiques
Professor Kolber has recently advanced two claims: first, retributivists
must care about the subjective experience of punishment, 30 and second,
retributivists must care about the comparative nature of punishment. 31 While
conceptually distinct, commitments to analyzing both subjectivity and changes
from one’s baseline conditions entail a policy of tailoring punishment
experiences to an individual’s particular background, tastes, and experiences.
Kolber’s claims are provocative and important for two reasons. First,
while most arguments over whether an individual’s subjective experience
matters vis-à-vis governmental policy have historically involved questions of
distributive justice, 32 Kolber says that the subjectivity issue also impinges on
questions of punishment, and specifically, questions of retributive justice.
The second reason requires some context. Kolber’s general approach to
the topic of punishment bears a large (acknowledged) debt to Bentham, one of
the forbears of utilitarian penology. For example, Kolber restates the
Benthamite observation that in order to deter offenders it is necessary to
understand what pain or suffering offenders actually feel when being
punished. 33 If they suffer more than what it takes to deter them and others, the

28. See generally sources cited supra note 3.
29. Kolber focuses primarily on variance across persons in his first piece on subjectivism.
See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 184–85 (arguing for calibration of punishment
based on the subjective experience of punishment). BBM, Bayern, and Kolber (in his second piece
on the subject) focus primarily on intertemporal issues associated with the same individual. See
Bayern, supra note 3, at 2–3 (focusing on problems for fair-play retributivism when considering
the time lapse between offense and punishment); BBM, supra note 3, at 1038 (arguing that the
experience of incarceration becomes easier to bear as time in prison passes, thus having little
lasting effect on prisoners’ well-being); Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1567–69
(arguing for consideration of an offender’s baseline pre-punishment condition in determining the
severity of punishment).
30. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3.
31. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3.
32. See infra Part IV.C (discussing distributive justice and equality).
33. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1594–95 & n.73 (citing Jeremy Bentham,
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punishment is too great. By the same token, if they suffer less than what it takes
to deter them and others, the punishment is too meager. This is a familiar point
to anyone who has read Bentham. But Kolber’s take, as we develop below, is
that retributivists are also committed by their own principles to take into
account prisoners’ subjective experiences of punishment. This is Kolber’s most
interesting claim—and the one with which we most take issue, as we explain
later.
1. The Subjective Experience of Punishment
Regarding the subjective experience of punishment, the introduction to
Kolber’s recent paper in the Columbia Law Review is instructive:
Suppose that Sensitive and Insensitive commit the same crime under
the same circumstances. They are both convicted and sentenced to
spend four years in identical prison facilities. In fact, their lives are
alike in all pertinent respects, except that Sensitive is tormented by
prison life and lives in a constant state of fear and distress, while
Insensitive, living under the same conditions, finds prison life merely
difficult and unpleasant. Though Sensitive and Insensitive have
sentences that are identical in name—four years of incarceration—and
the circumstances surrounding their punishments appear identical to a
casual observer, their punishment experiences are quite different in
severity. 34
Kolber argues that this practice is prima facie problematic, and any theory that
permits this practice to occur, without justification, is flawed as well. In
Kolber’s view, retributivists have wrongly endorsed this result by neglecting
the subjective aspect of punishment. 35
We can readily see why Sensitive, as his name implies, will be very
sensitive to the rough experience of prison, whereas Insensitive, also true to his
name, will not be. 36 But why should retributivists care about this experiential
difference?
According to Kolber, retributivists are committed to ensuring that
punishment is proportionate to the severity of the crime. 37 If someone suffers
more than what is proportionate to the crime because of their subjective
experience and tastes, then, according to Kolber, that excess amount of

An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 182 (Prometheus Books ed. 1988)
(1789)).
34. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 183.
35. Utilitarians have been less neglectful, but even they, in Kolber’s view, have not
sufficiently taken into account the subjective aspect of punishment. See id. at 236.
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 199. Kolber also briefly addresses the reality that many retributivists think prior
convictions may also be relevant to the proportionality analysis. Kolber, Subjective Experience,
supra note 3, at 224–25 (mentioning that dispute about whether recidivists should be punished
more disregards whether offenders “adapt” to prison after their first visit).
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suffering is disproportionate and therefore unjust from a retributive
perspective. 38 Kolber’s example of Sensitive’s experience in prison would be a
paradigmatic example.
Conversely, someone who is insensitive to the punishments imposed by
the state because of their subjective makeup, experience, or pre-punishment
baseline is at risk of inadequate—and therefore disproportionate and unjust—
retribution. Kolber illustrates this point by way of various fantastical examples,
such as truncation:
People sentenced to truncation are forced to stand upright while the
sharp end of a blade speeds horizontally toward them at a height of
precisely six feet above the ground. Those shorter than six feet merely
feel the passing breeze of a blade above their heads. Those about six
feet tall receive a very imprecise haircut. Those much above six feet
tall are decapitated. Each person sentenced to truncation receives the
same punishment in name: They are all “truncated.” Yet, in the most
important ways, truncation punishments differ in severity, and they
differ based on an arbitrary characteristic, namely the offender’s
height. 39
According to Kolber, the dominant practice of incarceration is much like
truncation because the experience of the punishment varies so much from individual to individual. 40 Consequently, Kolber contends that retributivists must
retool their policy prescriptions and endorse (at least in theory) the calibration
of punishment according to the individual experiences of each offender. 41
Given the long historical arc of retributive thought, retributivists’ inattention to
this problem would indeed be a striking omission—unless Kolber has

38. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 216 (“Inflicting such negative
experiences is a harm that requires justification. In order to meet the proportionality requirement,
retributivists must measure punishment severity in a manner that is sensitive to individuals’
experiences of punishment or else they are punishing people to an extent that exceeds
justification.”).
39. Id. at 188; see also id. at 235 (describing the punishment of “boxing”).
40. Id. at 188. For the most part, we address the subjectivists conceptually, choosing to
stipulate to their empirical claims even though one could plausibly be skeptical of such claims.
For example, perhaps people do not differ all that much in how they experience certain events.
There is a further question about whether people’s reports of suffering correspond to the suffering
they actually subjectively feel. See also infra note 75.
In any event, suppose that our subjective variances are rather significant. Would it be a
mistake for the law to assume that people—with the exception of certain outliers—are roughly the
same? Cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 191 (1961) (noting “approximate equality” between
all people); Morris, infra note 54, at 476 (supposing people to have a “rough equivalence in
strength and abilities, a capacity to be injured by each other and to make judgments that such
injury is undesirable”). Insofar as rough equality of experiences is a fiction, it may be a benign
one, because its inaccuracy only affects a very small percentage of the overall population—those
convicted and punished for their crimes. Cf. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in
Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1984) (discussing the rather low floor of
competence necessary for citizens to comply with most criminal laws).
41. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 236.
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mischaracterized what we take to be retributivism’s proper goals and
justification.
As we mentioned earlier, Kolber’s analysis owes a larger debt to the
utilitarians—and particularly Bentham—than to any version of retribution. In
Bentham’s mind, providing the greatest specific and general deterrence requires
keen attention to how punishment would affect individual offenders. In An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes a
passage that finely sums up Kolber’s descriptive point—a passage which
Kolber himself quotes:
[O]wing to the different manners and degrees in which persons under
different circumstances are affected by the same exciting cause, a
punishment which is the same in name will not always either really
produce, or even so much as appear to others to produce, in two
different persons the same degree of pain. 42
Kolber’s main innovation is to apply these Benthamite principles to
retributive punishment. Kolber’s application of subjectivity to retribution, in a
nutshell, is this: when Sensitive and Insensitive have committed the same crime
and receive the same punishment, insofar as the punishment causes Sensitive
more pain or suffering than it does for Insensitive, Sensitive’s punishment is
disproportionate and unjust, on retributivism’s own terms. Sensitive is no
longer being punished fairly because he is experiencing more hardship than
someone else punished for committing the same crime. Indeed, as Kolber
claims, insofar as we punish Sensitive more than necessary for his just
punishment, we are punishing the innocent—not in the sense that Sensitive has
not committed a crime (he has), but in the sense that, by causing him that
additional suffering, we are punishing him beyond what his guilt merits. So too,
by logic, do we punish Insensitive insufficiently and unjustly if, by dint of his
adaptation to prison, he suffers not at all—or much less than socially desired—
from his term of years. After all, under-punishment is also an injustice
according to Kant, among others. 43 Kolber’s claim is, in short, that more
punishment might be needed for some and less punishment for others in order
for them to be punished (i.e., suffer) equally.
This is a clever argument, but it is flawed. Indeed, Kolber’s critique may
not amount to much more than just “Bentham on stilts.” 44 We especially resist

42. Bentham, supra note 33, at 182; Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 184 &
n.1 (noting that Bentham “staked out a clear subjective position more than two hundred years
ago”).
43. See, for example, Kant’s views on the death penalty. Immanuel Kant, The
Metaphysical Elements of Justice 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (arguing that the death penalty
should be the penalty for each murder and that to fail to punish murder with death would be an
injustice). For a different elaboration of the concern for reducing both Type I (over-punishment)
and Type II (under-punishment) errors, see Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 25, at 265–
66.
44. Bentham is famous for, among other things, his dismissal of natural rights discourse as
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Kolber’s attempt to craft a Benthamite refashioning of retributivism since
retributivists were never thoroughgoing Benthamites who strictly endeavor to
optimize the state of affairs in which society calibrates the specific “disutils” an
offender subjectively experiences. In so doing, Benthamites otherwise
disregard the causal connections between human agency and states of affairs,
and the values implicated by such causal connections. For reasons we later
elaborate, we think Kolber has mistakenly taken Bentham’s point as an insight
that reaches deep into punishment theory.
2. The Comparative Nature of Punishment
In a more recent paper, Kolber has taken another bite at the retributivists’
apple. 45 This time, however, he tells retributivists to focus also on the
comparative nature of punishment. By this, Kolber means that “[t]o assess
punishment severity accurately . . . we must . . . examine[] an offender’s life in
prison relative to his life in his unpunished, baseline condition.”46 This
argument places the emphasis on subjectivity in a slightly different spot, but the
upshot remains the same: retributivists are bound, by their own principles, to
look at the distinct, idiosyncratic aspects of offenders.
Kolber argues that faithfulness to proportionality requires retributivists to
look at an offender’s baseline to determine the just amount of punishment. For
example, soldiers and wealthy people have different baselines with respect to
freedom and purchasing power than civilians and poor persons; to punish these
different people proportionately, the method of punishment must adequately
take into account their different baselines. 47 After all, Kolber notes, we use
baselines of this sort in tort and contract—why not also in criminal law? 48
One of Kolber’s examples illustrates the general point he tries to establish
about the comparative nature of punishment:
[I]magine a very peculiar fine that is absolute in nature. We could
punish offenders by setting their wealth to a particular level. People
punished by “wealth setting” would have the total value of their assets
reset to a certain dollar amount, say $10,000, and then they could do
with the money as they wish. The punishment would make no
reference to an offender’s assets before punishment. A billionaire who
is wealth-set would end up with $10,000, as would a person of very
modest means. Even stranger, a wealth-set person with no assets or

nothing so much as “nonsense upon stilts.” Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in ‘Nonsense
upon Stilts’: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man 53 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987). For
our use of this phrase, see supra text accompanying notes 7–8.
45. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3.
46. Id. at 1566.
47. Id. at 1567–68.
48. Id. at 1568. Kolber relies on Joel Feinberg’s work on tort law for this point. However,
as David Gray points out, Feinberg elsewhere distinguishes criminal law from tort on grounds that
the criminal law is a largely “non-comparative” enterprise. See Gray, supra note 14.
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with debt would have his wealth rise to $10,000. Clearly, the absolute
approach to punishment strikes us as bizarre. Many people would find
it unfair to punish a billionaire, a person of modest means, and a debtor
who are equally culpable by setting their assets to the same level.
If wealth-setting seems like an absurd, unjustified form of
punishment, know that we do, in fact, punish people with something
very much like wealth-setting. The reason is that wealth-setting is part
of the punishment of incarceration. For the period of incarceration, we
restrict prisoners’ rights to use personal property to just the bare
essentials. Prison officials wealth-set all inmates to more or less the
poverty level for the duration of their sentences. Inmates sentenced to
life imprisonment are permanently deprived of most of their baseline
property rights. If incarceration is to be justified, we must be able to
justify all of the burdens associated with it, including the absurdseeming, absolutist practice of wealth-setting. 49
As in his earlier paper, Kolber deploys imaginative hypothetical examples. 50
But here, too, we are not convinced. To be sure, Kolber is not entirely alone in
emphasizing the need for retributivists to tailor their punishments to the actual
experience of suffering by individuals. Besides the other subjectivists we
address in this Part, some courts, lawyers, laypersons and academics think
retributive ideals encourage or require a world where the offender should suffer
in response to his wrongdoing, 51 although the extent to which these persons
49. Id. at 1576. Note that Kolber risks overstating the way prison limits a prisoner’s
property rights. While in prison, some sticks in the bundle of property rights are removed (for
example, the ability to quietly enjoy the views of one’s parcel of Blackacre), but others remain,
such as the ability to sell or divide Blackacre or make plans to pass it to one’s heirs. The value of
those sticks might differ immensely across offenders.
50. See, e.g., id. at 1591 (“When a person, through no fault of his own, contracts a
contagious illness, he may be lawfully confined against his will for a long period of time. Suppose
that while under quarantine, he commits a crime over the internet [sic]. Because his baseline
liberty is already quite restricted, proportionalists have to severely curtail his liberties in order to
achieve a liberty deprivation that is equal to the deprivation that applies to others who commit the
same crime but who do not have unusually restricted baseline liberties.”) (footnote omitted).
51. Kolber cites, for example, Herbert Fingarette, Punishment and Suffering, 50 Proc. &
Addresses of the Am. Phil. Ass’n 499, 499 (1977) (“I would like to expound a retributivist view of
punishment—one that shows why the law must punish lawbreakers, must make them suffer, in a
way fitting to the crime.”). Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1582 n.43. He also cites
John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert 67 (1973) (“The principle that the wrongdoer deserves to
suffer seems to accord with our deepest intuitions concerning justice.”); A.M. Quinton, On
Punishment, 14 Analysis 133, 136–37 (1954) (stating that punishment is “infliction of suffering on
the guilty”); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 4–5 (1955) (describing
retributivists as embracing the view that “[i]t is morally fitting that a person who does wrong
should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing”); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at
199 n.48. Kolber notes the distinction between the focus by some on “deserved suffering” and by
others on “deserved punishment.” Id. It is important to see that the term “suffering” may be
ambiguous here. Some may be taking the word to mean that offenders should suffer (i.e., endure)
some objectively measured sanction. We are inclined charitably to read some of the philosophers
in this way. But to the extent subjectivists or others who identify as retributivists connect suffering
to physical pain or mental anguish, we believe they are focused on thing for reasons we elaborate
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actually are retributivists is disputable. In any event, to the extent that selfidentified retributivists emphasize these things, we break ranks with them and
join others 52—although we prefer to see ourselves as charitably clarifying what
retributivists should have meant all along, at least in the context of institutional
design within liberal democracies.
B. Bayern: The Private Burden and Lost Benefits Critique
Like Professor Kolber, Professor Shawn Bayern has emphasized the
variability of individual experience in two ways that also would work against
the relatively objective nature of distributing retributive punishment. 53 In a
recent article, Bayern analyzes punishment along the lines of Herbert Morris’s
venerable “fair-play” theory of retributive punishment: when someone breaks
the criminal law, that person unfairly takes advantage of the rest of the
community in that he benefits from operating outside the law while others are
burdened by operating within it. 54 By punishing that person, according to
Morris, the political community rights the balance of benefits and burdens.
Bayern maintains that this calculus of benefits and burdens should include
whether a person has already suffered, prior to her being punished. 55
Specifically, he examines two situations where the otherwise full measure of
punishment may be unjust. The first is where the offender has already suffered
a private hardship “as a result of the crime from a source other than punishment
by the state.” 56 The second scenario calls for mitigation where the offender
“does not retain any ‘benefit’ from her crime at the time punishment would be
imposed,” 57 for if she has, the full measure of the punishment may be
excessive. Bayern’s question seems to be: Hasn’t she suffered enough?
One of Bayern’s examples here is illuminating. He writes:
X commits a negligent homicide with Y, the victim’s brother, as an
later.
52. John Finnis has sounded the warning against too easily conflating punishment with the
experience of pain. See John Finnis, Retribution: Punishment’s Formative Aim, 44 Am J. Juris.
91, 97–98 (1999) (“To understand [the ‘retributive shaping point of punishment’], it is necessary
to set aside the assumption made all too casually by Nietzsche, but also by Bentham, Hart, and
countless other theorists—the assumption that the essence of punishment is the infliction of pain.
Putting punishment on the level of the sensory, sentient, and emotional is an efficient way of
blocking all understanding of its real point and operation, which is on the level of the will, that is
to say of one’s responsiveness to the intelligible goods one understands. . . . The essence of
punishments, as Aquinas clearly and often explains, is that they subject offenders to something
contrary to their wills—something contra voluntatem. This, not pain, is of the essence.”) (footnote
omitted). See also infra note 85.
53. Bayern, supra note 3, at 2.
54. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475, 478 (1968),
reprinted in Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral
Psychology 31, 33–36 (1976). See also infra note 109.
55. Bayern, supra note 3, at 2, 10.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
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eyewitness. Because Y is not the most reliable character, he fears the
police will not believe him when he reports the crime. . . . Unable to
tolerate the possibility that X may escape with his crime, Y
immediately subdues him. Being an accomplished criminal lawyer, Y
knows precisely what the penalty would be if X’s crime were
established in court. He goes to great lengths to construct a private
prison in his basement that mirrors the conditions of the public prison
in which X would have been held had he been convicted for his crime,
and he keeps X there precisely as long as the state would have done.
After the sentence expires, Y flees the jurisdiction to avoid being
punished for his vigilantism. The police capture X and, because it turns
out that he left evidence other than an eyewitness about which Y was
never aware, X is subsequently convicted of negligent homicide. 58
In other words, Bayern, like the other subjectivists, asks retributivists to
consider personal aspects of the offender’s prior experience to identify whether
the punishment imposed by the state would be redundant. In this respect, he
stands shoulder to shoulder with Kolber, whose paper on the comparative
nature of punishment demands that retributivists pay attention to “an offender’s
life in prison relative to his life in his unpunished, baseline condition.” 59
Indeed, Kolber uses a similar hypothetical example involving an abducted drug
dealer. 60 Additionally, Kolber’s extension of his position to include an
offender’s socioeconomic status in his pre-offense baseline is consistent with
Bayern’s belief that the state, in deciding how much to punish the offender,
should look at the particularity of the offender’s situation vis-à-vis lost benefits
or private burdens.
It is possible, however, that Professor Bayern might resist being grouped
with Kolber or other subjectivists. Bayern could plausibly argue, for example,
that his appeal for sentencing adjustments based on an offender’s experience of
lost benefits or private burdens could be determined in relatively objective
terms—for example, did this offender experience a privately imposed false
imprisonment for four years, or did this offender lose the material benefit of his
crime shortly after it was committed? In such scenarios, Bayern’s analysis
would not require a presumptive reference to an individual offender’s
58. Id. at 11.
59. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1566.
60. Id. at 1587 (“Consider an extreme case: A drug dealer is abducted by a rival gang. The
drug dealer is then held against his will in a walk-in closet for a year. During this time, the drug
dealer obviously lives in a state of severely restricted freedom. Suppose that police eventually find
the drug dealer, remove him from his rivals’ hideout, and take him into custody. The drug dealer
is subsequently tried and convicted for his prior drug trafficking crimes.”). For a less extreme
example taken from the headlines, see Douglas A. Berman, You Be the Judge: What Sentence
Would You Give to Gilbert Arenas Following His Plea?, Sentencing Law & Policy (Jan. 16,
2010),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2010/01/you-be-the-judgewhat-sentence-would-you-give-to-gilbert-arenas-following-his-plea.html (asking whether the
sentencing outcome for [basketball player Gilbert] Arenas should turn on the fact that he is also
suffering a “multi-million dollar ‘punishment’” in the form of a fine by the NBA).
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sensitivity to suffering or his capacity to adapt to his circumstances. We think
this is a fair point.
But our main reason for identifying Bayern with the other subjectivists is
that he endorses as retributively desirable or obligatory the ex post narrow
tailoring of sentencing based on the offender’s prior lost benefits or private
burdens. 61 In this respect, Bayern and Kolber, like Professors Bronsteen,
Buccafusco, and Masur (discussed below), emphasize the relevance of an
offender’s peculiar baseline or experiences. At the same time, they express
indifference to whether the hardships the offender endures either previously or
subsequent to the punishment are authorized and imposed by the state or
privately imposed, perhaps through the result of criminal activity. Moreover, by
looking at what a person has suffered independently of the state, and how the
state should factor that independent suffering into deciding how much to
punish, Bayern shares with the other subjectivists a focus on what we might
call pre-institutional or global-desert judgments. In these respects, Bayern’s
analysis—viewing the person and his past suffering in all his particularity—is
similar, though not identical, to the others who emphasize that the amount of
punishment imposed must be calibrated to the particular sensitivities,
experiences, and capacities of an offender.
C. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur: The Hedonic Adaptation Critique
The third subjectivist critique of retributivism we explore is in the recent
paper, Happiness and Punishment, by Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and
Masur (“BBM”). 62 Unlike the largely intuition-driven papers of Bayern and
Kolber, BBM draw upon recent empirical findings in psychology related to
hedonic adaptation, a term used to describe the phenomenon by which people
tend to maintain their level of happiness over the long term, notwithstanding
short spikes up or down that result from major life events such as winning the
lottery or becoming disabled. In other words, hedonic adaptation refers roughly
to the general tendency over time for people to revert to their mean level of
reported happiness. 63
BBM employ this research to generate claims similar to those of Kolber
and Bayern, namely, that retributivists must pay greater heed to the subjective
experiences of punishment if they are to be faithful to retributivist values. 64
61. Remember that for Bayern, the false imprisonment an offender experiences after his
crime but before his state punishment is a relevant consideration to the amount of state
punishment. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text.
62. BBM, supra note 3.
63. See generally Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WellBeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology 302 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999)
(discussing how hedonic adaptation allows people to become happier by adjusting their
sensitivities to various stimuli).
64. BBM, supra note 3, at 1069–70. As with Kolber, we do not intend to register a
substantial quarrel with the accuracy of the empirical work cited and relied on by BBM or the
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They argue that “[i]n designing a system of punishment, scholars and
policymakers need to account for the ramifications of hedonic adaptation to the
extent that penal regimes should reflect the actual experience of punishment.
This holds for both retributive and utilitarian theorists.” 65 Moreover, they
contend that retributive theorists must reflect upon “the actual experience of
punishment” because for retributivists “it is of core importance to understand
the actual amount of harm that punishment inflicts.” 66
BBM early on declare their allegiance to Kolber’s equation of punishment
and subjective suffering by stating, in the very first sentence of their article,
“When the state punishes a criminal, it inflicts suffering.” 67 They also concur
with Kolber’s assertions that “[a]ll leading theories of criminal punishment
must be concerned with the way punishment is subjectively experienced by the
offender,” 68 and that “the actual experience of negativity is central to
punishment theory.” 69 Citing Kolber on several points relevant to retributivist
thought, 70 and generally referring readers to his argument, 71 BBM attribute to
controversial assumption that one can effectively translate lessons from human psychology
associated with lottery winners and those rendered paraplegic to the context of punishment.
Rather, our aim is primarily limited to questioning the usefulness of these claims to reshaping
punishment policy in light of retributive justice values. But see infra notes 75 & 77, and supra
note 40.
65. BBM, supra note 3, at 1039.
66. Id. at 1039, 1069; see also id. at 1070 (“[I]f increasing the amount of a fine or the
length of a prison term does not increase the harm imposed on an offender to the degree expected,
then any quantum of punishment carries less retributive force than has been supposed.”); id. at
1071 (“[I]n order to deliver the deserved punishment, the state needs to be able to adjust the
amount of imposed harm . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 1072 (“Even more so than utilitarianism
and expressive theories of punishment, which place at least some importance on the severity that a
given punishment is perceived to have, pure retributivism concerns itself with the actual severity
of punishment.”) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 1037.
68. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1069 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 1039 n.4, 1068 n.148; see also id. at 1069 (“Kolber has argued that the actual
experience of negativity is central to punishment theory, and we credit his position. According to
Kolber, different individuals’ experiences of punishment must be taken into account. His
arguments to that end support our contentions as well, and we refer readers to those arguments.”)
(emphasis added). Prior to publication of this article, BBM informed us that they did not intend in
their earlier article to take a position (one way or the other) on the desirability of ex post tailoring
of sentences based on variance of individuals' capacity for hedonic adaptation. We thought the
language we have cited and quoted indicated otherwise—that they cared about “actual” variance
among offenders as much as the “typical” experience of offenders as a class. Nonetheless, if we
are wrong about conveying the intended meaning of their article, we still do not think it is a
mistake to address the issues of the relevance of hedonic adaptation at the ex post stage. One
reason for that is because we could discern no explanation offered by BBM as to why hedonic
adaptation is relevant only at the wholesale (legislative) level but not the retail level of sentencing
particular offenders. For example, it is possible that BBM believe other considerations (financial
or administrative costs associated with individualized tailoring for example) could counsel against
using hedonic adaptation at the ex post stage. Our point, however, is that, bracketing pragmatic
considerations, we could not discern a principled basis for thinking that if hedonic adaptation
mattered ex ante it would not matter ex post. Of course, even if BBM correctly reject the views or
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retributivists the desire to impose an amount of suffering that is proportionate
to the severity of the defendant’s offense. 72 To their credit, BBM, like Kolber,
consider some other views of retribution, which we address later in Part IV.A.
At the same time, their emphasis is on a version of retributivism that
emphasizes the infliction of subjectively experienced pain or mental anguish.
As a result of this emphasis on suffering, BBM argue that retributivists
have overlooked the significance of hedonic adaptation for designing
punishments. Consider, for example, the use of fines. BBM claim that people
adapt similarly well to varying losses of income, even substantial amounts. 73
Indeed, in one study cited by BBM, those who lost “at least half a standard
deviation of their annual income . . . over a period of nine years” were not
unhappier than people whose incomes remained level or increased—in fact, the
study suggested that those who lost money actually ended up happier. 74 BBM
contend that this finding, when extrapolated to fines as criminal sanctions,
creates proportionality problems for retributive programs of punishment that
seek to tie punishment severity to offense severity by increasing levels of
monetary deprivation in order to harm offenders more. 75 On their view, if all
fines, after sufficient time, trigger roughly the same difference to one’s
happiness, how can retributivists speak meaningfully of “proportionate”
financial sanctions? Indeed, if people simply adapt without ultimate
consequence to their hedonic well-being, there may not be any meaningful
financial sanction. 76
Relatedly, BBM consider the effects on an offender’s life both in and after
prison. According to BBM, people who enter prison experience an initial drop
in quality of life, but then over time their reported sense of well-being tends to
level out. Eventually the prisoners approach, without ever really quite meeting,
implications we ascribe to them, our addressing those views seems relevant and important because
we think others might nonetheless be tempted to think hedonic adaptation's variance among
offenders should matter for sentencing ex post—for example, it would seem important to Kolber
and persons sympathetic to his critique of retributivism. Finally, to the extent we were mistaken to
read BBM as caring about the significance of hedonic adaptation both ex ante and ex post, we
elaborate upon the significance of this issue (exegetical and otherwise) in a subsequent exchange
scheduled to occur later in the California Law Review. See BBM, Retribution and the Experience
of Punishment, 98 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 2010); Chad Flanders, David Gray, & Dan
Markel, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2011).
71. Id. at 1069.
72. Id. at 1068–69.
73. Id. at 1045–46.
74. Id. at 1046.
75. One might legitimately question the extrapolation of studies that show loss of income
resulting in no net loss of happiness to cases where the loss of income is the consequence of a
fine. Given the social meaning of a fine, as well as the fact that a fine is perhaps easily avoidable,
the resulting unhappiness may be greater than if you simply “lost” the money, say, because your
job was downsized or because you didn't know the stock market was going to tank.
76. Id. at 1070 (“Adaptation dulls the punitive effect of fines and incarceration, thereby
changing the calculus by which a retributive theory must assign amounts of punishment.”).
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their originally reported levels of well-being. 77 Thus, although someone may
enter prison as a Kolberian Sensitive, she may emerge as (more or less)
Insensitive. 78 Given the phenomenon of adaptation, then, the differences
between inmates may not be that great, at least to the extent that all inmates
will tend to adapt to the conditions of prison life.
BBM also raise the issue that once offenders are released from prison,
they experience a wide range of harms, such as struggles to acquire gainful
employment or maintain a semblance of normal family life. 79 To BBM,
retributivists inexcusably ignore these harms to offenders’ well-being when
analyzing how much suffering an offender must endure to match properly the
severity of their offense. Yet these are harms that offenders suffer, and for
which the state is responsible, according to BBM. Indeed, they contend, these
harms are some of the most devastating for offenders. 80
According to BBM, all of these issues together create sentencing
problems for retributivists. As with fines, it is harder to achieve proportionate
sentencing given the inferences BBM draw from the hedonic adaptation
literature—that “increasing or decreasing the amount of a fine or the length of a
stay in prison” will do little to affect “adjustments in the amount of harm felt by
the offender. Although an offender will expect a longer incarceration to
decrease her happiness far more severely than a shorter one, her expectation
will mistakenly ignore her own adaptive skills.” 81 In sum, from BBM’s
perspective, hedonic adaptation produces two effects of significance to
retributivists: “First, the workings of our adaptive capacities mute the
differences between long and short prison sentences, at least to some degree.
And second, adaptation decreases the level of harm that an offender sustains
from virtually any fine or period of incarceration . . . .” 82
77. See id. at 1048–49 (“Interviews conducted six years later revealed additional decreases
in negative affect and improvements of positive affect such that, on at least one scale, prisoners’
reports fell within the normal range.”). Of course, one can reasonably challenge the kind of wellbeing or happiness level at stake here. See Simons, supra note 21, at n.13 (distinguishing among
hedonic, desire-satisfaction, and objective list conceptions of well-being). Moreover, someone’s
reports of well-being may not be the best basis for formulating government policy. We prescind
from wading into this dispute since, for us, the well-being of offenders, or the measured decrease
in their quality of life, is not our primary focus as retributivists. See infra Part III.B.
78. See also BBM, supra note 3, at 1061 (“Having once experienced punishment (and the
attendant adaptation), the criminal might understand that she will learn to accommodate the
punishment she receives and that the initial shock of being thrown into prison or fined a large
amount will soon dissipate.”).
79. Id. at 1038 (“Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, face difficulty
finding and keeping employment, and may suffer from incurable diseases contracted during their
incarceration.”); id. at 1062–67.
80. Id. at 1049 (“Researchers have discovered that any amount of incarceration creates a
significantly higher likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health-related, economic,
and social harms with substantial negative hedonic consequences that will make adaptation
extremely difficult.”).
81. Id. at 1071–72.
82. Id. at 1070–71. Note that BBM aims this conclusion at pure retributivists, as
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BBM add an empirical richness to their explanation of the importance of
subjectivity, which is absent in Kolber’s account, 83 although BBM recognize
and acknowledge a debt to Kolber’s analytical framework. At the same time,
Kolber’s and BBM’s discussions of subjectivity have slightly different
implications. Kolber, at least in the first article, focuses on the initial subjective
capacities of offenders: Sensitive, since he has a greater sensitivity to
punishment initially, will constantly suffer more in prison than Insensitive will.
Under a regime of yielding equal objective deprivations, Sensitive will likely
suffer from punishment more than Insensitive will; this is unjust on retributivist
terms, Kolber argues. On the other hand, BBM are concerned less with starting
points than with how people adapt to prison—how prison may become more
bearable over time. Whereas Kolber is likely to conclude that Sensitive’s
experience will be much worse throughout his time of punishment than
Insensitive’s, the research BBM cites seems to indicate that Sensitive may start
out much worse than Insensitive, but he will in time adapt—in a way by
becoming more like Insensitive. Of course, Sensitive’s initial suffering suffices
to make Kolber’s point: Sensitive’s overall suffering will be worse than
Insensitive’s. But given BBM’s argument, Sensitive’s overall suffering may not
be much worse.
This difference between Kolber and BBM is minor compared to the
similarities in the way they understand retributive justice or punishment more
generally. 84 We think this understanding is largely misguided, at least with
respect to most “prevailing” contemporary accounts of retributive justice. 85
Importantly, at least as against our preferred account of retributive theory, we
view their argument as having very little bite. Accordingly, in the next Part we
explicate and defend one of these institutional accounts of retributive justice,
after which the inadequacies of these subjectivist critiques will become more

distinguished from other schools of retributivist thought.
83. To be sure, Kolber believes his argument rests on an intuitively plausible supposition—
that different people will have different responses to pain. But see supra note 40 (raising some
questions about Kolber’s assumptions).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 65–72.
85. Kolber intends to address only “prevailing” accounts of retributive theory. See Kolber,
Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 187. For what it is worth, we think Kolber’s intellectual
history of retributive theory is largely incorrect. While there have been some moral philosophers
who identify the goal of retributive theory as justifying the infliction of suffering, the leading
retributivists have not taken that path. See, e.g., Finnis, supra note 52, at 91, 97–98; see also Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in Punishment: A Philosophy and Public
Affairs Reader 112, 128 (A. John Simmons ed., 1995) (describing “punishment” as a “disruption
of the freedom to pursue the satisfaction of one’s desires” and distinguishing it from the
contingent pain or suffering subjectively felt by the offender). See also Gray, supra note 14, at 53–
60 (citing, among others, Joel Feinberg, George Fletcher, Immanuel Kant, Herbert Morris, and
Carlos Nino, all of whom reject the suggestions that punishment can be conflated with suffering,
an “equivocation” at the heart of Kolber’s and BBM’s accounts). We also give our own very brief
sketch of retributivism in Part II.B.3 (tracing evolution from accounts which emphasized causing
physical suffering to accounts which focused on liberty deprivation and communication), infra.
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apparent, at least as against this sort of justification for state punishment. In the
Parts that follow thereafter, we explain what areas of agreement and concern
we have with these subjectivist claims.
II
WHAT RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT
There are many conceptions of retributive justice. The following Part is
designed to articulate and defend a particular kind of retributive justice, one
that we call the “Confrontational Conception of Retributivism,” or the CCR.
This particular conception is political, not comprehensive, and thus is interested
in defending the claim that state punishment is, as a general matter, warranted
as a response to legal wrongdoing. Accordingly, the focus is on the legal
manifestations of punishment, particularly within a liberal democracy; it is not
concerned with justifying punishment in other spheres such as parent-child
relations. Related to this account of state punishment is that its contours should
be devised principally ex ante and that such punishment should be distributed
through actors upon whom there are checks with respect to their remaining
discretion.
A. The Confrontational Conception of Retributivism
On our view, retributive punishment is a form of humane but
condemnatory communicative state action directed at the offender. 86 Action is
communicative when directed to a designated recipient, in a way “meant to
convey thoughts done through means reasonably recognizable as serving that
end.” 87 The action is undertaken in a way the sender of the message thinks will
make sense to the recipient, and is performed in a way that the thought
conveyed can be made sense of, or effectuated, through the free will of the
recipient. 88 This communicative goal is distinct from the goals of more familiar
instrumental approaches to punishment, which include, but are not limited to,
the government’s “expression” of messages through the medium of an
offender’s punishment to an undefined public at large. 89
86. See generally R.A. Duff, Punishment, Community, and Communication (2001).
87. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1337, 1341 (2008). Greenman
calls this a “useful” but “coarse” and “overinclusive” definition. Id. We believe it is sufficient for
our (limited) purposes here.
88. Id. at 1344–45.
89. For our purposes, the term “expression” signifies that an action (including speech) may
emit certain views or attitudes but does not require that a particular member of the audience for
the action understands the basis for or purpose behind the action. The actor may intend the
expression to benefit other members of the audience or even only the actor herself. To illustrate
the expression-communication distinction, consider, for example, the following: when Mariah
calls her brother, Nathan, at home and speaks in a language Nathan can understand to tell him,
“Dad is coming home for dinner at 8 p.m. tonight,” that is a communication. When Nathan writes
an entry in his private diary, he is expressing his opinions without communicating them to anyone.
Similarly, when the Blues Brothers drive around a neighborhood with a giant speaker strapped to
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The discussion below sketches an account of this communicative
understanding, one that explains and justifies the intrinsic goodness of
retributive punishment independent of the external social ends it might serve. It
also justifies punishing mentally competent offenders for their crimes, as
opposed to treating the offenders or ignoring them in search of cheaper
measures of harm reduction. That said, for reasons we advance below, such a
view does not entail indifference to the consequences and costs of retributive
punishment. 90 Once we have explained retributive punishment as justified
communicative state action, we will demonstrate how it differs from an interest
in inflicting suffering on the offender.
While this account builds upon prior accounts of retributive justice, it also
departs from them in various ways. The point here, however, is not to trumpet
or explicate these differences or claim complete originality. Rather, we aim
first to present a sketch of retributive justice that illustrates the basis for a noninstrumental, communicative conception of punishment, and then to explain the
implications of such an account for whether or how much retributivists should
be interested in an offender’s subjective experience. Our bare claim is that
states are justified in and have positive, though not inflexibly demanding,
reasons for censuring and punishing legal wrongdoing in a manner shaped by
law. We now turn to elaborating what underlies this claim, that is, to describing
what retributive punishment seeks to communicate.
John Rawls once proffered the view that retributive justice rests on the
idea that
wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who
does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing . . . and the
severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his
act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is
morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and it is
better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him. 91
their car rooftop, broadcasting details of their upcoming show to all and sundry, that too is
expression. State punishment can communicate messages to offenders and express messages to the
public too. The message to the public may be “do not do X,” or “we are keeping our promise to
punish X.” But when punishments emit messages to the public, the messages have an unspecified
target; it is not important that one person in particular have a rational understanding of that
message. For that reason, we call those signaling goals to the public “expressive” goals instead of
“communicative” goals.
90. The polity’s pursuit of retributive justice is a prima facie obligation. Such duties cannot
be denied as obligations, but since the determination of how and when to discharge those
obligations is a prudential matter, these obligations may be set aside when other duties of justice
supersede them. Phrased differently, the obligation to create and maintain institutions of
retributive justice must be balanced against other social obligations and moral duties. For an
instructive elaboration on reconciling competing obligations, see generally Cahill, supra note 8;
Berman, supra note 19. See also infra Part II.B.2.
91. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 4–5 (1955). Rawls later changes
his focus from suffering to punishment. See id. at 10 (“[A] person is said to suffer punishment
whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal rights of a citizen on the ground that he has
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Similarly, Professor Michael Moore once summarily described retributivism as
the “view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who
receive it.” 92 Underlying this description is a sense that imposing punishment
for moral wrongdoing is a self-evidently attractive obligation. 93
The problem with this capsule characterization, however, is that the nature
of this obligation requires further explication. Imagine Jack. He has spitefully
run over Jane, his neighbor’s child. If the state seeks to punish Jack on account
of his purported moral desert, several questions arise. First, why does Jack
deserve punishment? And is that the same thing or different than deserving
suffering? Why shouldn’t Jack undergo some form of treatment that can cure or
ameliorate his antisocial condition? 94 Skeptics might also ask why one should
embrace the pursuit of retributive justice through authorized coercive
condemnatory deprivations, and not just solemn declarations of denunciation.
Even if one agrees that Jack deserves to endure some punishment in the form of
a coercive condemnatory deprivation, it does not follow that the state has a
right or a duty to punish Jack. Why is the state, rather than the victim or her
allies, adjudicating and punishing Jack? Liberal democracies must understand
what it is about Jack’s past offense that might entail the state’s prima facie right
and obligation to punish him. These issues animate the following account,
which tries to describe retributive justice as a socio-legal practice whose value
is internally intelligible when the state inflicts some level of coercion upon an
offender whose violation of an extant legal norm has had fair and reasonable
adjudication. In other words, the preconditions for this account’s attractiveness
are that the laws being vindicated are reasonable and democratically enacted,
and the adjudicative procedures are appropriately conceived and reliably
applied.
1. Holding Agents Responsible for Choosing Unlawful Actions
Retributive punishment for legal wrongdoing is justified in part because,
in treating the offender as a responsible moral agent, it communicates to him a
respect for his dignity as an autonomous moral agent. 95 When the state
adjudicates and punishes a person’s unlawful wrongdoing, it affirms his moral
agency through that process because he can express remorse, recognize his
wrongdoing, and endeavor to avoid that conduct in the future. Or, in the
violated a rule of law[.]”).
92. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in Responsibility, Character and
the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). For
Moore, moral culpability is the same as desert. Id. at 181–82.
93. See, e.g., Robert Blecker, Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves
Death?, 24 Pace L. Rev. 107, 123–24 (2003) (providing an example of retributivist intuitionism).
94. E.g., Karl Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 19 (13th ed. 2007) (discussing
scientific prevention approach to criminal activity); cf. N.B. Sen, The Wit and Wisdom of
Mahatma Gandhi 68 (1960) (“All crime is a kind of disease and should be treated as such.”).
95. Morris, supra note 54, at 46–49.
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alternative, during the adjudicative process the offender may give reasons why
the conduct was not wrongful under the circumstances. 96 The retributive
encounter of adjudication and punishment involves a cognitive process
possessing moral weight. 97 The public, through the state, conveys respect for an
offender by holding him responsible as a moral agent capable of choosing to
act unlawfully and thus in a blameworthy manner. In maintaining credible
institutions of criminal justice, the state communicates to offenders that their
unlawful actions matter to this community of shared laws, and that it will hold
them responsible for these actions. 98
Recall Jack, who maliciously killed Jane’s child. If the state, in its
ordinary course of business, knowingly did nothing to respond to Jack’s
unlawful action, its inaction here could convey two messages: first, a statement
signaling the polity’s indifference to the legal rights of its citizens; and second,
a statement of condescension by the polity toward Jack, suggesting that the
public does not take his actions seriously, even though Jack chose to commit
the wrongdoing, arguendo, without excuse or justification.
Through retributive punishment, the public holds Jack responsible for his
unlawful choices and blames him for that choice. When the state creates
credible legal institutions to advance retributive justice, it expresses certain
commitments ex ante to the public and communicates these commitments ex
post to the offender through retributive punishment. 99 In this way,
punishment—the censure manifested through coercive sanction—
communicates to offenders that they are autonomous agents capable of
responsibly choosing between lawful and unlawful actions, and that they can
and must be held responsible for the actions they choose and blamed for them.
To borrow from C.S. Lewis, retribution “plants the flag of truth within the
fortress of a rebel soul.” 100 The punishment of a competent criminal instantiates
a belief in the ideal that one is morally responsible, that is, blameworthy, for
one’s unlawful actions; importantly, to punish someone is to say that flouting
the law cannot simply be fixed by compensation or an acknowledgement of
causation alone. There is a communication of condemnation by the polity that
attaches to the punishment against an offender who is a worthy interlocutor. 101
96. See Andrew von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment
659, 666–67 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
97. Cf. Michael Moore, Placing Blame 133 (1997) (“Voluntariness of action,
accountability, intentionality, causation, justification , and excuse are the primary categories in
terms of which we judge someone as morally responsible and thus legally punishable.”).
98. See Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 Ethics 171, 176 (2007) (discussing
conditions of responsibility in context of punishment).
99. Cf. Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, 14 Phil. & Pub.
Aff. 327 (1985) (making this claim in the context of theory of punishment grounded in the right to
self-defense).
100. C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain 95 (1944).
101. Importantly, on this view, one cannot say that the obligation to respect another as a
morally responsible agent ceases as soon as a court has rendered a (correct) judgment; it must
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We noted earlier our view that retributive punishment is justified as a
communicative practice. In other words, the value of retribution lies in the
criminal’s ability to understand rationally the state’s desire to repudiate his
wrongful claim to be above the law. Imagine a perpetrator who is mentally
impaired, such that during his last dinner before execution he tells the prison
guard, “I want to save my dessert for tomorrow night.” 102 Would retributive
punishment make sense in this context? In our view, it would not. The
retribution would not be internally intelligible if the offender could not
understand the meaning of the state’s condemnatory action. Importantly,
though the offender must be able to rationally understand the communication,
he need not be persuaded by it. For example, he may proclaim his innocence
notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary. However, if he cannot
comprehend that he is being punished for his offense, then the punishment is
not retributive but merely a coercive deprivation whose condemnatory
character is lost on the offender.
Although this argument may seem similar to a justification for punishment
based on moral desert alone, it is not the same. First, moral desert may stand
outside the law. Thus, a theorist focused strictly on moral desert may oppose
punishing someone who is proven to have eaten on the subway (absent
justification or excuse) and thus in violation of a law prohibiting eating on the
subway. The account of retribution here distinguishes between moral and legal
desert in this way in that: one might oppose as a legislator criminalizing silly
things but nonetheless proceed (as a judge or corrections official) with
punishing someone who violates a democratically enacted law that is not itself
illiberal (or otherwise unconstitutional) but simply unwise. One does this out of
respect for the idea of democratic authority, about which more will be said
later.
A second way this account differs so far from traditional or familiar
notions of moral desert is that it emphasizes the significance of communication
over expression, which itself illuminates how we should think about punishing
persons across a timeline. For example, imagine that on Monday, Jack kills
Jane’s child but then on Tuesday, he bangs his head in a horrible accident,
thereby losing the capacity to understand why he would be punished. Even
though the question whether to punish him may arise on Wednesday, arguably
nothing has happened to change his moral desert, which according to some,
may have “congealed” on Monday. 103 However, what we take to be the
retributive point of punishment would be lost if he were punished on
continue throughout the retributive encounter.
102. Cf. Christopher Hitchens, Fool Me Thrice, Slate, Jan. 28, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2182938 (discussing Governor Clinton’s execution of Ricky Ray Rector).
103. See Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital
Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1030 (1996) (claiming that, from a retributivist perspective,
one only looks backward because an offender’s desert is “fully congealed at the time of the
crime”).
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Wednesday, not because he has already suffered a trauma and thus deserves
leniency, but rather because he could no longer comprehend the punishment’s
communicative significance, even if the state might still realize its expressive
goals to others. 104 In other words, the good achieved by retributive punishment
is internal to the practice of punishment itself, though the state must weigh the
pursuit of that good in all situations and contexts against the pursuit of other
goods. 105 In making these claims, however, we can still see that the point of
retributive punishment is not to achieve psychological satisfaction for victims
or their allies, nor is it to reduce private violence, or to educate the public about
norms of rightful conduct; all of these are contingent goals attainable through a
variety of means. 106
Notwithstanding the internally intelligible value of retribution’s
communicative practice, retributive punishment also performs important
coinciding expressive functions. That is, when the state creates institutions to
communicate reprobation of the offender, the existence of these institutions
signals that individuals’ actions and interests matter to the state and its citizens.
The expressive function of punishment (i.e., sending signals to the public),
however, derives its legitimacy only when the state has properly achieved its
primary communicative function to a culpable, competent offender.
Of course, in some instances one might think punishment could be
unnecessary to communicate to particular offenders the value of being held
responsible. For example, think of an offender who, immediately after
committing her misconduct, comes forward, attempts to make restitution, and
evinces her awareness of this ideal of moral accountability through her own
sincere repentance. Such a situation, where an offender has ostensibly
internalized the significance of the ideal of moral responsibility, illustrates that
the justification for state sanction needs to run deeper. As we develop next, this
is because part of the way one actually manifests her acceptance of
responsibility and repentance is through a willingness to endure punishment to
help secure the regime of equal liberty under law. 107
104. Of course, if Jack lobotomized himself intentionally after the crime, the state might
have a deterrence-based reason to punish him for his self-created condition of ill-repair
notwithstanding that the punishment would at that later point lack communicative significance. Cf.
Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory
in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1985). We treat this as an open question, however.
We are admittedly unsure to what extent concerns about making sure people aren’t able to
“escape” their punishments can trump the fact that communication with the offender was no
longer possible. This is, of course, an extreme case.
105. See supra note 19 (explaining that retributive theory might better be understood as
offering a “tailored” justification rather than an “all things considered” justification).
106. See Moore, supra note 97, at 90.
107. Kant put the point somewhat differently; he thought someone who endured
punishment for his wrong was perfecting his autonomy. See Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of
Morals 105, 107 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1785). Our claim that
even a repentant offender should experience equal punishment with a defiant but otherwise
similarly situated offender runs contrary to the views of some other punishment theorists. Cf.
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2. Effectuating Equal Liberty Under Law
Even against a quickly repentant offender, retributive punishment is
warranted to effectuate a liberal democracy’s commitment to the principle of
equal liberty under law. In a liberal democracy, punishment serves to fulfill part
of the promise of equality, because each citizen is burdened by an obligation to
obey those laws that have been reasonably crafted, enforced, and applied.
When someone flouts a legitimate law, he elects to untether himself from the
common enterprise of living together peaceably under a common law. He is not
merely flouting a particular law with which he may disagree, but rather he is
also defecting from an agreement about the basic structures of liberal
democracy that he (would have) made as a reasonable person in concert with
other reasonable people. By his act, the offender implicitly says, “I have greater
liberty than you.” He cuts himself off from the social order and elevates himself
above his fellow citizens, notwithstanding that all should enjoy equal liberty
under the rule of law in a liberal state. 108 Note that it does not matter that few
people, if given the chance, would seek to steal, rape, or murder. 109 All that
matters is that, ex ante, the offender can be seen as defecting from a legitimate
legal order to which she has good reason to give allegiance, 110 and that in
defecting she demonstrates that she has taken license to do what others are not
entitled to do. If the state establishes no institution to threaten punishment
credibly, the offender’s implicit or explicit claim to superiority over others
commands greater plausibility than it would if the state had created such an
institution. 111
By making credible its threat to impose retributive punishment, the state
makes its best reasonable efforts to reduce the plausibility of individuals’ false
claims of superiority over their specific victims, if there are any, 112 or claims of

Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Retribution Revisited, 1 Crim. L. & Phil. 5, 10 (2007)
(noting that Joel Feinberg, Jean Hampton, and Herbert Morris embraced idea of lower
punishments based on true repentance). Hampton was focused on repudiating false messages
emitted by offenders toward victims; our concern expands the focus to the false messages of
superiority emitted by the offender against the polity through a disrespect for democratic
authority.
108. See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to
Jurisprudence 124 (1990).
109. Some have expressed this concern regarding Herb Morris’s account. See, e.g.,
Murphy, supra note 107. For a discussion of how this account sidesteps the criticisms of Morris’s
“fair-play” theory of punishment, Persons and Punishment, supra note 54, see Dan Markel,
Misguidedly Merciful? A Reply to Professor Meyer (Sept. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
110. Or, at least, so we will assume for purposes of this Article.
111. A lack of at least a threatened state response would leave the offender’s claim to
superiority unchallenged, a situation that a society committed to equality should wish to avoid.
112. On the point of diminishing the plausibility of an offender’s claims to superiority, see
generally Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (Jeffrie G. Murphy
& Jean Hampton eds., 1988); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The
Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1659 (1992).
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superiority vis-à-vis the public. In other words, the state’s coercive measures
against an offender communicate society’s fidelity to the norm that all enjoy
the same package of liberties under law. 113 Moreover, these sanctions
communicate to the person most in need of hearing that message of
condemnation—the offender who violated the law. This rationale helps explain
both the notion of equal liberty under law and the subsequent personal
obligation of self-restraint.
3. Democratic Self-Defense
The two rationales we discussed so far—effectuating responsibility and
instantiating equal liberty under law—address why punishing an offender for
his unlawful action is internally intelligible. However, they do not explain why
the state should decide and implement matters of punishment. In this subsection, we examine why the state should play the central role in meting out
retributive justice.
One reason for the state’s role here has to do with the notion of
democratic self-defense. Recall from the previous sub-section how an
offender’s misconduct implicitly or explicitly serves to substantiate a claim of
superiority. That claim of superiority is not merely a claim against his victim—
indeed, for some offenses there may not even be an identifiable victim. Rather,
the claim of superiority is also against the political order of equal liberty under
law. Each time an offender commits an offense, he effectively tries to shift
where the rules of property, liability and inalienability lie, at least with respect
to him. 114 In doing so, the offender in a sense revolts against both society’s
determinations of what those primary rules are, and against the secondary or
meta-rules governing who gets to adjust the primary rules. In other words, the
offender usurps the sovereign will of the people by challenging their decisionmaking structure. 115 The misconduct, then, is not merely against the victim but
also against the people and their agent, the state, whose charter mandates the

113. See Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol’y 19, 25–26 (2003); see also Finnis, supra note 52, at 99–101. Of course, this does not
assume that in fact everyone has the same likelihood of enjoying the same liberties; clearly, tastes
and various constraints—economic, geographic, etc.—influence the patterns resulting from the
provision of equal liberty under law.
114. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1126–27 (1972) (discussing the
need for punitive sanctions to discourage the flouting of property and inalienability rules).
115. See Murphy & Coleman, supra note 108, at 116. It could be argued that violations of
all legal norms (i.e., both civil and criminal) would be sufficient to trigger the democratic selfdefense argument, making it seem that this argument proves too much in the context of a
justification for punishing violations of criminal laws. It is a plausible argument. But democratic
authorities get to decide which rules will be criminal or civil in nature. Consequently, one might
see the violation of a criminal law as a greater and more salient form of rebellion than a violation
of a rule simply establishing potential exposure to tort liability when a plaintiff brings a claim on
his own volition.
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protection of not only the persons constituting the political order, but also the
decision-making authority of the regime itself. 116
The principle of democratic self-defense is embodied in the oath that
federal officers take, which obligates them to protect the nation’s decisionmaking structure. 117 The oath illuminates the idea that these officers must
defend the Constitution against attack by those who shift the rules unlawfully,
and thus reveals offenses as, to some degree, a form of rebellion.
But one might ask: why democratic, rather than simply political, selfdefense? As mentioned earlier, this account does not purport to justify
punishment for all laws broken under all regimes. Its appeal lies in, and for now
is restricted to, trying to understand what is condemnable about breaking
reasonable laws passed fairly in liberal democracies that are generally
respectful of persons’ rights and liberties. 118 If we replace “democratic” with a
broader word, such as “political,” the principle could lend itself to justifying
punishment even for breaking laws that reinforce tyranny or oppression.
One might also wonder if the account of democratic self-defense might
seem inaccurate, even grandiose, with respect to the state of mind of most
offenders. Surely, the typical offender who commits a “smash and grab” would
deny that he is making any implicit or explicit “claim” against the victim or the
state. He might further deny that he is trying to shift the rules or usurp the will
of the democratic apparatus. Rather, he might assert that he is merely violating
the law and hoping to get away with it because he wants the money.
Consequently, there might be something implausible about imputing to
criminal conduct a greater rebellion against the state or one’s fellow citizens.
It only looks implausible, however, if retributivists are expected to justify
punishment to a person who already knows he is an offender. Such an
expectation is misplaced because it lacks impartiality and a commitment to
reasonableness. Instead, retributivist theory must explain the attractiveness of
punishment to one who is reasonably trying to secure the conditions for human
flourishing ex ante. At that point, such a person knows he will be punished only
for misconduct proscribed by law and subject to his control, but does not know
whether he will be rich or poor, an offender or a victim. 119 It would seem
116. See id. at 124.
117. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006) (setting forth the requirement that public officials swear to
support and defend the Constitution).
118. In this, we rest upon accounts of democratic authority similar to those espoused
elsewhere. See, e.g., Tom Christiano, Authority, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/authority (last updated July 2, 2004) (“To the
extent that the democratic assembly’s claim of authority is grounded in the public realization of
the principle of equal respect, the authority would run out when the democratic assembly makes
law that undermines equal respect. This establishes, at least for one conception of democratic
authority, a substantive set of limits to that authority.”).
119. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Kant’s Theory of Criminal Punishment, in Retribution, Justice,
and Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 83, 100 (Wilfrid
Sellars ed., 1979) (“The criminal himself has no complaint, because he has rationally consented to
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plausible that a person in this position would understand such misconduct as
warranting punishment because it is a rebellion against the public order. 120
Of course, prior to imposing sanctions, the state must also decide whether
such sanctions are appropriate as against a particular defendant. The modern
liberal democratic state serves to regulate and thereby to permit the pursuit of
diverse ends by citizens within a heterogeneous society. Accordingly, what
justifies the state’s involvement over some alternative private ordering
arrangement? Because private citizens rarely know who will violate their
rights—and thus cannot decide ex ante upon a dispute resolution mechanism—
the state has a strong coordinating claim to be an impartial authority in
resolving disputes among its citizens, acceptable to them as the judge over
disputes, and impartial in both imposing and enforcing sanctions against
wrongdoers. Moreover, the state also establishes, through its deliberative
bodies, the scope of one’s protected rights and interests; that also cannot be left
up to private asseveration. So, the state not only has a strong claim, but the sole
claim to be able to do these things with some degree of legitimacy in a “social
union of social unions.” 121 The state’s involvement in both the adjudication and
the sanction of wrongful misconduct is thereby warranted—so long as the
judiciary is independent and capable of reviewing abuses.
Taken together, commitments to the ideals of moral responsibility, equal
liberty under law, and democratic self-defense explain why certain individuals
should be punished and not others, and why some people (authorized officials)
and not others should do the punishing. Importantly, we can see why—without
reliance upon mere intuitions or emotions of vengeance, anger, or hatred—the
state must take care to punish only the guilty, and not the innocent. After all,
only a convicted offender has been judged to have made claims through his
criminal actions that deny his responsibility, his status as an equal under the
law, and his proper role in the chain of democratic decision making. Those
found guilty should be punished. A willful failure to punish the putatively
guilty signals that the state does not care about the offender’s misconduct, the
rights and interests justifying the breached rule, or the integrity of the
democratic decision-making structure. Such inaction wrongly conveys a lack of
concern for reducing Type II (false negative) errors of non-punishment for
or willed his own punishment. That is, those very rules which he has broken work, when they are
obeyed by others, to his own advantage as citizen. He would have chosen such rules for himself
and others in the original position of choice. . . .”).
120. Furthermore, to see the offense as a rebellion is not to say that all rebellions need be
quashed with maximum resources. We might wish to empower private citizens to address some
rebellions through tort and to empower the public to address other rebellions through criminal law
and the administrative state. Importantly, the scarcity of social resources in a society committed to
pursuing various projects of moral significance requires a principle of frugality in the use of
retributive punishment, such that the state pursues and punishes only those acts that are necessary
for securing the conditions conducive to human flourishing. See supra note 18 (discussing
Bedau’s principle of minimum invasion).
121. We borrow the phrase here. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 527 (1971).
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those laws whose underlying values we have committed to protect through
punishment. 122 And it is only the breach of those laws, and not simply generic
moral vices such as smugness or a nasty demeanor, that alone warrant
punishment under law.
Seeing the practice of punishment through a political lens helps us also
see that the framework above further explains why the innocent should not be
punished, for they have not made claims of legal superiority through their
actions, nor can they plausibly be deemed to have usurped power from the
decision-making structure, which they have good reason to obey ex ante.
Knowingly punishing the innocent presents a classic false positive, or Type I
error, within the criminal justice system.
Finally, the framework here explains why to under-punish or over-punish
relative to comparable offenders in the same jurisdiction exposes the state to
(rebuttable) claims that it favors some people and disfavors others, thereby
violating basic liberal commitments to equal concern and respect under the law,
and to consistent application of the law. One of the principal reasons we
punish, as we just saw, was to maintain the regime of equal liberty under law.
The way in which we punish must also cohere with that set of principles,
ensuring that the values of consistency and even-handedness are respected to
the greatest extent reasonably possible. And that means evidencing some
concern for ensuring the reduction of errors involving under- and overpunishment relative to comparable offenders. These errors frequently arise
from institutions permitting excessive and unreviewable discretion, rather than
making officials stay within some roughly proportionate band of sanctions for
the particular misconduct. 123 Retributive theory provides good reasons to
reduce errors both of under- and over-punishment in a liberal democracy.
Balancing the reduction of one sort of error against that of another obviously
involves difficult, even tragic, choices, but at the very least retributive theory
122. In a recent article, Alice Ristroph accuses retributivists of a “circularity” in their
argument, though it is better termed a non sequitur. Retributivists, per Ristroph, “assert that
responsible agents must be punished, and that failure to punish is failure to recognize the criminal
as a responsible agent.” Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 Calif.
L. Rev. 601, 627 (2009). Ristroph continues that we can recognize a person as a responsible agent
without punishing him. Id. at n.132 (citing Markel, Retributive Damages, supra note 25, at 260–
61). Of course this is correct and has never been denied. Our point is not that failing to punish
necessarily means failure to acknowledge as a responsible agent. Instead, we note that one way of
acknowledging someone’s legal responsibility is by holding him responsible, and one way of
holding a person legally responsible is to punish him. This does not exclude other ways of dealing
with offenders that are compatible with treating them as responsible, such as in tort cases. But at
the same time, reliance upon such alternatives might mean forsaking some important goods. So
while we are not committed to the thesis that punishment is the only way to hold someone legally
responsible, we do defend the claim that punishment realizes many goods, and that other ways of
holding an offender responsible (such as tort liability) may not realize these goods.
123. See generally Markel, Against Mercy, supra note 23. As explained there, the more
discretion over sentencing one confers on victims (or juries, or trial judges), the greater the
likelihood of creating Type I and II errors based on vindictiveness or unwarranted compassion.
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clarifies the deficiencies associated with both kinds of errors. This is a point
that has been largely lost on those courts and commentators who try to
understand retribution strictly through a victim-vindication or social
denunciation model of punishment.
4. Retributivism’s Internal Limits
Understanding retributivism as communicative action presents reasons not
only for imposing punishment, but also for limiting the availability, amount,
and kind of punishment. Obviously, the real world of retribution poses
significant risks of error and abuse by authorities. Occurrences of errors or
abuses stand at odds with the animating principles of retributive justice and the
rationales for reducing Type I and II errors. Consequently, retributive
punishment is commendable only when authorities take reasonable and
sufficient measures to reduce substantially or eliminate those risks. 124 In other
words, this means the state must conduct its rites of retribution with a degree of
modesty, and with assurances that those risks of error and abuse are tolerably
minimal. 125
Additionally, embedded in our account of retributive justice is a particular
requirement of communicative intent on the part of the state’s punishing agents.
To insist only on the offender’s perception of his defeat, to the exclusion of the
potential internalization of correct values that the confrontation encourages,
would stand in tension with our first interest—affirmation that society
recognizes its members as autonomous dignity-bearing agents. To realize this
vision in the concrete practice of punishment, the state should carry out its
denial of the offender’s false value claims in a manner conducive to fostering
the internalization of the values that the retributive encounter is meant to
uphold. 126 To be clear: the retributive punishment need not guarantee the
offender’s internalization of those values, but the state ought not to take
measures that, in the course of punishment, directly preclude the opportunity
for internalization. In other words, the state must strive for a punishment that
not only denies the offender’s false claim of superiority, but also invites his

124. As Professors Allen and Laudan demonstrate, however, an “innocentristic” social
concern eliminates only Type I errors, i.e., those false positives involving mistaken punishment.
As a matter of social policy, we have very strong reasons, on retributive and non-retributive
grounds, to be concerned with Type II error reduction—that is, reducing the false negatives
associated with failing to punish the guilty—as well. Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly
Dilemmas, 41 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 65, 81–84 (2008); cf. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1549, 1558–72 (2008) (providing a qualified defense of the “innocence movement”).
125. While invoking a principle of modesty may seem theoretically vague, it actually has
substantial policy implications. Elsewhere, for example, Markel has argued that a commitment to
modesty entails forbearing from the death penalty or shaming punishments. See Dan Markel,
State, Be Not Proud, supra note 25; Markel, Executing Retributivism, supra note 11; Markel,
Shaming Punishments, supra note 25.
126. See Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 112.
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transformation. 127 To borrow philosopher Robert Nozick’s memorable and apt
phrase, “The hope is that delivering the message will change the person so that
he will realize he did wrong, then start doing things because they are
right. . . .” 128
B. Five Key Contrasts
This concludes our primer on our favored version of retributive theory. In
the next few pages, we will further clarify and deepen what we take to be the
essential commitments of retributive theory, and in doing so, help set up our
critique of the subjectivists’ arguments. Our aim, then, is not merely to
illustrate that the subjectivists’ positions are mistaken; rather, by showing what
is misguided in the emphasis on subjectivity, we hope to show the attractions of
our own version of retributivism. Our retributivism focuses on the punishment
of the offender, and not on his suffering—that distinction is the key to
understanding our principal difference with the subjectivists. Moreover, our
focus is on the legal aspect of punishment, as opposed to its possible moral or
private meaning. 129 For us, justified retributive punishment entails a legal
institution, one that exists to enforce reasonable legal rules (fairly generated
and applied), and not to assess the moral goodness or badness of an offender in
toto. Enough by way of preface: on to the contrasts.
1. Retributivism as Distinct from Revenge
Contrary to various courts and commentators, 130 we can see how
retributive justice, especially once accounted for in its institutional form, might
usefully be contrasted with revenge—at least as an ideal type. 131 To begin with,
what induces retributive punishment is an offense against the legal order.

127. Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 25; cf. Ezekiel 33:11 (“I have no pleasure
in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.”). A similar point is
developed in R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishments 27–30, 79–82 (1986).
128. See Nozick, supra note 26, at 377.
129. Thus, we are not concerned, say, with a parent’s punishment of his or her child, or
with God’s punishment of sinners.
130. See Markel, State, Be Not Proud, supra note 25, at 410 n.13 (providing citations to
Supreme Court cases that crudely equate retributivism with revenge, the desire to make criminals
suffer, or both). See also James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity 152 (R. J. White
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873) (“[T]he feeling of hatred and the desire of vengeance . . .
are important elements of human nature which ought in such cases to be satisfied in a regular
public and legal manner.”); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 41–42 (1881)
(“If people would gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them,
the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private
retribution.”).
131. We qualify this discussion by reference to ideal types because there have often been
cultures or social norms involving revenge that fall somewhere in between. For an illuminating
and entertaining discussion of this cultural history, see William Ian Miller, Eye for an Eye (2006).
See also Chad Flanders, Retribution and Reform, 70 Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010)
(distinguishing ideal accounts of retribution from the practice of retribution).
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Therefore, where the law runs out, so must retribution. By contrast, revenge
(and perhaps also other conceptions of what we call “comprehensive”
retributivism) may address slights, injuries, insults, or nonlegal wrongs. Nozick
identified five other distinctions between retribution and revenge:
(a) retribution ends cycles of violence, but revenge fosters them; (b) retribution
limits punishment so that it is in proportion to the wrongdoing, whereas
revenge is not necessarily limited by this principle; (c) the state administers
retribution impartially, while revenge is often personal; (d) retributivists seek
equal application of the law, whereas the avenger is not attached to such a
principle; and (e) retribution is cool and unemotional, while revenge (often) has
a particular emotional tone of taking pleasure in the suffering of another. 132
There are a few other important distinctions. Retributivism, on our view,
always seeks to attach the punishment to the offender directly, because it is the
offender who makes the claims the state seeks to reject, whereas revenge may
target an offender’s relatives or allies. 133 Our account of retributivism, distinct
from revenge or some forms of comprehensive retributivism, is uninterested in
making the offender experience unvariegated suffering, that is, negative
experiences as such; 134 it instead seeks to communicate certain ideas through
the state’s power to coerce the offender. 135 Furthermore, accounts like the CCR
are interested in, and speak to, the moral autonomy and dignity of the offender,
whereas revenge may be indifferent to those qualities. This indifference
accounts for the crucial fact that certain defenses—justifications and excuses—
might limit retribution but fail to stem revenge. Finally, the CCR’s
communicative intent requirement, discussed above, requires that the
punishment not preclude the offender’s internalization of a “sense of justice”
that would allow her to demonstrate her respect for the norms of moral
responsibility, equal liberty under law, and democratic self-defense, whereas
revenge has no such requirement. Often enough, it is sufficient for an avenger
to have the target suffer or die without receiving a message of moral
reconstruction. (Obviously, this is not always true as some avengers want that
suffering to be known to the target as the result of his prior actions.) The CCR
by contrast encourages the offender to buck up and engage in moral recon132. Nozick, supra note 26, at 366–68.
133. This is not to deny that retributive punishment may result in third-party harms, nor to
suggest that revenge is always targeted at third parties close to the offender. The point is narrow:
retributive punishment does not aim to harm third parties, and in some cases, the kind of
retribution imposed should take into account innocent third-party harms. See, e.g., Dan Markel,
Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 2007 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 1147 (2007) (urging greater use of time-deferred incarceration to mitigate innocent
third-party harms).
134. As we note later, see infra Part IV, the subjectivist’s interest in suffering may make
her position more closely aligned with an interest in revenge.
135. An avenger who sees his antagonist experience suffering from some other source,
such as disease, may decline to follow through on the revenge, whereas the state’s retributive
interest would not be satisfied merely by having an offender suffer.
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struction—even if the offender were to spend the rest of his days in a prison.
The value of retributivism, on this account, is realized when the state
attempts to communicate its commitment to these ideals through the use of its
coercive power against the offender. In contrast to those who might be tempted
to view retributivism as merely an “expressive theory” reducible to its success
at projecting norms onto society, our account reveals retributivism’s intelligibility even if we focus strictly on the relationship between state and offender. 136
An important aspect of this type of retributivism is the emphasis placed on
the distinction between punishing the acts of a person and the person herself. 137
Revenge, we might think, makes no such fine distinction: it is directed not just
against a particular act done by a person, but rather against the person herself—
the person must suffer ideally through the agency of those wronged or their
allies. 138 On our view, the appropriate punishment for a person is the
appropriate punishment for the culpable act committed; the CCR does not take
that action to represent something deeper, something corrupt, about the
personhood of the offender.
Nor does the CCR necessarily aim at the rehabilitation of the offender for
society’s future and contingent benefit. The CCR limits how much the state can
punish; it cannot continue to punish an offender beyond his sentence, even if he
refuses to internalize society’s message of condemnation. But the CCR also
represents a key shift in emphasis. If our focus were on rehabilitating the
offender, or on deterring him, we might have to take into account the kind of
person he or she was in order to fix the person. If our focus is on acts, however,
the offender’s offense and adjudicated criminal history and match the
legislatively appropriate condemnatory sanction for that. We do not need to
tailor our punishments to the bad offender and the unique sensibilities he or she
might possess. That said, there might be a range of social self-defense
mechanisms the polity should undertake to a range of persons to reduce the risk
of crime, such as subsidized drug or alcohol addiction treatment or skills
training. But these programs could theoretically be made available to all

136. This notion might be enhanced for some through the thought experiment of the “secret
and fair punishments.” See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 25, at 2211–12. Cf. Moore,
supra note 97, at 90.
137. For discussions of this principle, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding From Humanity:
Disgust, Shame, and the Law 233 (2004) (“Punishments may treat the act very harshly, while still
expressing the sense that the person is worthy of regard and of ultimate reintegration into
society.”); James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide
Between Europe and America 51 (2003) (discussing Beccaria’s view that punishment should
focus on acts, not offenders); James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
2698, 2711 (2005) (reviewing Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, supra, and noting Christian and
liberal roots of person/act distinction).
138. Recent debates over the propriety of “shaming punishments” have also centered on
this distinction. With shaming sanctions, it is hard not to convey the impression that the whole
person is tainted, corrupted, and “lower,” rather than that he has just done a bad thing, which must
be condemned. See generally Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra note 25.
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persons regardless of a criminal past.
2. The CCR as Distinct from Utilitarianism
A second contrast exists, one that focuses on juxtaposing the CCR with
“thoroughgoing utilitarianism” in punishment. Thoroughgoing utilitarianism in
punishment focuses on realizing states of affairs that are theoretically
indifferent to communicating particular messages to the offender. On the
conventional and perhaps overly simplistic utilitarian account, the state
punishes a person merely to prevent him and others from committing crimes in
the future. The “pure” utilitarian will be indifferent to whether this deterrence
comes about through communicating to the offender the wrongness of his
action, through holding him responsible, or through some other means. The
goal of deterrence is compatible with treating the offender not as an
autonomous agent but rather, as Hegel contended, like a dog, which responds
to threats and incentives but not to reasons. 139 While we do not think deterrence
discourse must be crudely understood as impervious to reasons for action,
utilitarians are principally indifferent to choices among the various manners, or
causes, of harm reduction. Thus, on the utilitarian view, one could simply
administer shock treatment to competent offenders if that would better prevent
them from committing crimes in the future.
By contrast, the CCR finds its intelligibility and attractiveness through its
effectuation of certain intrinsic goods associated with the practice of
communicating condemnation to those found guilty of offenses against the
legal order: treating the offender as a responsible agent, effectuating the
offender’s equal status under a democratic legal system, and most important,
communicating to him that he has broken the law. In other words, the goods of
democratic self-defense, moral accountability, and the maintenance of equal
liberty under law are goods intrinsic and integral to the (correct and fair)
punishment of an offender; they are not goods achieved merely by means of his
punishment. To borrow Alasdair MacIntyre’s useful notion, these are goods
that are internal to the practice of punishing. 140
That said, because the CCR is less concerned with maximizing “just
deserts” above all else than it is with developing the claim for retributive
punishment’s internal intelligibility, it is better able than many prior
retributivist accounts to pay heed to the important costs and consequences of
institutions of retributive justice. 141 Furthermore, the CCR recognizes that
punishing offenders may realize many goods, 142 For one thing, there are hard
139. This may be unfair to dogs. Georg W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 71 (1821).
140. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 188–89 (2d ed., U. Notre Dame Press 1984).
141. See Cahill, supra note 8, at 834.
142. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 80–81 (Walter Kaufmann ed.,
Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Random House 1989) (1887) (discussing the
multitude of purposes punishment can serve).
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choices within the criminal justice system: how much to spend on policing, on
prisons, on the court system, and so forth; and of course more hard choices
arise between criminal justice and other moral priorities, such as health care or
national security. There are choices within the criminal justice system: how
much to spend on policing, on prisons, on the court system, and so forth; and of
course between criminal justice and other moral priorities, such as health care
or national security. No comprehensive theory of punishment will be, or should
be, ignorant of the real-world trade-offs that our democratic institutions
inevitably have to make. 143 Punishment realizes many goods—while also of
course causing some bads—but these goods (accountability, equality, etc.) are
not always the most important goods that a society will seek to ensure. In other
words, as Professor Mitch Berman has appropriately noted, the justification an
account like the CCR provides is a “tailored” justification to the “demand”
claim that punishment is an intentionally imposed sanction that requires
justification. 144 It need not and ought not be relied upon to justify the unsound
proposition that every last unit of scarce social resources must be applied to the
pursuit of retributive justice.
3. The CCR as Distinct from a Retributivism of Balancing Pain and Suffering
Third, although the CCR fits snugly within the family of retributive
theories, it has disagreements with various elders within that larger family. As
alluded to earlier, some older versions of retributive punishment directed
attention at the causing of suffering in the offender—in some cases,
emphasizing that such inflictions of suffering should follow lex talionis and
thus be equal to the pain and suffering he has caused or threatened against his
victim. 145 Those accounts, however, have often stumbled on explaining why the
offender deserves pain and suffering. 146 Hand-waving references to intuition or
“fittingness” were often the only support that the pain and suffering version of
retribution could muster. 147 Thus, relying on cultural leitmotifs dating back to
the Bible, it somehow made cosmic sense that the wicked should suffer and that
the good be made happy. 148 Even some modern retributivists, as Kolber is keen
143. This point has been trenchantly emphasized by Cahill, supra note 8, at 820.
144. Berman, supra note 19, at 278–84.
145. See sources cited supra note 51.
146. See Jacob Adler, The Urgings of Conscience: A Theory of Punishment 80 (1991)
(discounting the view that punishment’s defining characteristic is pain); see generally Ted
Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited 28 (1969) (noting objection that
merely saying punishment is fitting or deserved is not to give anything “that could count as a
reason for punishment”).
147. Cf. Berman, Punishment and Justification, supra note 19, at 270 (rehearsing the
objection that “the proposition that wrongdoers deserve to suffer on account of their blameworthy
wrongdoing is mere ipse dixit,” but concluding that “this charge does not stick”).
148. See, e.g., W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good 57–58 (1930) (“Most intuitionists
would take the view that there is a fundamental and underivative duty to reward the virtuous and
to punish the vicious.”).
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to point out, use the language of inflicting pain and suffering on offenders. 149
Regardless of intellectual genealogy, it is worth noting that “pain and
suffering” accounts of retribution made some progress in specifying the
appropriate form retribution should take. Some of them helpfully distinguished
retribution from revenge, because it would only be fitting that the offender
should suffer the same amount of pain as he inflicted, or on some views,
threatened, and no more. Even more usefully, these theories emphasized the
ways in which causing harm or suffering need not be a bad in itself; it could be
that suffering that responded to the harm offenders caused was a good that
could be justified without reference to other goods. Pain and suffering were not,
on this view, bad per se; they depended on the uses to which they were put. 150
As BBM note, this is not so for the utilitarian: suffering is a bad, and “a
significant check on the degree of punishment is the cost associated with the
punishment itself.” 151 Those who saw punishment as fitting and even good
obviously depart from this point of view.
More recent developments in retributive theory illustrated that the goal
was not to cause suffering for its own sake, but rather to communicate
condemnation to the offender, and, simultaneously, to express society’s shared
disapproval. Where the older versions obscurely referred to the fittingness of
retributive punishment, the more modern accounts of state retribution,
including the CCR, note the intrinsic goods that retributive punishment may
secure under the right conditions. In these modern versions the goal is not to
cause the offender unvariegated suffering, but to communicate to the offender
the wrongness of his action, using particular deprivations to signal that
condemnation. In other words, these versions treat the offender as an agent who
can understand the point of his punishment, not merely as a body that can
suffer pain in return for the pain he has caused or threatened. Punishment is a
good, then, not because it is fitting in some cosmic sense that pains be balanced
out between victim and offender, but because punishing the offender treats him
as an agent, equal to the other members of society, and communicates the
polity’s disapproval of his actions to him. Consistent with this reduced focus on
the offender’s suffering as the goal was a corresponding defense of objective
liberty deprivations, and not physical pain per se, as the means of
communication. 152

149. See supra note 51; see also Douglas Husak, Holistic Retributivism, 88 Calif. L. Rev.
991, 994 n.15 (2000) (“I am not confident that what wrongdoers deserve is punishment. What
wrongdoers deserve is to suffer some hardship or deprivation for their wrongdoing that may or
may not be achieved by punishment.”).
150. See the discussion in Ross, supra note 148, at 56. See also Mike Jay, The Day Pain
Died, Bos. Globe, June 7, 2009 (Ideas), at 1 (explaining the nineteenth-century view that
expressed skepticism toward the introduction of anesthesia because the experience of pain was
thought critical to a life well-lived).
151. BBM, supra note 3, at 1056.
152. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 54; A.J. Skillen, How to Say Things with Walls, 55 Phil.
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The CCR, we believe, continues in this spirit. How much someone suffers
as a result of a punishment may vary. But what retributivists ought to care
about foremost is the imposition of the punishment as a communication
directed at the offender, not the offender’s idiosyncratic and variable reaction to
the coercive condemnatory deprivation. This means that, in the aggregate, the
state should ensure that punishments are understood as condemnatory. Doing
so requires some understanding of human psychology, but it does not require
calibrating punishments to what each individual may suffer because, for
reasons elaborated in Part IV, that metric would actually be offensive to what
we take as the animating ideals of retributive justice properly understood.
4. The CCR as Political, Not Comprehensive
The fourth contrast we offer is that the CCR’s version of retributive
justice is political, not comprehensive. We mean here to invoke John Rawls’
famous distinction between a political conception and a comprehensive (or
metaphysical) conception of justice. 153 Political values, according to Rawls, are
those that are universally, or at least very widely, shared in a liberal political
culture. 154 Comprehensive values, by comparison, are those that are tied to a
“controversial” metaphysical system and therefore could not be the basis by
which the state legitimately exercises coercive power over a heterogeneous
population. 155
For example, the idea that the wicked should suffer because they are
wicked or have what Kant called “inner viciousness” is a metaphysical
conception of “divine” or “poetic” justice. 156 This is a comprehensive
conception of retributive justice that is predicated on a desert commitment that
proves to be a controversial ideal. To our mind, it doubtless could not be the
political basis of the institution of punishment, if only because so many people
might disagree with what counts as wickedness, or with the measure of
suffering, or even whether the wicked should endure suffering or therapy.
Moreover, though there is a rich philosophical literature about the nature
of moral desert and its relationship to punishment, 157 our sense is that we need
509, 521–22 (1980); Simons, supra note 21.
153. See generally John Rawls, Political Liberalism 9–15 (1993). The point here is not to
fully defend Rawls’s distinction between the political and the metaphysical or comprehensive, but
rather simply make the more modest point that CCR is not “comprehensive,” something which
may help to distinguish it from other, more metaphysically fraught versions of retributivism. This
is something we see as an advantage, but others may not.
154. See id. at 155–56.
155. See id. at 154–56.
156. E.g., Kant, supra note 43, at 102–03 (“[I]t is possible for punishment to be equal in
accordance with the strict Law of retribution only if the judge pronounces the death sentence. This
is clear because only in this way will the death sentence be pronounced on all criminals in
proportion to their inner viciousness . . . .”).
157. See, e.g., Russ Shafer-Landau, Retributivism and Desert, 81 Pac. Phil. Q. 189, 189 n.1
(2000) (providing citations to the relevant philosophical literature); Owen McLeod, Desert, in
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to look elsewhere to understand why punishment against legal wrongdoers is
justified in liberal democracies. Someone who is industrious, wise, and kind
may deserve plaudits, after all, but liberals (among others) tend not to believe
that it is the state’s responsibility to bestow those plaudits as a matter of social
programming. Conversely, one might be miserly and indolent, but one’s inner
viciousness in this regard is generally not a compelling reason for the state to
condemn that person through punishment. A person’s moral desert, whether
negative or positive, is generally insufficient by itself to motivate state action in
a liberal democracy.
Recall the values at the core of the CCR: accountability for unlawful
choices, equal liberty under the law, and commitment to protecting the
channels of democratic decision making in the impartial administration of
justice. All of these are properly political values and can be the basis of an
overlapping consensus among diverse groups of citizens of a liberal
democracy. 158 At its heart, the CCR does not rely on a controversial and
comprehensive notion of global just deserts; rather, it insists that retributive
punishment against those who offend against the liberal legal order is internally
intelligible and attractive in a prima facie sense. The state holds people
responsible through punishment for what they do, but only for those actions
that constitute offenses against reasonably enacted laws. All of this stays (much
more) on the surface, philosophically speaking, in Rawls’s useful phrase, and
avoids the metaphysical puzzles associated with linking political institutions
too closely with any controversial comprehensive notion of desert. 159
Stanford Encyclopedia of Phil., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/desert (last updated Nov 12,
2008).
158. These political values are, of course, also moral values. But they are moral values that
are thought to be implicit in the public political culture of a democracy. In this respect, we update
the familiar distinction between moral retributivism and legal retributivism so that it now signifies
the difference between political versus comprehensive forms of retributivism.
159. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
223, 230 (1985) (“[J]ustice as fairness deliberately stays on the surface, philosophically
speaking.”). Rawls is quite clear even in his earlier work that such metaphysical ideals of desert
are not the appropriate basis for exercising the coercive power of the state. John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice 273 (1971) (“There is a tendency for common sense to suppose that income and wealth,
and the good things in life generally, should be distributed according to moral desert. Justice is
happiness according to virtue. . . . Now justice as fairness rejects this conception. . . . A just
scheme . . . answers to what men are entitled to; it satisfies their legitimate expectations as
founded upon social institutions. But what they are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent
upon their intrinsic worth.”).
The account in the text, albeit brief, stands as a short summary of our position regarding the
debate between Professors Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy, among others, over the precise
character of punishment in a liberal democracy. It also points to a compromise of sorts for persons
torn between perfectionist and anti-perfectionist liberal worldviews. Agreeing with Murphy, we
see punishment as needing to have a political, and not a comprehensive, justification and shape.
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 Crim. Just. Ethics 3,
3–11 (1985). Agreeing with Hampton, we see this account as unproblematically retributive—our
emphasis remains, after all, on the core claim that punishment for legal offenses is internally
intelligible assuming that the content and application of the laws is suitably liberal and fairly
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5. Retributivism as a Theory of Justification, Not Primarily of Sentencing
There is a further distinction that is largely overlooked in the subjectivists’
descriptions and critique of retributive theories. This distinction involves their
failure to distinguish two questions, and thus their failure to ask how
retributivists might answer them separately. One question is: What might
justify the state’s creation of legal institutions of punishment? This is what we
call the “justification” question. The second question is: Once the state has
determined someone’s liability for a crime, how much and what kind of
punishment should the state mete out in response? This is the “sentencing”
question. That a retributivist theorist gives a retributive (or, specifically,
communicative) answer to the justification question does not require her to
offer a precise answer for each sentencing question. Instead, she can simply say
that the precise answer to a sentencing question should not be inconsistent with
the values underlying her answer to the justification question. Thus
retributivists may offer a range of permissible modes and amounts of
punishment without committing to one specific pre-political or moral notion of
the correct punishment for each specific offense. 160
Importantly, the punishment imposed reflects a choice of the public
exercised through the state’s democratic institutions, implemented through law,
and most reasonably done in a way that resonates with rule of law values that
facilitate the evenhanded treatment of similarly situated offenders and offenses.
That doesn’t mean there ought not be judicially enforced limits that reflect
concerns about cruelty, incompetence, or gross disproportionality, but it does
mean that the discussions about these sentencing issues should be addressed
with more modesty. Moreover, because of the concerns of error and abuse
enforced. But pace Hampton, retributivists need not be thoroughgoing perfectionists and need not
abandon their commitment to a Rawlsian-style political liberalism that emphasizes reasons for
punishment that are grounded in the state’s legal grievances against offenders who flout the
reasonable legal norms established and enforced fairly by the polity. See generally Jean Hampton,
How You Can Be Both a Liberal and a Retributivist: Comments on Legal Moralism and
Liberalism by Jeffrie Murphy, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 105 (1995).
Indeed, at least one of us would say that given the risks, costs, and consequences associated
with error and abuse in the criminal justice system, it might be permissible or desirable to promote
a greater intolerance of perfectionism within the criminal justice system while giving the state
more democratic (or perfectionist) flexibility outside the criminal justice system. By this logic,
criminal law and enforcement (including sentencing) must hew closer to the core liberal values of
individual liberty and equality under the law (e.g., not discriminating on the basis of family status
or religious affiliation) than, say, tax law or social policy, which might be used to create a civic
culture that promotes certain values (related to, for example, patriotism, volunteerism). An
illustration of this perspective can be viewed in Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib,
Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties (2009) (taking the view
that use of family status in the criminal justice system should be viewed with greater caution than
in other areas of social policy).
160.
Indeed this should help dislodge any quick sense of a natural relationship between
retributive justice and lex talionis. We are not committed at all to lex talionis but it is worth noting
how capacious even the lex talionis approach can be. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis,
34 Ariz. L. Rev. 25 (1992).
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adverted to earlier, the state should itself punish with modes of punishment that
are both consistent with the underlying values of the CCR and that reflect a
modest understanding of the state’s power, for example, by not punishing in a
way that renders impossible the state’s ability to apologize to the offender when
the offender was mistakenly punished. But a retributive perspective should give
relatively little consideration to the preferences, experiences, and capacities of
the offender vis-à-vis her punishment (regardless of hedonic adaptation skills)
because, after all, the nature of punishment is coercive. No doubt, most
offenders would choose no punishment if they could. They might alternatively
be willing to have two pinkies cut off to avoid having to spend a year in prison
away from their family. Such preferences neither necessitate that the state must
punish people by cutting off fingers nor signify that such punishments are
inherently less cruel than incarceration. The polity has to make its decisions on
how to punish based on the values and considerations the public’s
representatives deem vitally important, 161 not on the tastes, preferences, and
individual baselines of the offenders who come into the system. 162
Pure theorizing might lead to the abstract question of “what is the proper
punishment for X crime?” Proportionality is often invoked and yields the bland
assertion that the punishment should “fit” the crime. Indeed, the answer is often
indeterminate without greater context. Some might even suggest it is an empty
principle. To our mind, we should not confuse indeterminateness with
emptiness, as the concern of “emptiness” is misleading in two respects.
First, of course, retributive theory has something to say about the question
of sentencing. At the lower end of the scale for any offense, retributivists may
plainly criticize punishments that do not adequately and sufficiently
communicate and express any condemnation, such as the ticker-tape parade
example discussed earlier. Such punishments would be retributively inadequate
because they are disproportionately lenient, or not at all punitive. So too would
punishments that communicated and expressed too much condemnation in
proportion to the crime. To be sure, calibration on this end is more difficult: it
is relatively easy to understand that a parade is too little punishment to
adequately communicate societal disapproval to an offender, but how much is
too much condemnation for a given crime? Is our only benchmark that the
death penalty for parking violations is objectively disproportionate?

161. Anthony Duff makes a related point about punishment being concerned with crimes as
primarily wrongs implicating public concern: “What matters about crimes is not just their
seriousness but their character as public wrongs. What matters about punishments is not just their
severity but their character as responses to such wrongs.” R.A. Duff, Punishment,
Communication, and Community 139 (2001).
162. As we argue below in Part IV, there may not be a meaningful difference between
allowing offenders to “choose” their punishment and tailoring punishments to meet their various
subjective tastes.
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Such questions bedevil proportionality analysis both theoretically and as a
matter of constitutional praxis. 163 Moreover, it seems that adjusting
punishments on the high end is the more practical problem, given the practical
“hydraulics” of punishment: sentences, over time, tend to get longer rather than
shorter. 164 Suffice to say here that in principle, retributivism can lay out the
outer limits for punishment, both on the high and the low ends, in accordance
with its interest in properly communicating condemnation to the offender. 165
But beyond this, a retributive conception of proportionality need not have much
in the way of precision to say about the particular details of punishment’s
implementation, consistent with its greater concern with justifying the
institution of punishment within and by the liberal state. 166 That principles of
proportionality cannot give us a certain answer in every case does not mean we
can say that proportionality (or retributive justice) is never able to give answers
about what is too little or too much. But the better way to approach this
substantive question is one that squarely appeals to ideas of democratic
authority limited by liberal constraints.
Indeed, the question of whether proportionality is empty, we are tempted
to answer in a Bickelian vein: “no answer is what the wrong question
begets.” 167 In other words, the main problem in determining proportionality is
163. For some initial thoughts on the relationship between the CCR and the Eighth
Amendment; however, see Markel, Executing Retributivism, supra note 11, at 1205–21.
164. See Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 609,
631 (2006) (“Once there is a certain baseline understanding as to what is an appropriate
punishment, citizens work off that baseline and view any punishments below the baseline as
condoning the crime. Furthermore, when a particularly egregious crime occurs and citizens
believe it deserves a harsh punishment, they will again consult the baseline and demand that the
crime be punished in a way that is greater than the typical sentence. Over time the baseline
naturally creeps upward, as more people demand that a particular crime be punished more
severely than others. Eventually, the baseline gets redefined, so that the next time an egregious
crime is committed, citizens will seek a punishment that exceeds the new baseline.”); but cf.
Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 248 (2007) (“There
appears to be little other empirical work examining legislatures’ action on criminal law bills, but
these data suggest legislatures routinely decline to enact proposals that fit the stereotype of
politically irresistible proposals for expanded liability and harsher sentences.”).
165. Accordingly, banded or limiting retributivism is a possible structure for establishing
sentencing floors and ceilings with respect to punishing one person. But once we're in the business
of meting out condign punishment across persons, the legislature must protect the regime of equal
liberty under law. And to do that well, some use of structured sentencing that helps establish both
objective and comparative proportionality is important also. To be clear, we do think comparative
proportionality is normatively derivative of objective proportionality, but we are realistic enough
to see that getting agreement on objective proportionality (even banded or limiting objective
proportionality) is difficult in pluralistic democracies and so there will still have to be substantial
attention paid to the issues of comparative proportionality too—to help ensure that similarly
situated offenders are treated even-handedly by the state.
166. Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Unjustified: The Practical Irrelevance of the Justification/Excuse
Distinction, 43 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 79, 86 (2009) (speaking of defenses, “at a certain level of
specificity, the force of the theory stops dictating details, which can and must be supplied by
courts or legislatures”).
167. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
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not to figure out what the absolute “right” punishments are for each crime, but
to figure out who is in the most legitimate position to determine the sentence
based on a range of considerations. In this respect, there is a good argument
that legislatures in conjunction with accountable commissions may be better
positioned to reach these decisions than an array of individual and
unconstrained judges or parole commissions, whose untrammeled discretion
often creates risks of random, arbitrary, or discriminatory punishment choices.
So a better answer may be to determine the right institutions to fix
proportionality. As John Finnis has emphasized, punishment presents a good
example of “the need for determinatio, a process of choosing freely from a
range of reasonable options none of which is simply rationally superior to the
others.” The problem with discretion is not in how to eliminate it entirely (for in
this case it is ineliminable), but in finding out who it is in the best position to
wield it. 168 Our sense is that these kinds of challenges are more fairly and often
better worked out (subject to outer and somewhat deferential constitutional limits) through democratic authorities, a point we will return to more in Part IV.
III
ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT
In this Part, we identify the islands of agreement we have with the
subjectivists. We begin in Part III.A with an examination of the significance of
offender competence. We then turn, in Part III.B, to how the state must select
measures of punishment that adequately register with the public’s ex ante
predictions of their aversion to certain hard treatment while at the same time
avoid crossing a threshold of cruelty that violates both individuals’ and the
polity’s dignity. While we are happy to find areas of agreement with our
subjectivist colleagues, we think these matters do not implicate any need to
dramatically overhaul our systems of punishment so that each punishment is
calibrated dynamically to the evolving idiosyncratic experiences, capacities, or
baselines of offenders. Indeed, for reasons we adverted to briefly in Part II and
that we expand upon in Part IV, we think there are compelling arguments
against doing so.
A. Competence
We believe that, in order for punishment to be legitimate qua retributive
punishment, the offender must be competent throughout the crime and
punishment cycle. Initially, the offender must have been morally and
cognitively competent at the time of the crime. 169 Once the prosecution has
Bar of Politics 103 (2d ed. 1986).
168. See Flanders, supra note 131.
169. In other words, the offender had to have been in a position where he did understand
(or could have understood, based on conditions within his control) his actions and their moral
risks vis-à-vis unlawfulness.
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committed itself to accusing the offender, he must rationally understand that the
state is accusing him of a certain crime and thus stand in a position to aid in his
defense against these accusations. Finally, upon conviction, the offender must
rationally understand that he is being subjected to a coercive condemnatory
deprivation for his offense against the public. 170
In nearly all cases, the societal condemnatory stigma associated with
conviction and prison is sufficient to create awareness of condemnation, even if
the prisoner would prefer to be incarcerated. This communication of
condemnation is why the poor man in the O. Henry story discussed by Kolber
is being punished. 171 He may desire a warm bed but he does not desire (or
should not, if he is competent) the societal disapproval that comes with it. If the
criminal cannot rationally understand that the state is trying to communicate
condemnation (perhaps because he is mentally incompetent), then there are
actually strong grounds for thinking that the retributive punishment is
unwarranted, although perhaps some form of coercive treatment is warranted,
without condemnation. 172 When retributive punishment serves, at bottom, as a
communicative enterprise, it thus entails a critique of anyone applying
sanctions against those who cannot understand that they are facing sanction.
The punishment of someone who, because of a mental disability, does not
understand that he is being punished provides a real-world analogue to
Kolber’s “unknowing confinee” who is unaware that he is, in fact, in prison. 173
Because, on our view, retributive punishment involves a socio-legal
practice of coercive sanctions through which the state communicates its
condemnation of the offender’s misconduct, it is important that the offender
understand he is being condemned. If a punishment were a message of
condemnation delivered in a language the offender could not understand, the
punishment would lack any internal intelligibility because the offender literally
could not make sense of the nattering directed at him. This is not to say that for
the retribution to have internal intelligibility the offender must accept its
message; rather, he must be competent to understand both that he is being
spoken to and that the state expects him to understand what is being said or
done to him and why.
So at least with respect to post-conviction competence, we think
retributive justice institutions must consider the actual subjective experiences
of offenders. But few retributivists today would deny that proposition (or so we

170. These questions trigger matters of appropriate procedure that we leave for another
day, and that other scholars have begun to contemplate. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 26.
171. O. Henry, The Cop and the Anthem, in The Ransom of Red Chief and Other O. Henry
Stories for Boys 143 (Franklin J. Mathiews ed., 1928); Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note
3, at 205. In the story, an impoverished man positively sought out incarceration as punishment
because at least it would provide him with a warm meal and a place to stay for the night.
172. See Duff, supra note 127, at 27; Nozick, supra note 26.
173. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 204.
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think). 174 And it is certainly not a neglected point; even the Supreme Court has
paid some attention to it, most recently in the context of executing the
“presently incompetent.” 175
We emphasize, however, that this concession to the importance of ex post
subjective experience is slight. To justify imposing punishment, retributivism
requires that an offender possess enough competence to understand rationally
that he is being punished on account of adjudicated legal wrongdoing, and that
it is not just some random exercise of coercion or deprivation. Kolber
recognizes that retributivists think competence and awareness are significant. 176
But our shared recognition of a competence requirement does not extend to the
precise calibration that Kolber thinks retributivists should necessarily embrace.
Retributivism treats competence as a threshold condition for whether to
consider punishment, not as a factor governing the nature of the punishment.
B. At the Extremes: Ensuring Adequacy and Avoiding Cruelty
There are two other aspects of human experience that also merit
retributivists’ consideration. As we argue below, retributive punishment must
exhibit sensitivity to human experience by reference to, first, the legislative
choice regarding the adequacy (or floor) of punishment, and second, the cruelty
or excessiveness (or ceiling) of punishment.
1. Ensuring Adequacy
On our view, legislatures must authorize sentencing options. 177 To achieve
the goal of ensuring adequacy in punishment, legislatures have incentives to act
with an eye toward the reasonable public perception of what constitutes
adequate condemnatory treatment. There is not much in it for them to bestow
rewards instead of punishments. To be sure, awareness of hedonic adaptation or
expected subjective preference patterns of the public at large may conceivably

174. It is possible that Garvey, supra note 103, was speaking for some retributivists, but we
cannot discern from the context who, among any contemporary retributive theorists, would deny
the significance of present competence as a prerequisite for the legitimacy of retributive
punishment. Various contemporary retributive theorists recognize that in fact retributive justice is
not solely “backward-looking.” Rather, as John Finnis, and Gerard Bradley have noted, supra note
113, institutions of retributive justice play an important role in maintaining regimes of equal
liberty over time in states.
175. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 973 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Of course,
competence is not an all-or-nothing feature of people. There will be gray areas and tough cases.
But we feel it is within the competence of the legislature and the courts, as assisted by experts in
human psychology, to draw these lines—to decide who is fit for the communication punishment
provides and who is not.
176. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1596.
177. More specifically, the nature of the punishment for a particular offense should also be
determined ex ante through legislative deliberation or ratification of expert-agency decision
making. There should be opportunity for legislatures or sentencing commissions to revise
punishment levels or methods if a previously unconsidered factor is now at stake.
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inform the ex ante selection of sentencing ranges or penal techniques approved
by legislatures. But our agreement with subjectivists about the way in which
human psychology is relevant to determining what counts as an objective
condemnatory deprivation (or sanction more generally) does not require ex post
narrow tailoring of punishment to particular offenders based on their capacities,
preferences, or experiences. In other words, the state should not forbear from
punishing masochists, who might take a perverse pleasure in receiving
punishment, nor should the state worry (for competent offenders) that prison
for poor people or soldiers will somehow be less of an infringement vis-à-vis
the previous baselines of the offender, contrary to Kolber’s more recent
paper. 178 For example, legislatures are able to use imprisonment, and the
associated deprivation of certain freedoms, as a clear signal in this society that
clearly communicates disapproval. The longer that period of deprivation, the
more permissible the inference that such conduct is more egregious. If it turns
out a particular offender does not understand the punishment as something to
avoid, then perhaps the person is not competent for punishment and might
warrant a different social response. 179 In this respect, we as a society make a
permissible and legitimate assumption about projected human experience based
on social norms and social meanings.
If subjectivists limited their claims only to the anodyne observation that
criminal sentencing should consider how people as a general matter might react
to a given punishment, then we would agree—to that extent, human experience
matters, in terms of figuring out what counts as an objective condemnatory
deprivation. It would be an agreeable observation, but, to our mind, obviously
so, and no retributivist should deny that in the first instance. As we suggested
before, our social world would be unlikely to register a ticker-tape parade as the
kind of hard treatment that would adequately or effectively communicate
condemnation to the offender and express condemnation to the public of the
offender’s misconduct. But to predict that prison would signal condemnation is
a banal observation: it shows only that prison is an adequate vehicle for
communicating society’s condemnation for certain offenses; it does so because
for a period, it objectively strips offenders of certain liberties otherwise
available to non-offenders. While the state may adjust the level or duration of
condemnation based on factors such as the severity of the offense or the
offender’s criminal history, it does not follow that an individual’s idiosyncratic
reaction to or experience of punishment should be relevant.

178. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, discussed supra Part I.A.2. Recall
that, by Kolber’s logic, placing Wealthy Offender in the same size cell as Poor Offender
constitutes a harsher punishment for Wealthy than it does for Poor. See id. at 1566 (“It is the
amount by which we change offenders’ circumstances that determines the severity of their
sentences.”).
179. Of course, if the offender is not a fit interlocutor for punishment, that would not
preclude some other form of social self-defense mechanism or rehabilitative experience.
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More importantly, if the subjectivists’ claim amounted only to urging
retributivists to do nothing more than design sentences in accordance with
social norms and social meaning about what counts as punitive, they are not
telling us anything new or especially interesting. Indeed, the idea that
punishment ranges or modes should draw on generalizations informed by
human psychology would not even really be about subjectivity, which varies ex
post person to person. Rather, the claim would be about effectively matching
policy to social conventions and social meaning. After all, if people understand
that prison or fines communicate condemnation for their adjudicated offense,
then those penological tools are registering in a relatively invariant way across
competent persons.
Thus, while we agree that penal techniques must be scrutinized for their
capacity to condemn adequately and be scaled to, among other things, offense
severity, we reject the suggestion that this is somehow relevantly or
interestingly subjective in nature. In other words, attention to penal technique
does not mean the state must tailor punitive responses to each offender’s unique
psychological profile so that the “right amount” of harm, suffering, or negative
experience is endured by the offender.
Perhaps a different way to understand our position is this: the stateimposed deprivation must register ex ante and ex post as a condemnatory
measure, but if the defendant finds that as a result of or even during his
punishment he is better able to live a more virtuous or happy life, we would
still not view the retributive punishment as a failure. We do not begrudge the
joy an offender might experience from falling in love in prison or the
convenience of prison food or the time to write poetry and get in better shape.
What matters is the offender’s understanding that he is being coerced to endure
some hard sanction not otherwise imposed on innocent persons; his hedonic
outlook is, more or less, his own business.
To be sure, this does not mean the adequacy of existing punishment
cannot be debated in some contexts. Fines provide a good example. States
sometimes use fines in either static or dynamic relation to an offender’s wealth.
If they are static, the state charges, for example, $200 for each infraction. As
many have observed, the problem with a static determination is that for the
wealthy, fines, especially standing alone, appear to be no more than a luxury
tax on the prohibited activity. 180 Thus many jurisdictions around the world
employ dynamic wealth- or income-sensitive fines such as day fines, which
strip an offender of a certain number of days’ worth of income based on the
severity of the underlying offense. 181 Such sensitivity to wealth or income helps
180. Both Professor Kolber and one of his critics, Professor Simons, agree that more
gradation in fines is a desideratum. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 226;
Simons, supra note 21, at n.11.
181. Such jurisdictions are typically found in Western Europe. U.S. Dept. of Justice Bureau
of Justice Assistance, How to Use Structured Fines (Day Fines) as an Intermediate Sanction 3
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the state better achieve its commitment to making the punishment serve as a
condemnation register rather than as a luxury tax. 182 Notice, however, that even
with the use of wealth- or income-contingent fines, the state need not inquire
into the offender’s uniquely subjective utility curve regarding the value of
money. Rather, even dynamic fine setting can be based on ex ante rule-based
distributions of retributive punishment, making them objective across persons.
2. Avoiding Cruel and Excessive Punishment
A more difficult issue concerns the set of retributivist limits upon how and
how much a person can be punished ex post. We will discuss a few such limits.
Suppose first that an offender was so physically abused in prison by other
inmates that he became incapable of understanding his punishment as a
punishment. To punish him in this state would certainly be an impermissible
punishment under the version of retribution we have offered in Part II. If a
person’s mental condition—no matter if he has been convicted and tried—is
such that it prevents the realization of those goods we believe the practice of
punishment is for—holding a person accountable, communicating to him the
values of the democratic polity, etc.—then punishment of that person cannot be
justified. Indeed this point has led one of us to argue elsewhere that the death
penalty is a prohibited punishment for this reason as well: once a person is
dead, he can no longer internalize any values, thus defeating the
communicative hope underlying the retributive punishment. 183
There are also punishments that violate the dignity of the offender. CCR
adopts limitations on these punishments, partly by way of its commitment to
the dignity of the individual. 184 Indeed, we are concerned not only with the
offender’s dignity, but also our own. As Jeffrie Murphy pointedly observes in
the context of torture,
[s]ending painful voltage through a man’s testicles to which electrodes
have been attached, or boiling him in oil . . . are not human ways of
relating to another person. [The offender] could not be expected to
understand this while it goes on, have a view about it, enter into
discourse about it, or conduct any other characteristically human
(1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/156242.pdf.
182. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 377 (1807) (“The
quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines neither can, nor ought to be ascertained by any
invariable law. The value of money itself changes from a thousand causes; and, at all events, what
is ruin to one man’s fortune, may be matter of indifference to another’s.”); Ronen Perry, The Role
of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive Theory, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 177,
188 n.57 (2006) (“Imposing a $1,000 fine on a hard working proletarian may be enough as
punishment for accidentally injuring the property of another, but it will not be enough if the
injurer is a very wealthy man who will not feel the loss of $1,000.”).
183. See Markel, Executing Retributivism, supra note 11, at 1206–12; Markel, State, Be
Not Proud, supra note 25, at 460–62.
184. Markel, State, Be Not Proud, supra note 25, at 464–68. We recognize that one might
value dignity of persons independent of one’s retributive commitments.

MarkelFlandersBOS Final wth abstract and toc (Do Not Delete)

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1/22/2011 9:59 PM

[Vol. 98:907

activities during the process—a process whose very point is to reduce
him to a terrified, defecating, urinating, screaming animal. 185
Using punishments like torture that reduce a person to “a terrified, defecating,
urinating, screaming animal” eliminates the possibility that punishment will
comport with the respect for dignity qua autonomous personhood that
animates—at least in part—retributive punishment. Thus, we believe that
subjective experience matters in that individual “breaking points” might vary;
the point of punishment is not, we think, to break a person. To literally or
psychologically break or destroy a person under the aegis of retributive punishment would violate the offender’s dignity, and, in a democracy, our own. 186
To say that institutions must be mindful of the variance associated with
“breaking” individuals is a concession to subjectivity, but a minor one. That is
because the concern for breaking a person operates as a limit on what the state
may do, but this emphasis is different from one that focuses on what the
offender may or must suffer. By contrast, the subjectivists think calibration
based on peculiar experiences or capacity for adaptation is appropriate all the
way down, from start to finish. Kolber, for instance, does not merely want to
test whether people can understand their punishment—the competency
threshold—or whether they are undergoing sufficient or cruel punishment. He
thinks retributivists must calibrate each punishment for each offender based on
his particular psychological makeup. BBM, similarly, do not offer any
principled argument for why punishment should not vary based on individuals’
varying capacities for hedonic adaptation. And Bayern, like the others, thinks
adjustments in punishment for the offender’s private burdens or lost benefits
are important even when those burdens occurred outside of state-sanctioned
punishment.
These peculiar adjustments are not only unnecessary from the standpoint
of retributive justice but indeed also antithetical to that vision of the moral self
in political society. Retributivism as we understand it accepts and tolerates the
fact that prison will be more or less psychologically taxing for different
offenders. The subjectivists embrace this point, but think retributivists should
recraft punishment so that no one suffers more than anyone else who has
committed the same crime (or shares the same level of blameworthiness). We
think this view is misguided for reasons we sketch out in the next Part.

185. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Cruel and Unusual Punishments, in Retribution, Justice, and
Therapy: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 223, 233 (1979). Murphy’s concern was the violation
of the dignity of the offender, not the polity’s; our own view would consider both—but our
reasons for disagreement are not germane to the general thrust of this Article, so we will leave it at
that.
186. To clarify, however, we believe the state may use measured physical force or
restraints to protect its agents and others from an offender whose words and deeds signal a
readiness for violence.
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IV
A SEA OF DIFFERENCES
Although we have just laid out some similarities between our position and
that of the subjectivists, we have already hinted at a number of our differences.
Our burden in this Part is to articulate why the subjectivists’ agenda of
matching suffering to wrongdoing is inimical to our conception of retributive
justice. In what follows, we first deal specifically with the subjectivists’
attempts to anticipate retributivist objections to their position. We believe that
their attempts ultimately fail. We then proceed more abstractly, addressing our
disagreements with the subjectivists under several broad headings: autonomy,
equality, and dignity. Our elaboration of these points illustrates that the
subjectivists’ agenda is off-target in part because it conflates retributive
punishment, properly understood, with “hot” talionic payback, or revenge, or
victim vindication, all of which we think can be and should be conceptually
separated. By the time we are done, we will have provided a set of arguments
for why retributive justice does not require a focus on subjective suffering and
why such a focus is actually inconsistent with or prohibited by a commitment
to retributivism. To be clear, while other people with differing views, such as
those that emphasize suffering of the offender, may invoke retributive justice
labels, our view is that such views are unpersuasive justifications for state
punishment. The references in the text to retributivism here are to our preferred
way of seeing retributivism (i.e., as described in Part II). We close by
considering a possible objection to our argument.
A. The Subjectivists’ Attempt to Anticipate Non-Subjective Retributivism
To their great credit, the subjectivists anticipate some of the challenges
retributivists like us might raise in response. Here, we spell out those efforts
and explain why they are unavailing.
1. Kolber
We begin again with Professor Kolber, who staunchly defends his views
against conceptions of retributive punishment that emphasize objectively
tracked losses of liberty or property. Retributivists typically distinguish
deliberately imposed condemnatory state sanctions, which they try to justify,
from pangs of suffering that result independently of the state’s purposeful
response. Professor Kolber calls this distinction, and the work it is supposed to
perform, the “deliberateness” argument. 187 In response, Kolber argues that
retributivists cannot permissibly rely on this distinction to disclaim moral
responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable hardships an offender endures
after committing an offense, even if some of these hardships are not purposely
187.

Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1602–03.
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imposed during their punishment. On Kolber’s view, it would be morally
untenable to focus only on the intended liberty deprivation without caring about
any unintended ancillary distress. To illustrate the point more carefully, he
offers the following hypothetical:
If we could knowingly or intentionally inflict substantial distress
without justification, then we would have no moral grounds to criticize
prison wardens who purposely or knowingly cause distress. A sadistic
warden could put a chemical into prisoners’ drinking water that makes
half the inmates feel intense anxiety and distress, and we would have
no grounds to complain. Similarly, an uncaring warden could discover
that such a substance was already in the prison drinking water and do
nothing about it. The warden would have no obligation to fix the water
supply, even if he could do so costlessly by closing a valve that feeds
the contaminant into the plumbing. If we need not justify the
experiential distress we knowingly or intentionally cause people, we
have no moral grounds to criticize sadistic or uncaring wardens. 188
Kolber’s conclusion, however, does not follow from this illustration.
First, if an agent of the state sought, sua sponte, to cause directly the
physical or mental illness of the inmates, then that would clearly be at odds
with the custodial responsibility of the state—and the warden—to ensure
adequate but not excessive condemnation through punishment. 189 Institutions
holding persons are commonly responsible for satisfying their basic human
needs. 190 Thus, a rational retributivist would condemn a sadistic or reckless act
or omission that imposes a burden outside the warden’s proper discretion. The
risks the warden imposes would have to be measured against her reasons for
imposing them. Moreover, if the warden’s sadistic or reckless act or omission
were performed ultra vires, that is, without proper deliberation and
authorization by the polity, then he would be subject to civil and potentially
criminal sanctions. As we are properly reminded by Professor Gray, it is not the
burden of retributive theorists to justify criminal actions or torts committed by
the state’s agents or other private persons. 191
If Kolber’s argument here is that retributivists should not disclaim moral
responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable bad effects proximately caused by
the actions and omissions over which they have control, we agree. 192 But taking
188. Id. at 1596 (footnote omitted).
189. On the nature of the “carceral burden” a state must carry in the context of confinement
and intolerable conditions, see Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 881, 911–23 (2009).
190. See generally id.; cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994) (holding that
prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to provide humane conditions for
incarcerated prisoners).
191. See Gray, supra note 14, at 38.
192. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1603 (“Similarly, the sophisticated state
actors who establish and administer the criminal justice system are aware of many of the liberty
deprivations and inflictions of emotional distress associated with incarceration. They know about
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moral responsibility does not necessarily entail punishment adjustments, a point
elaborated below. All the variance in experiential distress associated with
retributive sanctions is not the same problem because the variance does not
necessarily present a bad state of affairs for which the state bears responsibility.
In part, this is because an offender, like the rest of us, is frequently able to
shape his personal response to a liberty deprivation (or a retributive sanction
more generally): he might take the sanction as a useful teaching experience,
making lemonade from lemons, as it were, or he might curse his entire
existence from the day he committed the crime.
Second, if the ancillary burden the inmate experiences during his
imprisonment lacks authorization, then we cannot equate that burden with
justified, authorized punishment; thus, it does not necessarily warrant relief
from otherwise justified and authorized punishment. If a retributivist bears
moral responsibility for bad effects proximately caused by the state—for
example, the acts of a sadistic or negligent warden—it does not follow that the
solution is to adjust the offender’s sentence, say, by releasing him early. If an
unconstitutional tort occurs during the punitive encounter, the state’s obligation
may reasonably take the form of compensation, apology, injunctive relief, or
administrative reform. Such harm to the offender does not necessitate the
remission of the offender’s balance of punishment; there are other currencies
the state can use. 193
Importantly, while retributivist institutions bear responsibility for what
their agents proximately cause, the same maxim or principle applies to
offenders. To that end, it is reasonable to hold offenders responsible for the bad
and reasonably foreseen effects they cause. If a person has sensitivities to
punishment that he can reasonably foresee or investigate, then he should be
extra cautious about avoiding behavior—criminal conduct, for example—that
will likely result in punishment and concomitant negative experiences.

these harms, even if they are unintended. Retributivists who seek to justify imprisonment cannot
artificially carve out foreseen harms from the scope of harms that require justification.”). BBM, by
calling attention to the foreseeable difficulties associated with an ex-prisoner’s reentry to society,
are implicitly making the same kind of claim. We deal with their version of the objection later in
the paper. See infra Part IV.A.3. As the quotation above shows, Kolber considers the differing
experiences offenders face in prison, and the state’s responsibility associated with knowing about
this.
193. We could imagine exceptions of course. To borrow Professor Sharon Dolovich’s
helpful term, if the state’s “institutional cruelty,” that is, its failure to discharge its carceral or
punitive obligations in a humane and safe manner, led to the “breaking” of the offender (a result
we condemned in Part III), we could imagine that the state has an obligation to try to repair or
restore the offender to some normatively acceptable baseline condition before it can proceed with
the initially intended and authorized justified punishment. See Dolovich, supra note 189, at 924–
28. Indeed, we could imagine egregious and irreparable situations of “breaking” an offender such
that if the state did so, it loses its warrant to permissibly continue punishing that person. And if the
polity breaks offenders regularly through its policy or practices, then the state could plausibly be
viewed as badge-wearing criminals.
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Kolber also anticipates this retributive response, which he calls the
“forewarned is forearmed” argument. 194 He finds this response unavailing,
however, because he thinks it would countenance the infliction of any
disproportionate punishment so long as the offender receives fair notice. 195
Kolber argues, for example, that a requirement of fair notice alone would seem
to allow punishing left-handed murderers more than right-handed murderers if
that factor were legislated. According to Kolber, retributivists committed to
proportionality principles should reject such a scheme. 196
The problem with Kolber’s counterargument is that it misunderstands the
proper structure of proportionality as a check on governmental action.
Understood in its full richness, proportionality is not a reflexive adherence to
lex talionis. Rather, proportionality can be assessed according to fault, the
rationality of means used by the government to promote reasonable ends, and
the availability of alternatives to achieve those goals. 197 Retributivists are often
thought to care only about matching punishment severity to offense severity (or
more loosely, the offender’s fault). But it is not hard to see that such a
formulation can be question-begging and might require some attention to the
other ways in which proportionality is often described in the law, that is,
whether the means used are sufficient to promote a legitimate state objective
and whether other (less restrictive or severe) alternatives suffice.
Thus, to a retributivist, a policy of different punishments for lefties and
righties fails any obvious kind of means-ends analysis (or rational basis
scrutiny) because there does not seem to be any defensible reason to justify the
selection of handedness as a basis for punishment enhancement. One can
describe this in terms of traditional fault analysis, too: there is nothing
differentially blameworthy about one’s handedness that could justify an
enhanced sanction. But importantly, one need not be a retributivist to object to
this example of differential punitive treatment. To oppose arbitrary distinctions
in the law like this, one need simply be a reasonable person trying to act in
concert with other reasonable people.
194. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1601 (“One might grant that there are
substantial variations in people’s baseline conditions that we ignore at sentencing. Nevertheless,
one might argue, we are permitted to deviate from proportionality because people have advance
notice of the sorts of punishments they face. People are aware or should be aware of their baseline
conditions as well as the conditions that they would likely face in prison. So, even though a
wealthy person may be punished more harshly than a poor person when they commit crimes of
equal blameworthiness and receive sentences of equal duration, the wealthy person foresaw or
could have foreseen his augmented penalty.”).
195. Id.; compare Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 1662, 1668 (1986) (stating that all that matters vis-à-vis the fairness of the death penalty is
that the sanction was announced in advance as a possible sanction in response to certain crimes);
with Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 178, 179
(1986) (noting that fair notice or consent arguments cannot obviate concerns of proportionality).
196. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, 1601–02; Kolber, Subjective Experience,
supra note 3, at 210.
197. See generally Frase, supra note 18.
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The disproportionality concern raised in response to the “forewarned is
forearmed” argument is misplaced for another reason. At the very least, the
“forewarned is forearmed” argument works up to the point of a justified
proportionate amount of punishment, and that amount has to be, in the context
of a liberal democracy, a product of complex political dynamics wherein
citizens deliberate over the comparative needs for various responses to
wrongdoing. As mentioned before, any excess that arises because of
unauthorized burdens proximately caused by the state or its agents—for
example, the warden’s unauthorized imposition of injury—is grounds for
potential relief through the equivalent of tort remediation; it does not follow,
however, that it is grounds for remission of punishment through leniency
toward the offender. This is something the subjectivists never properly address,
let alone appreciate.
To be sure, what counts as proportionality is a difficult subject, a point we
noted earlier. 198 Our view is that in a liberal democracy proportionality is also a
function of reasonable reason-giving for matching appropriate means with
appropriate ends. A more precise description is properly left to democratic
decision making. The offender qua member of a democratic society can
contribute his input. But qua offender, he has no special standing to ask society
to tailor punishments to his individual taste—putting aside the floors or ceilings
related to aspects of his competence or (medical) sensitivities outside his
control. 199 In the sentencing context, the complex political dynamic in which
citizens come together to devise appropriate punishment levels meant to
achieve adequate but not cruel denunciation means that offenders should not
have unique standing, or obligation, to challenge proportionality in the amount
of punishment. As we explain below, where citizens have freedoms to shape
and form criminal justice policy, as with other areas of policy, their complaints
about what counts as disproportionate cannot be a ready bypass around
established democratic laws. Challengers ought to bear a substantial burden to
show that the mode or amount of punishment lacks a reasonable connection to
the severity of the crime, its concomitant social costs, and the culpability of the
offender.
Turning back to Kolber, the striking thing about his two responses to
objective deprivation-focused retributivists like us is his failure to address the
implications for offenders. 200 His response to the deliberateness argument
chastises retributivists for apparently failing to take responsibility for the
reasonably foreseeable harms that befall offenders during or after their punitive
198. See also supra Part II.B.5.
199. Thus, if an offender is having a kidney transplant tomorrow, and will die if sent to
prison today after being convicted, there is a reason to put off his sentence compared to a codefendant who is healthy. The different treatment is responsive, however, to objective medical
conditions, not differences in temperament or a goal to produce a certain amount of suffering.
200. This is an oversight BBM replicate by uncritically incorporating Kolber’s analysis (a
point we elaborate shortly). See BBM, supra note 3, at 1073 n.167.
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encounter, regardless of whether such harms are actually authorized, intended,
and proximately caused by the state. 201 Oddly, neither Kolber nor BBM
explicitly obligate offenders themselves to bear responsibility for the
unintended but reasonably foreseeable effects their criminal misconduct might
have on themselves or others. If offenders were laboring under such a duty,
they would have to shoulder blame for the predictable responses they and
others might have in response to their criminal misconduct.
It is similarly odd that in Kolber’s response to the “forewarned is
forearmed” argument there is no expectation that would-be offenders
reasonably foresee how and to what extent they might be averse to the
punishments advertised by the state. If offenders react to punishments more
sensitively than they anticipated because of their deficient “affective
forecasting” of their happiness during and after punishment, 202 then, for
Kolber, this deficiency is a problem retributivists must ameliorate. But when an
offender bears a burden that the state has not proximately caused or intended,
Kolber believes the offender must be relieved of the resulting excess of state
punishment. Per Kolber, retributivists should account for the harms that
contingently befall offenders through the imposition of punishment; by
contrast, some offenders should receive leniency if it turns out they are
sensitive to the deprivations of punishment, while other offenders should be
punished more if it turns out they can stomach punishment more easily. It
would be puzzling indeed if retributivists were caught in this bind.
Succinctly, the problem with Kolber’s arguments here is that if the state is
responsible for the actions and effects it reasonably foresees and proximately
causes, then so too are offenders. And since foreseeability is relevant to his
analysis of the deliberateness critique, it should also be relevant to his response
to the “forewarned is forearmed” argument.
2. Bayern
Professor Bayern also tries to anticipate arguments from retributivists by
claiming that state punishment is not necessary for retributive punishment; all
that is required is state acknowledgment of an offender’s suffering, regardless
of the source of that suffering. So, for instance, if someone commits a crime
and then experiences some misfortune prior to being punished by the state,
Bayern indicates that it is unnecessary for the state to
do anything more than convict and acknowledge these prior burdens in
order to communicate the correct norms and prevent offenders from
claiming a false superiority over others. In other words, state concern
201. Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1602–03.
202. See generally Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting and Capital Sentencing:
Reducing the Effect of Victim Impact Statements, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 107 (2009); Timothy D.
Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 Advances In Experimental Soc. Psychol.
345 (Mark Zanna ed., 2003).
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is state concern, regardless of whether the state is the source of hard
treatment. And suffering can be sufficient to eliminate impunity and
unfair dominance, even if the suffering doesn’t come from the state. 203
We begin by noting some practical problems that such attention to private
burdens or lost benefits prior to state punishment would encounter. First, by
countenancing the dispersion of punitive treatment ex post, Bayern’s approach
would disrupt the values associated with the state’s ex ante efforts to secure a
monopoly on violence and coercion. Put differently, if the state equates the
offender’s private burden with the distinctive social meaning of the punishment
it metes out post-conviction, then it risks legitimating private violence—that is,
more crime—upon the offender. 204
Indeed, there would be odd dynamic effects from a policy allowing
sentencing discounts to offenders based on their lost benefits or private burdens
borne post-crime but prior to state punishment. The policy would invite
offenders to tolerate private burdens or lost benefits in the hope of later
mitigating the normal sentence. Responding to such incentives, an offender
might wish his brother to jail him for two years in his basement. But even
assuming his brother agreed to do so, the state would have trouble knowing
whether the conditions of confinement were in fact similar to those of state
imprisonment.
Perhaps the information costs involved in verifying the comparability of
private and public incarceration are negligible compared to the public costs of
incarceration. Still, there would be little basis for understanding what kinds of
private burdens endured as “a result of the crime” 205 would suffice to forestall
or mitigate punishment. Say, for example, a robber breaks his arms and legs as
he escapes from a tangle with a wily victim. Should the victim’s justified selfhelp measures serve to mitigate the robber’s ultimate sentence? We think the
answer is quite obviously no, because the private burden endured by the
offender “as a result of his crime” is lacking the distinctive features of stateimposed and authorized punishment.
The social meaning of retributive punishment is distinctive from private
burdens borne by the offender in that, like all social meanings, the results of the
retributive actions must track the intentions attached to those actions. To use
Nozick’s phraseology, if the punishment is hitting the offender over the head
with the intention of sending the message “this is how wrong what you did
was” 206 (by the lights of the polity), then the fact that the state neither
203. Bayern, supra note 3, at 13–14 n.21 (challenging Markel’s communicative account of
retribution).
204. If suffering is suffering, why shouldn’t private citizens go ahead and inflict
“punishment” on the offender, saving the state its time and resources? Cf. James Q. Whitman,
What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 Yale L.J. 1055, 1087–92 (1998) (noting
various difficulties with putting punishment in the hands of citizens).
205. Bayern, supra note 3, at 2; see also text accompanying supra note 56.
206. Nozick, supra note 26, at 370–71.
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authorized nor intended earlier beatings or harms is significant for maintaining
the special language of communicative retribution. Nozick’s point is an
elaboration of a view one might have about a person who has been sentenced to
death. If the offender commits suicide before his formal punishment, one might
think he has “cheated” the state because he has escaped his punishment. His
punishment was not merely to die at the hands of anybody or at his own hand,
but to be executed by the state because it was the state’s laws that he
violated. 207
For reasons we have spelled out in Part II, retributive justice in the form
of state punishment is not properly concerned with a person’s overall desert or
justice in some holistic sense. It is not about making the wicked suffer and the
virtuous prosper. Rather, in its most persuasive form, it is about altering the
offender’s relationship to the state. Inasmuch as the offender has violated the
state’s reasonable and fairly enforced commands, it is the state’s job to
diminish his implicit or explicit claims to being above the demands placed on
his fellow citizens. He may suffer to some degree en route to his punishment,
including at his own hands, but these sufferings cannot substitute for his
punishment because, as Alon Harel argues, “[p]rivately inflicted sanctions are
grounded in the private judgments of those who inflict them,” and thus they
“sever the link between the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of
the act or the appropriateness of the sanctions and the infliction of the
sanction.” 208
Moreover, subjectivists’ concerns for shifts from baselines are not really
relevant to the institutional design of a legal system. This approach is more
relevant to philosophers or theologians thinking abstractly about punishment or
theodicy. 209 While such global “blameworthiness” inquiries may be vulnerable
to some of the talionic matching of pain-for-pain analysis that the subjectivists
think some retributivists embrace, we think that such inquiries should not affect
any retributivist in the legal academy contemplating actual sentencing
practices. 210 Put differently, legal retributivists, who contemplate institutional
207. Thus it does not matter that private imprisonments might be cheaper (or even more
effective at deterring the offender). The point is that privately imposed hardships communicate a
different message than state-authorized punishment does. Indeed, in many such cases, the
privately inflicted sanction is a crime that should itself be prosecuted.
208. Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case Against
Privately Inflicted Sanctions, in Criminal Law Conversations 129, 133 (Paul H. Robinson,
Stephen P. Garvey, Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).
209. Cf. Alan H. Goldman, Toward a New Theory of Punishment, 1 Law & Phil. 57, 61
(1982) (“[I]f the purpose of the state were to proportion reward and suffering to moral merit, to be
fair it would have to do so over entire lifetimes, and not in reaction to specific criminal acts.”).
210. In some respects, we might say that if you think what the Supreme Court did in
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), is permissible (i.e., permitting allegations of
misconduct not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to serve as the basis for the execution of an
offender), then you by definition are not a (legal) retributivist, since the predicate for enhanced
punishment is not proven in a manner consistent with the criminal law’s fact-finding process,
which requires a higher threshold of reliability. Of course, we do not doubt that there are legal
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design, do not embrace the idea that the state might use the criminal trial or
plea agreement as a vehicle for extramural tourism by which the state may
enhance or diminish punishment based on the morality of the offender in
spheres unrelated to proven offenses. 211 Rather, what gives the state warrant to
punish are offenses against the legal order.
3. Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur
As noted above, Kolber and Bayern appear to reject the claim that state
action in the context of punishment is a distinctive type of action not to be
confused or conflated with other types of suffering. Thus, for Kolber, the
limitations on liberty a soldier experiences by virtue of her service in the
military is retributively relevant to the shape or length of her sentence for a
crime. 212 Moreover, when comparing a private actor’s false imprisonment of X
to the state’s imprisonment of X, Kolber thinks there is no reason to distinguish
between the kinds of harms inflicted on X based on the identity of the person or
entity imposing the burden on X. 213 Similarly, Bayern thinks that retributivists
should award sentencing discounts to offenders based on the lost benefits or
private burdens they bore prior to state-imposed punishment even if those
burdens or lost benefits were caused by non-state actors. 214
Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur are no different in their
view that individuals’ negative experiences imposed via punishment should be
calibrated to their capacity for hedonic adaptation. 215 But as we noted in Part I,
BBM also think retributivists who care about proportionality should factor into
their punishment calculus those harms that befall persons upon reentry to
society—after their completion of state punishment—even if the state neither
intends nor proximately causes those harms. 216 In other words, BBM also

scholars who think good deeds or unproven misconduct ought to count for non-retributive reasons.
We also readily admit that some might try to invoke a “just deserts” type of argument to suggest
that features of a person’s life unrelated to crime or criminal history should weigh in at sentencing,
such as military service or charitable giving. See generally Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only
Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1109 (2008) (providing citations and
overview of the literature on prior bad acts with discussion of retributivists both for and against
consideration of past deeds).
211. For an outstanding discussion, see Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of
Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 523 (1993). In this respect, we think Professor Simons
did not go far enough when he argued that, per retributivism, the state “need not” engage in global
character judgments. We think the state ought not do so. See Simons, supra note 21, at 4 (“[The
state] need not monitor the flow of burdens and benefits in the offender’s life and make
appropriate corrections so that when he meets his maker, cosmic justice has been done.”).
212. See Kolber, Comparative Nature, supra note 3, at 1591.
213. See id. at 1574–75.
214. Bayern, supra note 3, at 13–14 n.21 (critiquing Markel’s communicative account of
retribution and suggesting that the state’s communication of condemnation can be decoupled from
the experience of hardship endured).
215. See also supra note 70.
216. BBM, supra note 3, at 1073 n.167.
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consider the social effects on offenders after they have been released from
prison.
As BBM summarize, “virtually any period of incarceration, no matter how
brief, has consequences that negatively affect prisoners’ lives in ways that resist
adaptation, even after they have been released.” 217 But they mistakenly locate
blame for those effects on the state, even if the effects contingently result from
independent choices by third parties (for example, reduced marital or job
prospects) made in response to the offender’s violation of the law. 218 In this
respect they seem to go beyond the concerns of Kolber and Bayern. We want to
explain why retributivists should reject this particular line of argument.
As we see it, retributive justice has in some respects strikingly limited
ambitions. As we explained earlier, it is best understood as a theory about the
proper justification of punishment—not a comprehensive theory of sentencing,
nor a theory of what people “deserve,” all things considered. Rather, retributive
theories stand at their tallest when they explain why we punish, through the
state, certain people for certain actions. As for what people might contingently
and speculatively suffer after the state has appropriately punished them,
retributive justice has very little to say, for reasons connecting back to our
responses to Kolber and Bayern. Those harms are simply not state punishment
and thus are not part of what retributive justice theories have to justify. Why
should this be?
First, many of the effects of post-imprisonment life that concern BBM are
not effects that the state intended, authorized, or proximately caused the
offender to endure; in some cases, however, the effects are reasonably
foreseeable, a point we address below. Retributivism, on our view, does not
seek suffering for offenders after punishment. Rather, the point of retributive
punishment lies in the communicative sanction the legislature or sentencing
commission sets, the judge imposes, and the bureau of prisons oversees. The
state thus bears responsibility for what it does and authorizes during the term of
punishment—including probation, parole, other release conditions, and
authorized collateral consequences. But the retributive punishment does not
include whatever difficulties—economic, physical, psychological—the
offender may suffer after release from supervision of the criminal justice
system. That is because under our communicative conception of retributive
justice, that communication ends when the state stops speaking to the offender
via state-sanctioned punishment. When the state releases the offender and
extinguishes any remaining conditions, it has said all it had to say. There is
nothing it needs to or even tries to communicate after the offender has served
217. Id. at 1038.
218. See id. at 1073 n.167 (“[I]t would seem irrational as a matter of policy, and perhaps
indefensible on normative grounds as well, for the state to choose to ignore what it knows will
follow from its acts. The post-release effects of imprisonment are at least known to juries, judges,
and legislators, even if those parties do not incorporate them into their own calculations.”).
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his sentence and related release conditions.
To this point, BBM raise Kolber’s argument in response to the
“deliberateness attempt.” 219 Namely, retributive institutions can anticipate the
reasonably likely aftereffects of punishment, and thus, if these are reasonably
foreseeable, the state should be held morally responsible for them.
We still disagree. We think the state is morally responsible for what it
does and does not do while the offender is in the state’s control, that is, while
the state is punishing. The state is not morally responsible vis-à-vis punishment
calibration for what might happen after it has spoken through punishment just
because the offender experiences harm that the state might reasonably foresee.
For example, the harms that the offender experiences because of choices by
family members or employers are largely the contingent result of private
decisions, not public ones. 220 Additionally, to say that the polity should be held
morally responsible does not entail that the currency through which such
responsibility is cashed out is one of remitting or extending punishment. It
might be that the proper remedy involves compensation, injunctive relief,
apology, or other forms by which we recognize moral responsibility. BBM (and
the other subjectivists) never provide an argument for thinking that re-calibration of punishment is the necessary way to address whatever incidental and
proximately caused harms may have contingently befallen upon the offender.
Moreover, the harmful effects of prison in post-prison life are also
reasonably foreseeable to competent would-be offenders and they are in the
best position to avoid those harms, since they can avoid criminality
altogether. 221 And because the state is not imposing those post-punishment
harms, the subjectivists’ view of the state as obliged to act in a way that is
bounded by proportionality proves flawed because those harms cannot properly
be called punishment. That is not to say the state should do nothing to prepare
offenders for successful reentry into society as productive and law-abiding
citizens. The state may offer various opportunities for prudential reasons of
social self-defense to reduce recidivism, or out of a sense of humanity. But the
measures have little basis for support—or for that matter, criticism—in
retributive theory.
Given our focus on the idea of communicating wrongness to the offender,
219. As we noted earlier, Kolber makes this same point. Kolber, Subjective Experience,
supra note 3, at 211–13.
220. To be sure, the state cannot disclaim responsibility for unconstitutional torts that occur
during supervised release conditions or other deprivations imposed on offenders outside of prison,
but we don’t think any retributivist would deny that either.
221. We do not mean to be glib here. Clearly, too many crimes have punishments that
exceed any rational analysis. And insofar as states impose collateral consequences retroactively,
we agree that this would undermine our foreseeability claim. Needless to say, we do not endorse
the retroactive imposition of collateral consequences, nor their uncritical extension into all walks
of life for offenders. See infra note 222. But whatever our disagreements with current practice,
and there are many, they don’t necessitate or even suggest that the best strategy for amelioration is
through thoroughgoing focus on individual idiosyncrasies or experiences.
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and, in the case of prison, using the custodial period to signal in part the degree
of societal condemnation, the offender’s post-supervision experience is less
important. Because the polity did not intend, authorize, or proximately cause
these contingent and speculative (even if foreseeable) post-punishment
experiences or effects, they cannot plausibly carry any communicative message
on behalf of the polity. 222 Put simply, they are not retributive punishment.
In other words, in equating the infliction of punishment with the suffering
of non-punitive harms imposed by third parties such as employers or family
members, BBM follow Kolber, 223 and thus reveal obliviousness to the
distinctive social meaning of state punishment. 224 As Professor Gray points out,
this leads to a situation where the subjectivists have difficulty telling the
difference between crime and punishment. 225
BBM’s apparent indifference to social meaning is problematic because
their concern, like those of Kolber and Bayern, could easily cut in the opposite
direction, leading to absurd results. For example, what about the unintended
benefits a prisoner reaps during or after his prison experience? Imagine that
upon release he marries his former prison guard and experiences bliss
thereafter. 226 Theoretically, should the state countermand that postincarceration benefit so as to adjust the offender’s “pain” levels

222. Of course, we think the state emphatically cannot abjure its share of moral
responsibility for the various ways in which its archipelago of imposed collateral sanctions affect
the well-being of offenders. Many of these residency, voting, occupational, educational, and
registration restrictions (or requirements) are unduly onerous and poorly conceived, reasonably
leading one to conclude that a sizeable share of the offender’s post-prison hardships might fairly
be characterized as authorized and intended burdens that the state must account for, just like the
propensity of some states to impose unduly long sentences. Importantly, though, our disputes with
current practices here do not affect our argument related to the bare relevance of offenders’
idiosyncratic subjectivity or prior baselines or capacity for hedonic adaptation.
223. See, e.g., BBM, supra note 3, at 1039 n.4 (citing Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra
note 3).
224. This is odd because BBM carve out space for addressing the implications of their
claim for “expressive” theories of punishment, under which heading they recognize that the state’s
interest in punishment is “‘not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention
that signifies moral condemnation.’” BBM, supra note 3, at 1076 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, What
Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1996)). But of course, that second
clause is the nub of retributive theories, a point well-made in Ken Simon’s reply to Kolber. See
Simons, supra note 21, at 8 (noting that retributivists might view incarceration as a distinctive way
to deny offenders from enjoying outside relationships, in which case whether the offender
experiences “suffering” or harm is beside the point.). As Professor Simons notes regarding
Kolber, “Prison excludes the inmate from valuable experiences and opportunities that he might
otherwise have had on the outside. Such punishments are not primarily designed to cause pain or
negative psychic reactions, though these effects may occur as a consequence of the deprivation.”
Id.
225. Gray, supra note 14.
226. Or consider the story of Shon Hopwood, who used his time in prison to become an
“accomplished Supreme Court practitioner.” Adam Liptak, A Mediocre Criminal, But an
Unmatched Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2010, at A12 (discussing successful jailhouse
lawyer who flourished in the prison law-library and now plans to attend law school).
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appropriately? 227 That some bad side effects are reasonably foreseeable does
not mean they will eventuate; the state cannot know what will happen to any
specific prisoner after his release. Some criminals may suffer, some criminals
may reform; some go on to lead happy lives, others have miserable ones. The
implication that the state should adjust punishment lengths or conditions of
confinement for those who turn out to benefit personally from their punishment
seems so bizarre that we find it good evidence of the flaws in taking into
account the converse—when prisoners suffer after their time in prison.
Indeed, this issue about which harms and benefits the state bears
responsibility for requires further careful analysis. On our view, the state does
not bear moral responsibility for at least two different kinds of harms that may
arise indirectly during or after the state’s punishment of offenders: the spillover
effects to third parties that arise from an offender’s crime and punishment, and
the harms offenders endure as a result of private choices by third parties.
The contingent harms third parties may experience as a result of the
offender’s actions that culminated in state punishment—sometimes called
spillover effects on the offender’s family or loved ones—are, in our view,
morally attributable to the offender as reasonably foreseeable consequences
arising from the offender’s criminal conduct. That said, for prudential reasons
(for example, social self-defense against criminogenesis) and humanitarian
reasons (benevolence to morally innocent persons), the state ought to recognize
and do what it can to minimize the extent of harms on innocent third parties. 228
But that is different than saying the state is morally obligated to abandon or
disregard the retributive reasons for state punishment against offenders. 229
Furthermore, per the concerns of BBM regarding the contingent harms an
offender may experience after his state-imposed punishment due to choices of
third parties, our view regarding where to place moral blame for those harms is
similar: on the offender—or, if the harms are unreasonable, on the third parties
making those choices. The state’s punishment might be an event along the
chain of harms an offender experiences after his crime. It may even be that but
for the state’s punishment of the offender, the offender would not experience
those harms, but more likely those harms are responses to the offenders’
criminal choices and not the state’s punishment. Regardless, our view is that
the state is not the proximate cause for the post-punishment harms when they
result from a choice by a third party in response to actions (criminal activity)
brought about and properly attributed (that is, proximately caused) by the
offender. 230 Thus, the offenders either should shoulder entirely or share with

227. See Simons, supra note 21.
228. See supra note 133.
229. In other words, the claims of potential spillover harms do not serve as “cancelling”
reasons, to use Joseph Raz’s terminology. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 27 (2d ed.
1990) (describing the difference between conflicting reasons and cancelling reasons).
230. See H.L.A. Hart & Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law 114–15 (2d ed. 1985)
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the third parties the responsibility for the bad effects they endure subsequent to
official state punishment.
Before moving on, we should stress that BBM, during a brief survey of
various retributivist approaches, acknowledge that their arguments leave some
“expressivist” theories of retribution somewhat untouched insofar as those
theories emphasize exclusively the expressive aspect of punishment, and focus
“less on actual harm to an offender.” 231 This is an important point, but BBM
write that they doubt that anyone cares just about expression to the exclusion of
the offender’s negative experience. 232 Unfortunately, BBM do not delve
sufficiently into this area of punishment theory; by failing to explore the
expression-communication divide, they miss an opportunity to limit properly
the scope of their argument.
If, as we believe, punishment is principally justified as a matter of
communication, and not as a matter of simply expressing sentiments into the
public or causing suffering or physical pain, then certain concerns of BBM
matter much less. In other words, whether an offender adapts to his prison
conditions or whether he endures harms caused by others after his punishment
are issues of less importance under our rationale for punishment.
In addition, instead of caring only about expression as if the sole point of
punishment were to vent society’s anger, 233 we also care about communicating
to the offender the wrongness of his action. The greater the wrong, all other
things being equal, the greater the need for a harsher sentence to effect that
communication of condemnation. This choice of sentence undoubtedly has an
expressive aspect: punishment expresses society’s condemnation to the public.
But on our account, how much punishment is warranted should have little to do
with how much society wants a particular offender to suffer.
BBM more accurately address liberty deprivation theories. Liberty
deprivation retributivists, they write, “could try to disconnect punishment from
criminals’ actual experience of it by focusing only on objective facts such as

(discussing the need to select the proximate cause from an otherwise “infinite series of necessary
conditions”). For what it is worth, we think that diseases or disabilities contracted by an offender
during punishment on account of poor or squalid conditions of confinement raise different issues.
They are not authorized punishments but repair for these conditions might be necessary under tort
principles and injunctive relief if the state failed to carry its carceral burden in a safe and secure
manner.
231. BBM, supra note 3, at 1077. BBM are referring to “expressivist” theories of
punishment. The CCR is not an expressivist theory, which is largely an instrumental view of
punishment. Instead it is, as described earlier at the outset of Part II, communicative. Retributive
punishment thus both communicates condemnation to the offender and in so doing it expresses
society’s disapproval to others, but not merely for the sake of expression to the public.
232. See id.
233. See Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 66–82 (1965). H.L.A. Hart
characterized Lord Devlin’s view that punishment may be used for “venting” as “uncomfortably
close to human sacrifice as an expression of religious worship.” H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and
Morality 65–66 (1963).
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the amount of liberty deprived.” 234 They claim that this will not work, however,
because even liberty deprivation is used as punishment because it is a “negative
experience” by the offender. “If it were not a negative experience, then it would
not be retributively appropriate or meaningful and indeed would not be
punishment at all.” 235 But this proposition merely approximates one of our
areas of agreement with the subjectivists: society should choose punishments
ex ante that capably signal society’s condemnation.
It does not, however, follow from this that the purpose or aim of
punishment is to make the offender suffer negative experiences, or that
punishment should be adjusted to ensure that equally blameworthy offenders
endure the same amount of hedonic effect. Indeed, if someone comes to a place
of contentment through the experience of his punishment, we would have no
quarrel with that resulting “happiness.” The idea of retributive justice is not
intrinsically tied to the embitterment or immiseration of offenders.
Unless there is some reason to believe that hedonic adaptation will likely
(and systematically) make either extra prison time or larger fines viewable as a
benefit to the offender, society is justified in believing that more (objective)
punishment communicates a stronger message of condemnation. Indeed, there
is an endogeneity problem related to social meaning that merits attention. A fit
interlocutor for punishment will recognize that the social meaning of
condemnation conveyed to the prisoner becomes more pronounced as the
punishment grows longer or stiffer. Retributive punishments are not, on our
view, about negative experiences. They are about creating the conditions
through communicative actions to get the offender to understand that his
actions are being condemned as violating the rule of law. 236 Put differently,
what a punishment means may be more (or less) than what the particular
prisoner feels.
Having surveyed why we think the subjectivists’ arguments are not
required by retributive justice, we now turn to explain our view that retributive
justice is in fact not properly compatible with and indeed prohibits the use of
suffering or negative experience as a punishment metric. Some of what follows
has already been foreshadowed, but we want to be clear about the values
threatened by use of such a metric to affirmatively and systematically calibrate
punishment to the subjective individualized experiences, baselines, and
adaptive capacities of offenders. The source of our disagreements with a
scheme committed to such calibration runs deep. In the next three sections, we
spell out the CCR’s deeper commitments—to autonomy, equality, and
dignity—and how these commitments frame its response to subjectivist challenges. We also want to defend, or at least sketch, the underlying theoretical
commitments that lead us to be retributivists of the sort that we are. In doing
234.
235.
236.

BBM, supra note 3, at 1068.
Id.
See supra note 52 (adverting to John Finnis’s view on the matter).
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this, we try to connect both the critical and positive threads of our project.
B. Autonomy
Our position begins with the familiar Enlightenment ideal of the person as
a choosing being, able to exercise his autonomy, which the liberal state is
committed to securing—within limits. When someone crosses those limits by
voluntarily disobeying the law, we respect his autonomy by treating him as
someone responsible for his actions. If, however, the offender was not a
competent agent—for example, if he was insane—then there is no meaningful
choice to respect, and so the legitimacy of retributive punishment against that
person is lacking.
While we would assume that the subjectivists would favor some account
of free choice as a prerequisite to just punishment, this is not where they focus
their arguments; this shift in attention is significant. The subjectivists stress the
effects of punishment on the offender, treating the offender as mainly a feeling
being. This is in line with the subjectivists’ overall debt to Bentham. He
famously pleaded in relation to our treatment of animals that the key question
was not whether animals could think or reason or choose, but whether they
could feel—that is, whether they could suffer. 237 The subjectivists share this
emphasis. They ask: how much does the offender suffer, as a feeling being, by
his punishment or other negative consequences of his crime?
This is a much less pressing question for retributivists like us.
Retributivists emphasize the moment of choice at the time of the crime, the
meaningfulness of later responding to that choice through punishment, and
thus, the way in which punishment is respectful of the offender who made that
choice. Furthermore, retributivists care whether the offender remains competent
to understand his punishment as the appropriate sanction for his actions
because it was devised through democratic political institutions in which he has
both a stake and a voice. As mentioned above, if the offender lacks this level of
rational autonomy, even if he remains a feeling and suffering being, retributive
punishment would be inappropriate.
As we saw earlier, the institutional retributivist interested in
communication does not seek a certain level of suffering that the offender must
endure; desiring someone else’s suffering is much closer to a revenge-focused
account of victim vindication or social ventilation. Instead, retributivists want
to communicate condemnation of the offender’s wrongful choice and
misconduct. And again the focus of this condemnation is autonomy. Because
the offender has abused his autonomy through his misconduct, society
communicates disapproval to him by imposing something intended to cause
him a coercive deprivation. In the case of liberty deprivations, the state reduces
his autonomy to act, move, and interact with others. Whether he suffers more or
237.

Bentham, supra note 33, at 283.
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less than another person is less important than the content of the message sent
through the removal of or restrictions upon his liberty or property. Sentencing
judges and prison officials might allow marginal exceptions to general rules
regarding sentencing in order to account for the previously articulated concerns
of adequacy, competency, and cruelty. The subjectivist errs in seeing these
minor adjustments to sentences as somehow disclosing the key to just
punishment rather than imposing some limits operating at the boundaries of
legitimate state action.
C. Equality
Because, on our view, offenders are largely responsible for the foreseeable
effects of their punishments on themselves and those they love, we emphasize
that retributivism’s aversion to fine-tuned levels of idiosyncratic sentencing
calibration connects with another principle that retributivists like us hold dear:
equality under the law.
1. Equality in Choice and Capacity
Consider how different and how unequal people are as feeling beings.
Early childhood and adolescent growth each leaves a unique and probably
indelible mark on a person’s life. People desire, fear, and suffer from different
things. 238 As feeling beings, people are simply, irreducibly distinct.
Accordingly, some subjectivists allege, the state must accommodate these
differences in its theory of punishment; otherwise people’s status as feeling
beings supposedly translates into unjust treatment by the state.
Retributivism does not deny that people are different as feeling beings—
they undeniably are—but instead focuses on relative equality. Insofar as most
everyone reaches a certain level of autonomy and rationality, that is equal
enough, in terms of our capacities, for the purpose of living together as
members of a liberal state. 239 In other words, above that threshold of
competence, everyone is equally subject to the law and, after violating a law—
fairly passed, administered, and enforced—equally deserving of the state’s
sanctions. The subjectivist account, if not outright denying this equality,
downplays it. By focusing on how people are different and how the state not
only can but must take this variability in the experience of suffering into
account, subjectivists nearly deny that competent persons in society are all to

238. Indeed, even the very term suffering proves too ambiguous in this context. Someone
may “suffer” from paper cuts or basketball injuries. One might suffer from all sorts of causes. See,
e.g., George Orwell, 1984 286 (1949) (“The worst thing in the world . . . varies from individual to
individual. It may be burial alive, or death by fire, or by drowning, or by impalement, or fifty
other deaths. There are cases where it is some quite trivial thing, not even fatal.”).
239. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 40 (discussing the minimal competence required to be a
law-abiding member of society).

MarkelFlandersBOS Final wth abstract and toc (Do Not Delete)

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1/22/2011 9:59 PM

[Vol. 98:907

be treated as equal and autonomous dignity-bearing individuals. 240
Focus on variance in suffering or negative experience is wrong because it
distorts the proper way in which equality matters. For example, Sensitive robs a
bank, and because of his sensitivity, he gets three months in prison. Insensitive
robs a bank, and, because of his apparent insensitivity, he gets three years in
prison. Whatever this policy may capture in terms of making Sensitive and
Insensitive suffer equally as a subjective matter, it also obscures that Sensitive
and Insensitive both made the same choice, both broke the same law, and both
were convicted for the same offense. Supposing that both Sensitive and
Insensitive were competent agents who freely chose to rob a bank, the law
should look at them as similarly competent and free, whatever their individual
subjective variability, to avoid the anticipated and actual pains of sanction. If
there is injustice that lingers notwithstanding the fair notice associated with the
misconduct and penalty, then it is an injustice regarding the rationality between
the means and ends used; this is not, strictly speaking, an injustice that
Sensitive and Insensitive have unique standing to challenge. In other words, if
three months is thought to be legitimately or objectively proportionate to the
offense as a ceiling, then three years is too much, period. And if three years is
thought to be the minimum floor for adequate communication of condemnation
of the offense, then three months is objectively too little to do the job.
Thus, if the state must make ex post adjustments based on Sensitive’s
consciously acquired sensitivities, then it is basically treating both offenders
unequally, that is, without equal concern and respect for their autonomy and
standing before the law. It would communicate, wrongly—and to the
retributivist’s mind, arbitrarily—that somehow Insensitive’s choice was deeper
and more weighty than Sensitive’s. But if they made the same choices, they
should have to answer equally to them. So in fact, in the name of equality of
suffering, the subjectivists propose instituting a grave inequality. They propose
to treat equals in choice unequally.
Diminishing these differences in subjective well-being may be the charge
of our distributive justice obligations. 241 But the relevant equality for a liberal
society when it comes to retributive justice is the equality of citizens in their
capacity to comply with laws that are fairly and reasonably developed and
enforced. Everyone must obey the law, and as Herbert Morris spelled out long
ago, every citizen benefits from the restraint others show through their
compliance. 242 Significantly, enjoying this benefit does not hinge on material
equality; nor do people have to be materially equal to be subject to this

240. We might note here that this emphasis on the objective equality of persons is not
unique to the punishment phase, as several friends have noted to us. Ideas of the “reasonable
person”—ubiquitous in the substantive criminal law—are for the most part objective, relying on a
standard of competence and knowledge to which citizens are expected to adhere.
241. For reasons we explain below, however, we are skeptical about such claims.
242. Morris, supra note 54, at 478.
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obligation to comply with the law. 243
2. Equality Before the Law
In the context of punishment, the relevant equality is equality before the
law, not equality all things considered. By punishing an offense against the
laws with a publicly authorized penalty, retribution enacts this message of
equality before the law. A privately imposed hardship, without lawful
jurisdiction, does not serve equality before the law. Indeed, such “self-help”
may simply be just another instance of crime. Subjectivism thus risks
muddying the message of equality by offering the possibility that the rich, the
powerful, and the sensitive may escape equal treatment of the law by virtue of
their social status or varying baselines. 244 CCR avoids this counterintuitive, and
indeed unappealing, result; in fact, it need hardly be emphasized how
subjectivist principles could exacerbate existing racial and class disparities in
the criminal justice system.
The CCR also holds that those who are more insensitive do not, on that
account, have to suffer more in the name of “equality.” When the criminal laws
are democratically established for the common benefit, capable of passing a
threshold of substantial basis review, and administered fairly, then everyone
(above a threshold level of competency) is expected to live up to them, absent
some otherwise compelling defense. Punishment for similar crimes will be
similar; sentences would not be longer or more arduous for poor persons or
soldiers merely because the change in baseline conditions seems more
pronounced. 245
The literature on distributive justice can help us explain why retributivists
should reject an approach that focuses on achieving equality in suffering or
negative experience. As Kolber himself recognizes, his subjectivist critique has
a parallel in debates about how to distribute resources; indeed, part of the
appeal of Kolber’s essay is that he does not flinch from considering some of the
implications his position may have in other areas of political philosophy. Some
distributive justice theorists believe that the state has an obligation to allocate
243. For an updated and deep look at the relationship between distributive and retributive
justice, see Stuart P. Green, Hard Times, Hard Time: Retributive Justice for Unjustly
Disadvantaged Offenders, 2009 U. Chi. Legal F. (forthcoming Oct. 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1511732.
244. See George Orwell, Animal Farm 118 (1945) (“All animals are equal, but some are
more equal than others.”).
245. This version of equality may seem excessively formal, like the liberty that the rich and
the poor share in both being forbidden from sleeping under a bridge. We disagree. To be sure, the
political community envisioned by retributive justice is in one sense a formal community: it is a
community organized around securing the conditions for human flourishing in part by
deliberating, legislating, obeying, and enforcing the law. But it is also substantive, because
underneath the laws is a vision of autonomous people united in support of an ideal of equality
under the law. We think it is worth embracing, and trying, however imperfectly, to live up to this a
substantive, “thick” version of community and equality. See also Christiano, supra note 118.
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resources (money, food, etc.) on the basis of individuals’ personal “tastes.” 246
These theorists—“subjective welfarists”—define a person’s welfare by how
well his subjective preferences are satisfied. 247 Subjective welfarism has fallen
out of favor in the distributive justice debates over the years, and the reasons
for its failure are illuminating for our debate with subjectivists in punishment.
Very few contemporary philosophers defend without substantial qualification
the view that the state has an obligation to make sure everyone’s subjective
welfare is the same. Rather, the trend in distributive justice discussions seems
to be towards measuring welfare according to some more “objective” metric—
for example, equality of resources or equality in facilitation of capabilities. 248
The reasons for this trend are many; for example, it is difficult to define a
subjective “preference,” and more critically, it is a challenge to discover what a
person’s “true” preferences are. 249 Listing them all would take us too far afield.
But, for our purposes, the most important objection to subjective welfarism is
the objection from “expensive tastes.”
Here is a short version of the objection. Some people have very ordinary,
pedestrian tastes: they are satisfied with a meal consisting of a burger, washed
down with a beer. Other people have very expensive tastes: they are only sated,
to take Ronald Dworkin’s well-known example, by “plovers’ eggs and prephylloxera claret.” 250 Now, a problem arises when we introduce the principle
that everyone should have equality of subjective welfare. If this is the relevant
metric, then the person who is content with his burger and beer will get far
fewer resources than the person who is happy only with much finer things. As
the late G.A. Cohen put it, a person with expensive tastes simply
needs more resources than the average person does to achieve an
average level of fulfillment . . . . [A] person has expensive tastes if, for
example, ordinary cigars and plonk wine which give pleasure to the
general leave him cold, and he can get something like that pleasure . . .
only with Havana cigars and Margaux. 251
So subjective welfare, in the name of equality, yields a very unequal
distribution of resources, at least when considered in objective terms. This has

246. For a particularly sophisticated statement of the subjectivist view, see L.W. Sumner,
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (1996). For a basic overview and contrast between various
subjective and objective theories, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons App. I (1984).
247. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 164–67 (1993) (providing an
overview and critique of subjective welfarism); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human
Development: The Capabilities Approach 116–17 (2000) (describing subjective welfarism).
248. For a discussion of various objective views, see Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, chs.
11–12 (2009) (comparing equality of resources with equality of capabilities).
249. For a good survey of objections to subjective welfarism, see Nussbaum, supra note
247, at 119–21.
250. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare, 10 Phil. & Pub.
Affairs 185, 229 (1981).
251. G. A. Cohen, Expensive Tastes and Multiculturalism, in Multiculturalism, Liberalism,
and Democracy 80, 84–85 (Rajeev Bhargava et al. eds., 1999).
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struck many as intuitively implausible: why should the person with expensive
tastes get more resources than the person of average tastes? It seems rather
unfair, especially in cases where an individual chose to acquire those more
expensive tastes. Now, some will simply conclude that we must distribute
resources this way. 252 Others have looked for ways out: focus, instead, on what
each person’s basic needs are; or simply give everyone an equal share of
resources, no matter their subjective tastes; or ensure each person has resources
sufficient to develop their capabilities to function in certain specified ways. All
of these are more objective measurements of well-being than the satisfaction of
subjective preferences. All of them, in other words, do better at capturing our
refined judgments about distributive justice. Of course, subjective welfarists
have responses to this objection, one of which is that if expensive tastes are not
the person’s fault, then it is not fair to deprive her of what she needs to achieve
happiness. 253 We will return to this point.
But first, note that the problem of expensive tastes seems easily
transposed onto the subjectivist position in punishment. Imagine that Person A
and Person B have committed the same crime. Person A, however, has very
expensive tastes: he is used to silk sheets and fancy soaps, and not to life
behind bars. Certainly he will suffer more in prison than Person B, who usually
sleeps on a beat-up mattress in a run-down apartment. The subjectivists would
say that proportionality in suffering requires that Person A be punished less
than Person B.
Here it would seem our non-subjectivist views are even stronger than in
the case of distributive justice. We resist the idea that a person’s acculturation
to finer things should matter to how much he is punished; at the very least, he
could foresee his sensitivity to punishment and can avoid this suffering through
compliance with the law. Thus the context of punishment makes expensive
tastes irrelevant, and corroborates a deep and wide view that the length of a
person’s sentence should not change simply because he is wealthy and used to
a high standard of living—or used to living in large rooms rather than in small
cells. 254
As we mentioned earlier, Kolber is aware of this possibility, 255 and he
spends several pages discussing it. We think his analysis is unsatisfactory,
252. Interestingly, in a footnote, Kolber indicates that he may be willing to bite the bullet.
Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 233–34 n.144 (“One may think that equality of
distribution should be understood on grounds of subjective welfare. . . .”).
253. See G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 923–24
(1989) (distinguishing between chosen and unchosen expensive tastes).
254. See Douglas N. Husak, Already Punished Enough, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 82 (1990)
(“Few suggestions are more distasteful to the public than that the privileged, in virtue of their
elevated status, should be punished less severely than the disadvantaged.”).
255. It may be misleading to call this an objection to Kolber’s position, because it is
unclear what Kolber’s affirmative commitments ultimately are. He may simply be drawing out the
implications of a view he believes others may be committed to once they take subjectivity
seriously.

MarkelFlandersBOS Final wth abstract and toc (Do Not Delete)

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1/22/2011 9:59 PM

[Vol. 98:907

however, and shows the problems associated with an overemphasis on
subjective experience. Kolber contrasts “Hoity-Toity,” who is a “well-to-do
man of leisure,” with Insensitive, “a man who has lived his whole life in
cramped living conditions with meager financial resources.” 256 The
subjectivists, Kolber acknowledges, would seem to be committed to the
position that Hoity-Toity should indeed be punished less than Insensitive if
they are both found guilty of the same crime because this would be the only
way their punishments would be “equal” in terms of units of suffering or
negative experience. 257 Kolber acknowledges that this will strike many as
counterintuitive. What can the subjectivists say in response?
Kolber attempts to escape the implications of his hypothetical by means of
two stratagems. The first is to suggest that despite appearances, Hoity-Toity is
actually more morally blameworthy than Insensitive. We should assume he has
had more life opportunities and a better chance to avoid crime than Insensitive
has had. 258 Therefore he deserves the same amount of punishment as
Insensitive; the fact that Hoity-Toity will have a harder time of it is fine
because he really deserves to suffer more.
But this is a weak reply. First, it would be odd if Hoity-Toity’s greater
moral blameworthiness would mean that he would have to serve exactly the
same number of years as Insensitive. 259 Second, we could strip out the greater
moral blameworthiness if we stipulate that Hoity-Toity, with the same amount
of wealth and comfort, actually has not had more opportunities—perhaps
having been ruthlessly raised to embrace only one goal: to succeed in his
father’s business. Now, according to Kolber’s theory, since he would not
deserve to suffer more than Insensitive, he should not receive as much
punishment. Yet we would still say that his greater wealth does not mean he
should receive a lesser punishment.
Most urgently, the idea that the rich might be more inherently
“blameworthy” relies upon an idea with which, as we have repeatedly
indicated, we are very uncomfortable: the idea that criminal punishment is
somehow about judging people’s lives as a whole rather than their discrete acts
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Kolber’s second stratagem is to raise the notion that wealthy people who
are punished are the ones who are really guilty because rich people tend to have
better representation than poor people: “[i]f a rich person and a poor person are
given the same term of incarceration, one might plausibly believe that the rich

256. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 231.
257. Id. (“Giving Hoity-Toity a shorter sentence or better accommodations than Insensitive
is not favoritism but rather is precisely what is required to treat them equally . . . .”).
258. Id. at 231–32.
259. Kolber concedes as much. Id. at 232 n.142 (“Yet, it would be very coincidental if
Hoity-Toity’s augmented blameworthiness . . . make[s] him deserve augmented experiential
distress that ends up giving him his just deserts when he serves the same term as Insensitive.”)
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person is more blameworthy, since he ended up with the same sentence as the
poor person despite having better advocacy.” 260 Again, this seems a jerryrigged reply. Suppose that the rich and the poor person have the same quality of
advocacy; we would still not think that the rich person should get a lesser
punishment because of his previous (comfortable) life. Our belief that the
punishments should be equal is not based on some overall judgment that the
rich who are found guilty are more blameworthy than the poor. It is, rather,
based on a judgment that those who commit similar crimes merit similar
punishments.
The basic problem with Kolber’s answers, again, are that they are indirect
and ad hoc ways to a result that we can get more directly, and more
satisfactorily, by an appeal to our non-subjective views about punishment. Per
the CCR, and in contrast to Kolber, if the two offenders have committed the
same crime, then Hoity-Toity’s punishment should communicate the exact
same message as Insensitive’s. 261 Both Hoity-Toity and Insensitive freely chose
to violate the same conduct rule, and that explains why the same set of decision
rules—and resulting punishments—should apply. Although Kolber is clear that
he does not endorse retributivism, he believes that those who do, and who also
find subjectivism plausible, must conclude that “Hoity-Toity deserves a
subjectively equal but objectively less severe punishment than Insensitive,
given plausible assumptions about their relative sensitivities to punishment.” 262
We think this provides a good reason to abandon subjectivism.
But what about the harder case where Hoity-Toity has expensive tastes or
a more refined sensibility through no fault of his own? This parallels cases in
distributive justice where people simply are “stuck” with un-chosen expensive
tastes. For example, think of people who are only interested by expensive
hobbies: shouldn’t they get the resources they need to be as happy as everyone
else? 263 Intuitions about the wealthy stem from a general assumption that they
have chosen their comfortable lifestyle: if they chose it, then they should suffer
the consequences of it. However, these intuitions may produce skewed results
in cases of wealthy individuals who did not choose their “expensive”
circumstances.
Regardless of the distributive justice perspective, the fact remains that
even offenders who did not choose their expensive tastes still chose their

260. Id. at 232.
261. We recognize, of course, that many jurisdictions entrust sentencing judges (or in some
cases, parole boards) with vast discretion to make widely disparate judgments for similarly
situated offenders. In this respect, we acknowledge that our account is in no way interpretive of
our current institutions but rather provides a critical guidepost against which to measure our
occasionally benighted institutions of criminal justice.
262. Id. at 235.
263. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics 287, 293
(1999).
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crimes. 264 They are adequately forewarned that there will be consequences to
their choice to commit a crime. If Hoity-Toity has more expensive tastes it is
no injustice vis-à-vis the state because, after all, he could have chosen
otherwise. This does not relieve the state of being able to explain why
Insensitive who commits a theft is punished by a term of P years and not Pminus-one years, but it does remove the claim of special standing Hoity-Toity
might otherwise invoke to challenge P by virtue of his subjective experiences,
capacities, or baselines.
By committing the crime, Hoity-Toity at the very least took the risk that
punishment will be tougher for him than others. The more the state calibrates
punishment based on idiosyncratic features of the offender, the further it gets
away from the equality ideal that should govern punishment. The subjectivists,
by contrast, would allow the offender to call the shots, in a significant way,
about how much he will be punished. But that is not his choice. His choice was
his criminality, not his punishment. 265
D. Dignity and Sadism
The argument against tailoring punishment to subjective experience and
capacity has another philosophical source: a concern with the dignity of the
offender. This point is partially conceptual and partially practical. The CCR
respects the dignity of the offender by holding her responsible and accountable
for her free choice to do wrong; it respects that choice by taking it seriously and
then condemning it. Retributive punishment addresses the crime, not as a
random act by a physical being, but as a freely willed choice by an autonomous
agent. It was in this connection that Herbert Morris, and before him, Hegel,
famously adverted to the right to be punished for violating the law. 266
But there is also a practical concern with the offender’s dignity that drives
the CCR’s emphasis on equality or evenhandedness in punishment. An intimate
concern with how much an offender suffers and, more to the point, that he
suffer a precise amount, could easily tend towards sadism. As we learned
(again) from the Abu Ghraib incident, prisons and other detention facilities can
easily slide into breeding grounds for sadism. 267 When this occurs, prison
guards and wardens adopt a condescending attitude toward their wards,

264. Or so we will assume here. Our interlocutors do not take up this issue, so we will
assume that the criminal offenses leading to punishment required some voluntary action and
culpable state of mind.
265. Of course, there are limits to what punishment offenders can be subject to, even when
they have chosen their crime. These limits include, among other things, those we have already
discussed previously in this article.
266. Morris, supra note 54, at 486.
267. Cf. Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil
30ff & 352 (2007) (describing the infamous “Stanford Prison Experiment,” where individuals
role-played as prisoner guards and inmates; invariably, the “guards” became brutal and abusive to
the “inmates”).
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permitting themselves to be cruel to inmates because “they deserve to
suffer.” 268 Happily, not all prisons are run in such a fashion. 269 But consider
how much this sadistic tendency would be reinforced if the mandate from the
criminal justice system were to be harder on Insensitive because he tends to
adapt to prison more easily. There is a certain, often unrecognized, good in
forbearing from calibration so that penal institutions do not become too
intimately concerned with apportioning the right amount of suffering for each
offender. That is not their purpose. 270 Indeed, too much emphasis on making
the offender suffer just the right amount starts to make punishment look less
like retribution and more like a personalized vendetta—again showing the deep
similarity between hot revenge and the subjectivists’ account of punishment. 271
Orwell highlighted this problem at the end of 1984, where O’Brien exploits
Winston’s fear of rats: O’Brien seems to take delight in finding the exact thing
that he knows will cause Winston to suffer. 272 At the end of the day,
subjectivists have little to prevent the O’Briens from appearing in every case
where state—or, for some subjectivists, private—agents feel empowered to
mete out global desert judgments.
To be sure, overreliance on incarceration as a penal technique may be
averting our eyes from the moral costs of our penality because offenders who
are out of our sights are also more easily out of our minds. 273 But the risk with
subjectivist tailoring is our becoming too intimately involved with ensuring an
offender is suffering to the right degree. The CCR abjures this meddling; if, at
the conclusion of his prescribed sentence, the offender rejects the state’s
message, the state cannot keep him past his term of years in an attempt to
continue driving the message home to him.
Moreover, punishment focused on causing a certain subjective reaction or
experience, sadly, aims not to communicate to the offender, but to make him
feel something. If we must tailor to ensure that the prisoner really “feels” it,
then this is bad news: this is not only unhealthy for officials, who administer

268. Cf. Lawrence H. Davis, They Deserve to Suffer, 32 Analysis 136 (1972).
269. Cf. Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 137, at ch. 3.
270. Here we might usefully examine the policy of Captain Frank Townshend, as reported
by Robert Blecker:
[Inside Lorton Central Prison] a man’s crime is virtually ignored. Officers routinely
deny that they treat a prisoner with an eye to his record, to his crime, to his “evil”
choice that brought him to prison. Captain Frank Townshend . . . insisted that he never
looks at a man’s record when he deals with him lest he be “prejudiced. Everyone is
entitled to the same treatment here, regardless of what they did to get here. What a man
is in here for is not our concern.”
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment
Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149, 1171 (1990).
271. To be clear, we do not think that any subjectivists of the sort we engage would
necessarily endorse this result. We only flag it as a risk that seems more likely to arise with
subjectivist accounts of punishment than with other ones.
272. Orwell, 1984, supra note 238, at 283.
273. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 213.
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the punishment and must therefore take a keen interest in what each offender
“feels,” but also for the offender herself, who has no choice but to suffer as
much as it takes for her to experience the “right” amount of suffering. By
contrast, the CCR sends the offender a message through its punishment, but
then leaves the offender free to reject that message. Subjectivism takes away
that freedom, and with it, some of the offender’s dignity.
E. Communication and Culpability
This interest in protecting the offender’s dignity—even his ability to reject
the message society is trying to send him via punishment—enables us to
answer what may be a residual doubt about the CCR’s response to the
subjectivists: whether the CCR’s goal of communication requires attention to a
subjective aspect of punishment, namely, whether the offender actually
internalizes and lives the message that the state is trying to communicate
through its hard treatment and adjudication of guilt. 274 If so, would people who
get the message right away (perhaps the genuinely remorseful) need less severe
punishment, while others who resist the message (perhaps the genuinely
defiant) need exposure to harsher treatment for longer periods of time? On that
view, the state would in fact need to tailor punishments, not in the interest of
getting people to suffer a negative experience equally, but rather in the interest
of ensuring that every offender internalized the message eventually.
This potential subjectivist objection to the communicative aspect of
retributive punishment, while superficially tempting, is predicated on a
misunderstanding of the CCR’s aim qua communication. Our goal as
retributivists is for the state to make its best reasonable effort to communicate a
particular kind of message. Part II explained why that is our goal, and why that
goal is achieved through retribution against persons determined to be guilty.
Importantly, our goal is not to maximize the involuntary internalization of the
message and the values underlying that message; indeed, such a goal, which
could hypothetically be administered by a little pill or a “negative experience
machine,” would be an instrumental and therefore non-retributive way of
thinking about punishment.
In this regard, it might be helpful to think back to Part II.A.2, where we
explained why, under the equality banner, even the remorseful offender
warrants punishment. Punishment is an important communication device by
274. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 208 & n.71 (“Those punished by
disapproval are not successfully punished unless they are at least aware of their community’s
disapproval. Furthermore, the extent to which they are punished will vary based on their different
reactions to expressions of disapproval. Some are prone to react strongly to feelings of shame,
while others are not.”). Again, it bears repeating that the offender who is incapable of receiving
any message (because he or she is incompetent) is not a fit subject for punishment. Interpreted this
way, we have no quarrel with Kolber’s claim that successful punishment requires that the offender
be “aware” of his punishment, or more precisely, that he or she be capable of rationally
understanding it as a punishment for a prior crime.
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which we signal our condemnation and its relative severity. We explained that
an offender’s demonstration of remorse immediately after criminal misconduct
is not a basis for relieving the state of its positive reason for retributive
punishment. Holding the offender responsible through the ordinary measure of
punishment for the offense effectuates the idea of equal liberty under law. On
this view, it is not redundant to punish the remorseful offender. To grant relief
of punishment on the basis of contrition alone is to grant special favors, such
that one can act unlawfully without the repercussions that the state threatened
to apply to all. Granting such a request for leniency disrupts the idea that
retributive justice helps maintain a regime of equal liberty under law. Indeed,
the offender better manifests his remorsefulness by willingly undergoing the
state-authorized punishment reasonably imposed on similarly situated
offenders. 275
Conversely, and following on the point we made in the previous section,
the defiant person who rejects the values underlying the communicative
punishment is not to be punished longer than ordinary. Doing so would
undermine the retributivist emphasis on both equality before the law in the
realm of punishment and fair notice with reasonable specificity as to the state’s
responses to particular offenses. Through democratic institutions, society
announces the appropriate punishment range for each offense; offenders who
have committed that crime must receive a punishment within that range. 276 If,
for subjectivist reasons, one wanted to punish above that range, that would be
to fail to communicate what society has decided to communicate: that this
crime, looking at the nature of the wrong and the culpability and perhaps criminal history of the offender, is deserving of this range—and not a higher one or
lower one—of punishments. An offender who commits a crime is reasonably
on notice, not that he will be punished for however many years it takes for him
to understand the message, but that he will be punished for his wrongs in

275. If the punishment is designed to perform communicative work, then whatever
apparent “internalization” that happens prior to the completion of the punishment cannot be relied
upon as an aspect of intentional punishment. That is logically no different than Nozick’s example
of the murderer in the canyon killed by the avalanche accidentally started by a witness to the
murder. Nozick, supra note 26, at 376. The death of the murderer in that situation is not a form of
state retribution. The situation in prison (or death row) is only different in that there has been an
adjudication that involves some judgment of guilt. But there has not yet been the completed
punishment called for by the legislature in conjunction with the court. Because the state’s
intentions have to line up with its causal actions to convey the correct social meaning, it cannot
use the defendant’s post-conviction but pre-punishment completion attitude as evidence of the
success of the communicative punishment; after all, the punishment intended to be used as a
communicative device has not yet been fully imposed and completed.
276. For what it is worth, we think that range should be relatively narrow because of our
fear that broad ranges, coupled with unchecked discretion, will create various Type I and Type II
errors compared to other offenders, for reasons that might be random, arbitrary, or discriminatory,
and thus also in violation of certain constitutional norms. See generally Dan Markel, Luck or
Law? The Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate Sentencing (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with authors).
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accordance with society’s fair and best understanding of how severe that
offense is, as reflected in a discrete and relatively narrow punishment range. 277
Even when the defiant offender rejects the message undergirding
retributive punishment, the state should not punish him more for that fact alone
because doing so would violate both the fair notice and the equality
commitments. Nor should the polity seek to brainwash the offender or torture
him into submission. Rather, society announces its standards, enforces them,
and then the offender is free. He can choose not to agree with the state’s
message. The polity may regret this result, but to do more to achieve
involuntary internalization of the values animating retributive punishment
would be contrary to an adequate respect for the dignity of the offender, which
includes the ability to dissent, even from a just and justly administered
punishment.
CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF PUNISHMENT REVISITED
Earlier in this Article, we discussed Professor Kolber’s example of
“truncation” as a way of explaining his subjective theory of punishment. 278 In
the same piece, Kolber discusses the example of “boxing.” 279 Suppose, he says,
that an offender is put into a box for his punishment. 280 The trouble is, the
boxes are all of uniform dimensions: the tall offender, no less than the short
offender, has to fit into the same box. 281 Surely, Kolber reasons, the tall and
short offender are being punished differently. 282 The tall offender, who has to
squeeze his way into the punishment box, is being punished more than the short
offender, who enters easily and perhaps can even stand. How could it possibly
be the case that retributivists speak of “the same” or “proportionate”
punishment for both of them, if both have committed the same crime but
experience the punishment so differently? Kolber’s truncation example makes
the same point, although much more graphically; wealth-setting, discussed
earlier too, is one more example. 283
Needless to say, the state would not employ fanciful punishments like
truncation or wealth-setting in part because they could be predicted to fail to
register as punishments ex ante against short or poor people, respectively.
Kolber does not mean to suggest them as examples of punishments that the

277. But see supra note 261. To be sure, we have been assuming throughout that society
can plausibly establish a reprehensibility scale that reflects severity of the offense, criminal
history, and other related sentencing factors, and then match that scale to a different scale
encompassing and ranking various punishment options.
278. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 188; see supra notes 39–40 and
accompanying text.
279. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 235.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

MarkelFlandersBOS Final wth abstract and toc (Do Not Delete)

2010]

BENTHAM ON STILTS

1/22/2011 9:59 PM

987

state should adopt. He raises them only to prove his point, which is that
punishment must be thought of as subjective.
In our view, aside from consulting subjectivity to determine whether the
offender is incompetent or ineligible based on other medical conditions, or
whether he is being broken by the punishment because of its cruelty as applied
to him, we find it difficult to embrace the idea that considerations of
subjectivity should play much of a role within a retributive conception of
punishment. Various state-imposed condemnatory sanctions—fines, restrictions
on where and how one can move or live in particular ways—these can largely
be measured in terms of length or amounts that are relatively objective; the
amount imposed need not vary based on a particular person’s reaction to the
deprivation. This is important. After all, from the perspective of the CCR, the
punishments (and the institutions) we would endorse are not meant simply to
cause a specific number of disutils of pain or displeasure.
As long as persons are sufficiently competent to understand what is at
stake with punishment, then it is clear what they will miss if they are in prison.
They will miss their autonomy. They will miss their ability to take a walk when
they want to or simply to go outside and breathe in the open air. They will miss
being free to see their family and friends on a regular basis, whenever they are
able and choose to. Even a loner, who may not desire regular contact with
others, will find it hard to feel truly “alone” in prison. These things are not too
different from person to person, regardless of wealth or social status. Thus, we
do not think there is much point in debating how, given an inmate’s cell size,
he might be able to do more or less—like “trac[ing] the contours of a . . .
squash court” in a large cell, or “climb[ing] up the walls” in a small cell. 284
To be sure, and as we have said, the state must factor in considerations of
non-humiliation and simple humanity when designing punishments; it can
deprive certain liberty or property rights but it may not eliminate all care for
basic human needs and dignity. And so, if a state legislature decided to give
longer beds and longer pants to taller people, and shorter beds and pants to
smaller people, then that would be fine with us as long as the rationales for
such determinations were made publicly, in advance, and administered fairly; it
would not be much different than scaling fines to objective metrics of wealth or
income, which we would also support. But such alterations, it bears
mentioning, are not subjective in nature because there would not be any need,
or desire, to consult offenders’ individual reactions or past baselines to ensure
the retributive goals were met. Instead, they are variations based on human
needs the state must consider to carry its “carceral burden.” They are not
responses to the chosen tastes and preferences of offenders.
By emphasizing this set of norms for punishment, the CCR reinforces
people’s sense as equals: everyone is equally responsible for his choice and
284.

Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 206–07.
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equally in need of condemnation if his choices are criminal ones. While the
subjectivists’ general claims about the boundaries of punishment are
instructive, their more particular claims on behalf of radically individualized
calibration are distractions from the difficult tasks involved in creating a just
legal order. We hope that our account here, while critical, also proves
constructive, lending promise to that vision and that enduring task.

